Socio-political aspects of higher education and knowledge production : the case of university rankings by Dmitrishin, Alexander
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca
Lucca, Italy
Socio-Political Aspects of Higher Education and Knowledge
Production: The Case of University Rankings
PhD Program in Political Systems and Institutional Change
XXIV Cycle
by
Alexander Dmitrishin
2013

The dissertation of Alexander Dmitrishin is approved.
Program Coordinator: Prof. Giovanni Orsina, LUISS Guido
Carli.
Supervisor: Prof. Giliberto Capano, University of Bologna
Tutor: Dr. Antonio Masala, IMT Institute for Advanced
Studies, Lucca
The dissertation of Alexander Dmitrishin has been reviewed
by:
Prof. Marvin Lazerson, University of Pennsylvania; Central
European University.
Prof. Ildiko Hrubos, Corvinus University of Budapest.
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca
2013

5Table of Contents:
Abstract…………………………………………………………….7
Introduction……………………………………………………….8
Chapter 1. Academic Rankings and Higher Education:
Background, Literature Review, and Research
Outline..…………………………………………………………..14
1.1. Higher Education and the European University…......…14
1.2. Research on University Rankings: Literature Review….22
1.3. Identifying the Problem: Structure and Methodology of
the Research……………......……………………….…………....42
Chapter 2. History and Methodology of Rankings in Higher
Education and Research………………………………………...54
2.1. History and Context of Global Ranking Systems……….54
2.2. Methodology of main ranking systems…………………..70
2.3. Auxiliary academic rankings……………………………....86
Chapter 3. University Rankings and Incentives: Theoretical
and Empirical Investigation…………………………………...103
3.1. Benefits of Performing in University Rankings………...103
3. 2. Policy Incentives of University Rankings………………105
3. 3. Institutional Incentives of University Rankings……….117
63. 4. Individual Incentives of University Rankings………....128
3.5. Schemes and Models……………………………………....137
3.6. Empirical Testing………………………………………….149
Chapter 4. Beyond Academic Rankings………………….….156
4.1. Wider Implications and the Future of Rankings….........156
4.2. Rhetoric of Academic Rankings………………………….170
4.3. Prognosis of Trends in Global Academia..………...……182
Conclusion………………..……………………………………..197
Appendix 1. The Surveys…………...…………………............203
Appendix 2. The Empirical Data.................................………..209
Appendix 3. The List of Surveyed HEIs……..……………....215
Bibliography………………………...…………………………..217
7Abstract
The dissertation deals with the topic of academic rankings.
Unlike other works in the field, it analyses the rankings as a
part of the academic knowledge production system. The main
question of the dissertation is how the emergence of various
measurement systems, including the rankings, influenced the
global academia.
The impact of academic rankings is studied through the prism
of incentives that the rankings produce on various levels. The
three levels that are studied in the dissertation are policy,
institutional, and individual level.
The research shows a considerable skew that the rankings
introduce into the academic system. On the policy level the
rankings promote institutional mergers, re-distribution of
resources in favor of more influential institutions, and priority
funding of STEM disciplines. On the institutional level, the
rankings lead to gradual separation of teaching and research,
better funding of STEM departments, faculty head-hunting.
On the individual level, the rankings promote prioritization
of certain research topics and marginalization of other topics,
quantitative tilt, and investment into development of research
rather than teaching skills.
In addition to the aforementioned impacts, the rankings have
an impact on a whole set of sociological issues, such as power
and rhetoric in global academia. Taken together these trends
change the traditional features of the academic system and
push it into a certain direction. To a large extent this direction
is determined by the logic of the market.
8Introduction
The idea for this research was conceived in somewhat
unusual way. The first concept of the thesis came from a
research into dependency and world system theories. While
the theories alleged that there exists an unfair system of
international economics relations, none of them explained
how this unfair system manages to persist despite an unfair
treatment of developing countries. The question thus born
was how certain social paradigms entrench and maintain
themselves in the global discourse.
The question of paradigms led to investigation into the
sources of social discourse production. A suggestion of a
colleague from a history institute in Spain was to turn the
question upside down. Instead of looking at the social
paradigm creation from the macro-level of competing ideas,
the suggestion was to look at this issue from the micro-level
of idea creation. Since the most influential discursive
paradigms were created within the academia, it was
reasonable to study the system of higher education and
research. Within the academia there seemed to exist an
informal hierarchy of domains that contributed the most to
the formation of social paradigms. The most influential
disciplinary domains were those that created ideas easily
convertible into policies. At the time, economics was by far
the most influential of these disciplinary domains.
The shell of the dependency theory eventually came off. Three
things came together at that point of time: a long standing
interest in higher education issues, knowledge production,
and history of social ideas. In higher education, one of the
9most interesting issues was inconsistent performance of
higher education institutions in the global university
rankings. Some universities that seemed to be well esteemed
did not place that well in the rankings, while other, less
esteemed universities, fared surprisingly well. In the area of
knowledge production, some research methodologies seemed
to be more welcome than the others. In the area of social
ideas, certain ideas came to gain acceptance while others
marginalized without the obvious connection to their intrinsic
merits. Eventually, an intuition emerged that all of these
questions are a part of a bigger puzzle, and that they could be
answered within the borders of one research.
The shape that the project acquired was to investigate socio-
political influences on higher education and knowledge
production through the prism of global university rankings.
The rankings here served as a case study to answer various
questions. Why higher education institutions that produce
certain sort of research tend to place lower in the rankings
regardless of their productivity? Does the social system
privilege some forms of knowledge over others? Are there
mechanisms to encourage choices of research valuable for the
social system on various levels?
To answer these questions a complex research agenda was
devised. It included investigation of the rankings, but also
their functions in the wider system of higher education and
knowledge production. The research was structured along
these axes. Each chapter, thus, serves a particular purpose.
Together the chapters combine into an investigation of how
academic rankings impact higher education, and how this
inputs into the changing directions of higher education and
knowledge production.
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The first chapter provides the overview of the evolution of
higher education system in Europe, with particular emphasis
on the European university. This is done in order to identify
the development of the contours of the contemporary higher
education system, and it involved a historical research into
the development of institutionalized knowledge production
in Europe and social interests that accompanied this process.
It is suggested that the European knowledge production has
always been subjected to strict social controls. Although,
direct checks on the higher education system were eliminated,
the market overtook the regulatory function.
In the rest of the chapter, the main pillars of institutionalized
knowledge production are identified as a prelude to the
investigation of the rankings. The two later sections deal with
existing research on academic rankings, and with a detailed
explanation of the dissertation’s structure and methods. The
gaps in the existing research on rankings are identified, and
the main objectives of the dissertation are explained in great
detail.
The second chapter of the research deals with the emergence
of the academic measurements. It surveys the history and
methodology of academic rankings. As the research into the
university rankings proceeded, there was an intuition to look
into auxiliary systems of measurements. That is the rankings
of journals and rankings of individual researchers. This
intuition proved to be quite important. Various types of
rankings turned out to be connected in multiple ways. Their
mapping allowed for deeper insights into how the system of
academic measurements, of which various academic rankings
are related elements, works and steers the knowledge
production system.
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The chapter is the first original contribution of the
dissertation. Unlike the previous works, the dissertation made
an attempt to look at seemingly unrelated academic rankings
as a part of a bigger system. It allowed identifying common
trends in the system of academic measurements. These trends
translate into a very peculiar set of incentives that affect the
system of higher education and knowledge production in
significant way.
The third chapter is the crux of the dissertation. It builds upon
the theoretical understanding of the ranking trends identified
in the previous chapter. In particular, it deals with behavioral
incentives that rankings create on every level of higher
education and research production. These incentives emerge
out of concrete benefits involved in complying with the logic
of academic rankings.
Three principal levels of the incentives are identified here:
policy level, institutional level, and personal level. Each of
these levels is connected to the next one. Priority government
funding of particular disciplines promotes strengthening of
corresponding departments on institutional level. The
strengthening of the departments changes preferences of
student and researcher applicants. Such connections are
ubiquitous for widely divergent academic issues. Together
these incentive levels combine into pushing the system of
higher education and knowledge production in a particular
direction.
The main achievement of the dissertation is that it makes the
relationship between these levels explicit as a part of wider
academic system. The original contribution of the dissertation
is investigation of micro-impacts of incentives that the
rankings create on the various levels of knowledge
12
production system. Although the research also makes
considerable contributions to the study of macro-impacts that
the rankings have, investigation of the micro-impacts is
principally novel and has never been conducted before.
To analyze the micro-impacts of academic rankings, the
research uses an original methodological frame. Game
theoretical modeling is used to show how ranking incentives
converge to marginalize minor research fields. The case for
the model is heterodox economics. The conclusion is that,
even assuming perfect ideological neutrality, there is a large
disincentive to pursue heterodox economics research for
graduate students. Abstracted from this concrete case, the
conclusion of the chapter is that the rankings create incentives
for maintaining and reinforcing dominant research paradigms
and against developing marginal theoretical domains. This
situation is quite dangerous in that it undermines any
challenge to dominant discursive paradigms and may lead to
ossification of the knowledge production system in the
absence of healthy competition.
Finally, the fourth chapter of the dissertation deals with
implication of the incentives that academic rankings create for
the present and future of the academic system. A step back is
taken here to look at the general picture. The chapter deals
with the prognosis of trends in the academic system. It also
identifies discursive impacts of academic ranking, and it
shows how the rankings impact the main pillars on which the
academic system rested before. The last chapter mirrors the
first chapter in that it returns the more detailed discussion of
the previous chapters into the discussion of more general
trends that the academia has been undergoing recently. The
fourth chapter is the most theoretical in the whole
13
dissertation, and it should be treated as a philosophical
appendix.
Multiple original ideas are elaborated in the chapter.
Although both the rankings development scenarios and the
study of fundamental changes in international academia are
of considerable originality, the most novel part of the chapter
is the discussion of the discursive impacts of the academic
rankings. The section discusses how university rankings
transformed a particular discourse into a concrete set of
incentives, and how the discourse of rankings in general
defines the order of power in the global academia. It is a
sociological chapter, and it provides a set of ideas rather than
a set of answers. However, the ideas presented could be quite
useful for the future research into the wider impact of
academic rankings.
The dissertation concentrated on some less explored issues
surrounding academic rankings. It did not answer all of the
questions concerning the impacts of the rankings on higher
education and knowledge production, and it did not intend
to. However, the dissertations filled some gaps that had been
present in the research on rankings. Furthermore, it led
rankings research into new domains. Some of these steps into
the undiscovered issues of academic rankings had long been
due, while others would come as completely unexpected. In
the process of answering some questions, more new questions
emerged. These questions will be answered in further
research for which this dissertation could serve as a solid
basis. Hopefully, this dissertation will also provide a reading
as exciting as was its writing.
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Chapter 1. Academic Rankings and Higher Education:
Background, Literature Review, and Research Outline.
1.1. Higher Education and the European University.
Higher education in Europe has been confined to the
institution of university from the middle ages. The origins of
the first European universities can be traced back to the
universities of Paris and Bologna. The principal difference
between the universities established in Paris and Bologna was
the issue of corporate control. The University of Paris, which
was established by rogue maîtres of church schools, was
primarily faculty-led. The University of Bologna, established
by students from different parts of Europe, was entirely
student-controlled. This entailed countless differences in the
university organization and administration. After the rise of
modern nation-states the faculty-led model of the university
gradually overtook the student-led one.
Before that moment, however, universities had undergone
centuries of evolution. After the first European universities
emerged, more and more universities arrived on the
continent. The origins of the first universities are dissimilar
although the initial impulse came either from scholars looking
for better fortunes or from political authorities. The first
university of English speaking world – the University of
Oxford (1167 AD) originated from a murky political situation
prohibiting foreigners to attend the University of Paris. Its
famous rival – University of Cambridge (1209 AD) was in
turn the result of a mass exodus of scholars from Oxford due
to a conflict between the townsfolk and the university
scholars.
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The University of Naples had a different origin. It is a prime
example of a university established because of political
reasons. Frederick II decreed to establish a university in
Naples in 1224, as an alternative to the University of Bologna,
which was located in the unfriendly Papal States (Rudy, 1984:
27-28). In medieval Europe university was a matter of
political prestige. In 1348, Charles IV established the
University of Prague – the first university in Central and
Eastern Europe – close to his power seat in Bohemia.
The colonization of Americas brought the export of the
European higher education model overseas. The first
university of Americas – the University of San Marcos was
established in 1551 in what is now Peru by a royal decree of
Charles V. The same year another university – Royal and
Pontifical University of Mexico was founded in North
America. By the end of XVIIth century Europe alone had
more than a hundred universities. The highest concentrations
of universities in XVIIth century can be found in German
territories, Italian lands, France and Spain respectively
(Frijhoff, 1996: 104). By the end of XIXth century there were
hundreds of universities spanning every continent of the
globe, except for Antarctica. The university prevailed as the
dominant institution of higher education and knowledge
production in the world.
Two important developments in the history of the university
can be identified at this stage. The first of these events is the
so-called Recovery of Aristotle – the rediscovery of Aristotle’s
scholarship and its introduction into universities’ curricula. It
was a gradual process spanning both XIIth and XIIIth century
(Dod, 1988: 45-79). Highly rational and naturalistic thought of
Aristotle influenced the direction of scholarly inquiry in
16
medieval universities and undermined traditional educational
orthodoxy (Huff: 185, and 235-236). Theological texts were
now reinterpreted through the prism of naturalistic
philosophy. The way to interpret the world through
naturalistic lenses signified no less than the onset of the
scientific revolution (Grant, 1984: 68-102).
The impact of Aristotle’s thought on the university education
and knowledge production is hard to underestimate. It had
some quite important implications for the university. The first
implication is the emerging idea of the autonomy of scholarly
inquiry which was born out of hard battles waged between
those who wanted to introduce Aristotle to the university and
their conservative opponents (Perry, Chase, Jakob and Jakob,
2008: 261-262).
The second implication concerned a change of universities’
curricula. Previously taught areas of Trivium and
Quadrivium were gradually substituted by a more precise
division of disciplines, based on Aristotle’s classifications
(Huff, 2003: 179-188). It is at this point that instead of teaching
general skills to scholars, the universities start to specialize
their scholars in particular areas of inquiry. Thus, the vision of
“the researcher” can be directly traced to the medieval epoch.
Another watershed moment for the university’s history is the
advent of a new paradigm of higher education in the XIXth
century. This paradigm was based on ideas of Friedrich
Schleiermacher, a German philosopher and theologian, and
Wilhelm von Humboldt, a Prussian minister of education.
They envisioned a model of higher education involving
independence from the state, close interaction between a
student and his tutor, and applied character of the university
education (Fallon, 1980: 10-20).
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Von Humboldt is credited with the further development of
the idea of “academic autonomy” (Scott, 2006: 20).
Humboldtian model of the university was first utilized to
create the University of Berlin in 1810. It was since borrowed
world-wide and influenced the whole system of higher
education and research (Ibid: 22-23). Johns Hopkins
University is one of the first examples of a direct application
of this model in the United States.
The Humboldtian model also affected the way in which
higher education was structured. Instead of direct
transmission of knowledge to students, the model implied a
degree of involvement of the students in the process of
knowledge creation. Instead of teaching, based on pre-
authorized materials, the professor was now supposed to
share results of his research with his students, preparing the
student for an independent knowledge creation. The lecture
as a linear way of knowledge transfer gives way to the
seminars and laboratories. By the end of the XIX century, the
institution of the university becomes the dominant
organization for scientific research (Ruegg, 1996: 3-42).
The university as we know it owes a lot to the Humboldtian
paradigm shift. This shift was directly intertwined with the
ongoing scientific revolution. There is no agreement on the
timeline of the revolution, and some authors are skeptical of
its very existence (Shapin, 1996). However between XIIth and
XIXth centuries there was a profound change in the way the
universe was perceived and studied. At the center of this
change is a new form of empirical inquiry that is known as
“the scientific method.” This method, based on building and
testing hypotheses, firmly established itself in the universities
during the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries and contributed to a
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long-standing association between the university and science
that is still current nowadays.
After the scientific revolution and the advent of the
Humboldtian model, the idea of the university independence
from social and political realities got a firm hold of social
imagination. It is true that unlike many other institutions of
knowledge production, the university was a legally
autonomous corporation. The legal autonomy of the
university, however, does not necessarily translate into
academic autonomy. Restrictions arise from the way socio-
political system works. It is on this level that those critical of
dominant knowledge paradigms are either marginalized or
face outright ban. To illustrate this idea, let us revisit the main
stages in the development of the European university.
The University of Paris, decreed by Philippe August in 1200,
was put under direct authority of the church (Verger, 1995:
13). Its students and professors were treated as clergy; its
organization and curriculum were decreed by papal bulls
(Denifle, Chatelain, 1889: 136-139). The situation of the
University of Bologna, a legal entity since 1158, was
somewhat different. It was however still directly accountable
to the authority of the Church, since it was under direct
jurisdiction of the Papal States. The incorporation of
universities certainly gave them a wider space to maneuver in
the medieval society. Nevertheless they were far from
independent from dominant social and political trends.
An early example of restrictions that medieval universities
were facing is the “Condemnations of 1210-1277”. The
recovery of Aristotle brought to light many ideas
contradicting some of the basic teachings of the Church. As a
reaction the teaching of Aristotle was prohibited at the
19
University of Paris. According to a passage from
Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis “Neither the books of
Aristotle on natural philosophy nor their commentaries are to
be read at Paris in public or secret, and this we forbid under
penalty of excommunication (cited in Thorndike, 1944: 26-
27)”. Thomas Aquinas eventually reconciled the teachings of
Aristotle with the doctrine of the Church, which brought
Aristotle back to medieval universities (Perry, Chase, Jakob
and Jakob, 2008: 261-262).
The age of scientific revolution once again exposed the
conservatism of the universities in Europe. As Richard
Westfall noted “in 1600, the universities gathered within their
walls a group of highly trained intellectuals who were less apt
to welcome the appearance of modern science than to regard
it as a threat both to sound philosophy and to inspired
religion (Westfall, 1977:106).”And this time Aristotelianism
was one of the main obstacles to the acceptance of new ideas.
Ideas of Aristotle fitted well with teachings of the Church.
The geocentric model corresponded to the idea of mankind as
a centerpiece of creation. Alternatives to mainstream theories
were not well taken. Biographies of such figures as Galileo
Galilei evidence clearly to the conservatism of medieval
universities, and their unwillingness to contradict the Church.
According to Westfall “With the exception of some doctors,
virtually none of the leading scientists held university chairs,
and the scientific revolution was created more despite the
universities than because of them (Ibid: 107).” The
traditionalism of the universities led many scholars to
conduct their research in alternative institutions, such as
emerging scientific societies (Ornstein, 1928: 298-304).
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The growth of capitalism and the rise of the nation states
somewhat changed the orientation of the European
universities. With traditional forms of authority displaced, the
university finally got a breath of fresh air. It is at this point of
time, however, that the control over the organization and
content of universities’ teachings was simply passing from
one authority to another. According to Hastings Rashdall
“universities throughout Europe in the course of the fifteenth
century tended in the same direction – towards the
nationalization of Paris as of all other universities (Rashdall,
2010: 553)”. Over the course of XVIIIth and XIXth centuries
universities were gradually integrated into the machinery of
the modern state. New, more sophisticated mechanisms of
control were created to assure the university’s compliance to
dominant socio-political interests.
The state control over universities was exercised through
various means – finances, administration, and certification.
The loss of private financial resources of the universities was
a gradual process extending from the late Middle-Ages to the
XXth century. It involved complete or partial loss of original
endowments that the universities had. According to Paul
Gerbod “In less than a century and a half from the end of the
French Revolution to the beginning of the Second World War
in 1939, almost all university establishments, some earlier and
some more radically than others, reached the stage where
they lost their financial independence (Gerbod, 2004: 84).” As
a result, many nation states started to finance their
universities. The state funding of the university, ironically,
came at a cost.
In the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries, strict administrative
controls were established over universities. Ministries of
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education were set up to oversee learning in general and
higher learning in particular. Appointments of the
university’s administration were now handled by the state
bureaucracy. In some countries even appointments to
professorship became an exclusive domain of the state.
A related mechanism of control was the introduction of
educational standards. They allowed the state to control
smallest aspects of higher education. Students and professors
alike now had to undergo various examinations set in line
with discretions of the state. This involved corresponding
changes of curriculum and internal organization of
universities. John Scott commented on this tendency that “[In
the early modern universities] the newly consolidated state
began to increase visitations, intervention, regulation
(curriculum, subjects taught, and publications allowed), and
appointment of chancellors (Scott, 2006: 10)”.
Where indirect controls did not suffice, nation states could
always resort to their monopoly on violence. Famous
examples of such actions are university purges in France in
the XIXth century, which saw, among others, the dismissals of
Francois Guizot and Victor Cousin (Gerbod, 2004: 97).
Similarly, the Russian tsarist government subjected
universities to occasional purges throughout the XIXth and
the early XXth century (Flynn, 1971: 598-614; Whittacker,
1978: 148-167). In Prussia in 1819 the king issued an order that
individuals posing ideological danger to the state should not
to be tolerated within the universities (Pinkard, 2001: 440).
Gerbod noted in this respect that “State interference in the
functioning of the universities and schools thus intensified.
As a result, university autonomy diminished during the
nineteenth century (Gerbod, 2004: 121).”
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The rise of communism and division of the world in two
political blocs saw an extreme polarization of universities
along ideological lines. The two superpowers ardently battled
“subversive ideas” in their influence zones. Ideologically unfit
university intellectuals were marginalized discriminated or
purged by their respective overseers. Examples here are
numerous in both ideological blocks1.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumph of the
capitalist system once again seemed to grant universities
much coveted academic autonomy. However, this autonomy
was not complete.  The modern states were crumbling piece
by piece under the onslaught of free-market, which, like a
large black hole sucked every social relation in its orbit. It is
the workings of the market that determines to a large extent
the direction of the university today. The issue of university
rankings illustrates this situation quite well.
1.2. Research on University Rankings: Literature Review.
The topic of academic rankings is becoming more and more
prominent in higher education discourse.  Few have not
heard about the rankings or have not commented on the
topic. Numerous articles have been dedicated to the issue.
Plethora of conferences, round tables, and workshops are
organized to discuss university rankings annually. The issue
of rankings received so much attention that it is now
monitored by a non-governmental organization2. A whole
1 See Ellen Schreker’s research on effects of McCarthyism on United States’
universities (Schrecker, 1986) or John Connely’s account of purges in Eastern
Block Universities (Connelly, 2000).
2 See, for instance IREG Observatory that was created with a specific goal of
monitoring ranking systems (http://www.ireg-observatory.org/).
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business industry has been gradually forming around the
rankings.
Despite a constant surge of interest in academic rankings, the
main focus of various parties is on scope and method of
academic rankings. Very few issues are being considered
beyond that focus. Hence, academic rankings are often treated
in isolation from the system that they attempt to measure. Yet,
they are an inherent part of the academic system, and they
influence directions of its development.
Similarly, agendas that are pursued in the research on
rankings are usually quite narrow. A multitude of works have
been dedicated to the analysis of history, methodology, and
policy impacts of academic rankings. Much fewer works
analyze rankings as a part of the system of knowledge
production. This situation is likely due to the fact that,
although numerous articles are published each year, there are
but a handful of comprehensive works of sufficient length to
analyze ranking issues in their proper context. In the
following part of this section, the principal works that have
shaped academic discourse on the international university
rankings are reviewed.
Two main groups of works could be distinguished in the field
of rankings research. The first group comprises works that
provide multidimensional analyses of university rankings.
Most of these books are nothing more than collections of
articles by different authors. There are only few single-author
books in the field. The second group of works comprises
articles dedicated to the analysis of separate aspects of
rankings, ranking methodologies, their advantages and faults.
Most of these works are purely technical, but few do take a
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closer look on implications of ranking methods for the global
academic system.
One of the most thorough works that provides a
comprehensive overview of university ranking systems is the
report Global University Rankings and their Impact
(Rauhvargers, 2011). The report was written by Andrejs
Rauhvargers, senior adviser to the European University
Association (EUA). It provides a thorough analysis of
principal ranking systems, their potential implications, and
their problems. Rauhvargers’s report includes five main
sections: introduction, ranking methodologies, analysis of
results, conclusions, and guidance to interpreting ranking
results. To date it is one of most important reference points in
rankings research. The reason for the work’s reference value
is that, despite not offering much new information on
implications of rankings, it integrates insights from various
sources into one of the most complete overviews of global
university rankings.
Rauhvargers’s report is focused primarily on institutional
rankings. The work does not provide analysis of auxiliary
rankings – rankings of research productivity, or academic
periodicals. The overview of rankings’ methodologies and
rankings’ flaws is fairly standard. However, the analysis of
implications of international ranking systems is quite
interesting. In this respect, one of the most trenchant sections
of the report is its concluding part, where the actual analysis
of results is made. There are a number of important points in
the conclusion, dealing with research missions of the
universities, rankings biases, and rankings implications.
The main focus of Rauhvargers’s report is on institutional and
policy impacts of ranking systems. The bias towards natural
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sciences is identified, including criticism of field
normalization techniques and impact factor problems. Other
problems that are discussed in the report include peer-review,
language and regional bias. More relevant to this dissertation,
however, is the attempt of the report to analyze distortions
that rankings produce on institutional level. The analysis is
done in a perfunctory manner, as the report pursues other
goals.  Three main distortions that are identified by the report
is tilt towards better funding of natural sciences and
medicine, incentives to tinker with the submitted data, and
possible attempts to attract Nobel Prize winners. Rauhvargers
does not go into as much detail on these categories as it is
done in this dissertation. Furthermore, he does not provide
any analyses on how rankings may impact individual
incentives.
The popularity of the Rauhvargers’s report prompted the
author to issue the second version of the report (Rauhvargers,
2013) “with the intention of documenting the new
developments that have taken place since 2011 (Ibid: 6).” The
report, originally intended as a short addition to the first part,
analyzes evolution of main ranking systems over the last
years and provides an important perspective on policy
responses and institutional strategies produced by the
rankings. It is this latter part of the report that is of particular
relevance to our work.
The new report consists of two parts. The first part lists recent
changes in various ranking systems. An important addition to
the report is an analysis of new developments in the ranking
audit, particularly in regards to The International Ranking
Expert Group (IREG). Additionally, the first part analyzes the
main trends of the rankings and their policy impacts. These
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latter sections are very interesting as they somewhat intersect
with certain parts of our analysis. The second part of the
report is more technical and concerns analysis of new players
in the ranking business, as well as detailed analysis of
updates to principal ranking methodologies.
As has already been mentioned, the ranking trends and policy
impacts identified by Rauhvargers are especially relevant to
our research. Among the trends of the university rankings,
Rauhvargers lists focus on elite universities, neglect of
humanities and social sciences, inadequate description of
methodology and poor indicators, English language bias, and
consolidation of ranking systems (Rauhvargers, 2013: 17-21).
While some of these points are debatable, the others have
already become well-established elements of the rankings
discourse.
A more interesting part of the Rauhvargers’ report concerns
the impact of rankings. Rauhvargers notes that qualification
recognition, eligibility of partner institutions for cooperation
agreements, and mergers proliferation as some of the
important policy effects that rankings have (Ibid: 21-26). Of
these, only proliferation of mergers is directly related to our
research and the author does not dwell on this issue much.
Rauhvargers also analyses institutional responses to rankings.
The two most important points that he makes are that global
universities use rankings for strategic planning and that the
universities adjust their strategies to suit the main ranking
indicators (Ibid: 25). This directly supports the point that the
rankings determine choices on the institutional level,
elaborated in the latter parts of this dissertation.
Ellen Hazelkorn’s book Rankings and Reshaping of Higher
Education: The Battle for World Class Excellence (Hazelkorn,
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2011) is one of very few comprehensive works dedicated to
the analysis of rankings’ impact on the international higher
education. Unlike other analyses of global university
rankings, which are often concentrated on immediate
advantages and disadvantages of various rankings,
Hazelkorn’s account goes further to analyze implications of
rankings for the future of higher education industry. She
conducted numerous surveys and interviews with principal
stakeholders in higher education sector, including students,
government officials, funding agencies etc. Most important
for this dissertation is that Hazelkorn’s book provides a
detailed analysis of institutional responses to incentives that
academic rankings create.
The book consists of six chapters. The first chapter
“Globalization and Reputation Race” provides an excellent
overview of relations between globalization pressures and
rising market competitiveness in higher education sector.
This, according to Hazelkorn, is a function of three main
factors. First, the narrative of the knowledge society
established knowledge as a cornerstone of modern economy
(Hazelkorn, 2011: 6). The second factor concerns competition
for qualified professionals as an essential component of the
success in the knowledge economy (Ibid: 7-8). Hazelkorn
avers that the changing perspectives on higher education
placed the sector at the core of attempts to build productive
economy (Ibid: 8). Finally, she states that growing demands of
higher education consumers practically pushed the system
towards simple comparative measurements (Ibid: 9-10).
In the second chapter, Hazelkorn explains how rankings
measure higher education institution’s performance and how
measurement proxies work. She provides detailed analyses of
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rankings’ methodologies and indicators. This is mostly a
technical chapter, a prelude to the rest of the work. The third
chapter provides a background for the next two chapters. It
argues that rankings impact student and policy choices.
Hazelkorn finds that institutions, as well as students are
generally well aware of the rankings. Students may use them
in choosing a suitable program, while institutions observe the
rankings as influencing potential funding, accreditation and
collaboration decisions (Ibid: 82-120). In the chapter
Hazelkorn also identifies key stakeholders of the HE sector
and researches their attitude towards the rankings.
Chapters four and five of the Hazelkorn’s book develops her
research on impacts of rankings on the student’s choice and
HE policy making. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the
student choice. The empirical part of the chapter is based on
interviews with international students. She finds that many
students’ choices are affected by the reputation of the
prospective institutions. The reputation is in turn partly based
on the position of an institution in domestic and international
rankings (Ibid: 121-153). She also notes a constant increase in
the influence of rankings on student choices over the last
years (Ibid: 150). Similarly, in the fifth chapter Hazelkorn
analyses impacts of rankings on policy choice.  She conducts
country by country study and shows importance of
international rankings for policy making. Hazelkorn
distinguishes two models of strategic positions that countries
take in regards to rankings. The neo-liberal model aims to
create a handful of research powerhouses, while leaving
teaching and locally important research to less important
universities (Ibid: 185). The social-democratic model aims to
promote diversified system of higher education while keeping
the global focus (Ibid: 185-186). In both cases, ranking have
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contributed to a growing importance of higher education for
the global economic competition.
Finally, in the last chapter of her book, Hazelkorn analyses
how ranking reshape higher education. Higher education
institutions are learning to reap the benefits of their position
or visibility within the rankings. They are restructuring their
organization, strategy, recruitment policy, and pedagogy in
order to improve their position (Ibid: 153-186). The
restructuring trends that Hazelkorn mentions confirm the
idea of this dissertation that institutions factor their ranking
performance into the choices they are making. Hazelkorn
provides a list of effects that rankings have on various
stakeholders of higher education. Some of these effects, such
as “relieve best researchers of teaching,” “increase output,”
and “reward faculty publication in highly-cited journals,” are
quite similar to the impacts that are identified in this work
(Ibid: 202-203).
Hazelkorn’s book is one of the very few attempts to look
beyond the immediate impact of the global academic rankings
on the system of higher education and research. First of all,
the ranking are treated in the context of wider changes in the
higher education system that happened over the last decades.
Second, Hazelkorn actually shows how the rankings could
potentially affect the system of knowledge production as a
whole. In this respect, the book of Ellen Hazelkorn comes the
closest to the purpose of this dissertation’s analysis, albeit
with different focus and conclusions.
Another comprehensive work on rankings is University
Rankings: Theoretical Basis, Methodology and Impacts on Global
Higher Education, edited by Jung Shin, Robert Toutkoushian,
and Ulrich Teiler (Shin, Toutkoushian, Teiler, 2011). It is the
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first of multi-author works that are reviewed in this section.
The three main chapters of the work are: “Organizational
Effectiveness, Quality, and Rankings,” “Methodological
Issues of University Rankings,” and “Social Impacts of
University Rankings.”
The first part of the work gives a general overview of the
rankings. In the opening section of the work, Shin and
Toutkoushian give a brief overview of problems that the
rankings research deals with. They analyze history and
rationale behind the rankings and their social effects. Among
the problems of the rankings the authors distinguish
emphasis on attracting students, lack of attention to different
universities’ missions, and promotion of particular
disciplines. To rectify the problem the authors suggest
creation of more nuanced rankings in the future (Shin,
Toutkoushian, 2011: 1-16).
Shin also wrote another chapter for the first part. In this
chapter, he claims that although rankings generally
correspond to the logic of measuring organizational
effectiveness “There is no clear evidence that ranking
contributes to institutional quality, while ranking appears to
have many negative effects on higher education institutions
(Shin, 2011: 31)”.
Another interesting chapter of the work is written by Ulrich
Teiler. The chapter takes a critical approach and summarizes
main problems of ranking systems. Teiler concludes that “The
popularity of rankings is not positively related to their
‘quality’ and normative ‘acceptability.’ There is even a “law”
of a negative correlation, namely, the lower the quality and
the more biased the normative basis, the higher the
popularity of a ranking study is likely to be (Teiler, 2011: 67)”.
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The second part of the book deals with ranking
methodologies. Longden reviews ranking indicators and
weights. He claims that ranking methodologies could often be
confusing and cannot really measure complexity of higher
education institutions (Longden, 2011: 73-104). Webber
analyzes faculty productivity, which is quite important for the
arguments of this thesis. In line with our ideas, she finds that
productivity as measured by the amount of publications is the
main quantitative indicator of faculty performance (Webber,
2011: 118). Toutkoushian and Webber aver that measurements
of research performance are still fairly primitive, rely on
hardly reliable mix of indicators, and tend to favor quantity
over quality (Toutkoushian, Weber, 2011: 140-141). Trigwell
draws attention to an almost complete absence of teaching
measurements in the principal ranking systems, which
parallels our conclusions on potential impacts that the
rankings may have on academic profession (Trigwell, 2011:
165-181).
The third part of the book is particularly interesting to this
research, as it analyzes social impacts of university rankings.
Morphew and Swanson point out that the rankings are going
to stay an important part of higher education system. Thus, it
is important to pay attention to them, but without “falling to
their allure” and losing sight of the institutional mission
(Morphew, Swanson, 2011: 196). Arimoto analyzes reactions
in academic profession to university rankings. Her chapter is
quite interesting for our work. It provides insights into
impacts of the rankings on changing system of knowledge
production. Among the most important impacts Arimoto
distinguishes growing importance of research, decline of
teaching, and a tendency to measure academic productivity
exclusively by research (Arimoto, 2011: 229-258). Finally, the
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concluding chapter, authored by Ulrich Teiler is dedicated to
the future of university rankings. He suggests various
possible scenarios in the development of ranking systems.
The important part of one of scenarios is that “if main stream
rankings are biased towards the research functions, there is
potential for serious problems in the quality of teaching and
learning (Teiler, 2011: 264-265).” As it will be demonstrated in
the following chapters, one of the most important impacts of
rankings is precisely the undermining of the university’s
teaching component.
Another collection of works on rankings is The World Class
University and Rankings: Aiming beyond Status (Sadlak, Nian
Cai, 2007), edited by Jan Sadlak and Nian Cai Liu. The work
consists of three parts: “Characteristics and Criteria of the
World-class University,” “Evaluation and Ranking of World-
class Universities,” and “Building a World-class University.”
Only the second part of the collection is applicable to the topic
of the dissertation.
In the second part Jan Sadlak provides the general overview
of connections between the global rankings and the trends
defining higher education in the last years (Sadlak, 2007: 75-
87). The entries of van Raan, Bellon, and Zitt and Fileatreau
discuss methodologies of principal rankings systems. Van
Raan reiterates the point that peer-review is somewhat
unreliable, and simple metrics do not quite represent the
complexity of educational institutions. Bellon draws the
attention to the point that rankings are essentially external to
the institution, and draws a line between internal and external
evaluations. Zitt and Fileatreau point that the ARWU
rankings tend to prioritize larger institutions over smaller
ones. In other words, they show that ARWU is strongly size-
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biased. Finally, the entry by Liu and Ying continues the long
tradition of their other accounts of methodologies and
problems of the ARWU ranking. The rest of the articles
mostly analyze specific rankings and are less relevant to our
research.
Similarly diverse work on the university rankings is
University Rankings, Diversity, and the New Landscape of Higher
Education, edited by Barbara Kehm and Bjorn Stensaker
(Kehn, Stensaker, 2009). The work also includes entries by
multiple authors. The volume is split into two main parts:
“Methodology” and “Implications”.
In the first part, the entries are dedicated to methodologies of
rankings, their uses and misuses. The book provides a
refreshingly critical perspective on the ranking matters.
Proulx, for instance, point out multiple problems of ranking
methodologies, as well as their homogenizing character,
unreliable indicators, and reputational dependency (Proulx,
2009: 35-46). Similarly, Federkeil points to various problems
of reputational rankings. He notes that there is a certain
correlation between reputation of a university and its research
performance; however, in individual cases the correlation
might be quite inaccurate (Federkeil, 2009: 19-34).
The second part of the book is smaller and includes an
analysis of various implications of the global rankings. Simon
Marginson provides an analysis of how university rankings
influence distribution of private and public goods in higher
education. One of his conclusions is that rankings often work
according to their own logic, rather than the logic of the
higher education system (Marginson, 2009: 85-96). The article
of David Dill also points to the increasing tendency of
rankings to be valuable as a tool of prestige, rather than the
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real measurement of the system of knowledge production. In
his opinion, such situation could lead to the higher costs of
education for its consumers and the degradation of rankings
to a sort of simple screening mechanism as universities vie for
dominance in the global system (Dill, 2009: 97-116).
Another notable report on international university ranking is
A World of Difference: A Global Survey of University Ranking and
League Tables by Alex Usher and Massimo Savino (Usher,
Savino, 2006). It is considerably smaller than the previous
works. The report is primarily concerned with methodology
of rankings and consistency of their results. The authors
conclude that “league tables are only in their infancy, and all
of them can clearly benefit from greater analysis of the
assumptions implicit in their own schemes. This is
particularly the case with respect to international league
tables, which, as noted above, have a restricted range of
possible indicators due to the lack of available cross-national
comparative data. To the extent that international ranking
schemes are taking on a quality assurance role in the growing
international student market, this is a matter of no small
import, and suggests that the global higher education
community needs to begin to look at how best to collect and
report data on institutions so as to permit thoughtful and
responsible inter-institutional comparisons (Usher, Savino,
2006: 38)”.
Among the works that treat rankings in passing are Ben
Wildavsky’s influential book The Great Brain Race contains a
chapter dedicated to university rankings (Wildavsky, 2010).
The chapter called “College Rankings go Global” provides
valuable information on issues behind the main university
rankings. In particular, Wildavsky gives a good insider’s
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account on the beginnings of the THE-QS ranking.  The
chapter gives a standard overview of the principal ranking
system’s history, and a passing reference to their
methodology (Ibid: 100-140). Wildavsky also provides an
overview of some of the national responses to the global
rankings. The biggest merit of the chapter, however, is that it
treats international rankings as a reflection of global
competition for talent. “If rankings ultimately spur
universities to improve the quality of the research they
produce, as well as the education their students receive, then
the much-disparaged metrics will have succeeded […] in
providing their very own version of added educational value
(Ibid: 140).”
Jamil Salmi’s work The Challenge of Establishing World Class
Universities is another work that deals with rankings (Salmi,
2010). The book shows connections between the knowledge
society narratives and global rankings. The work treats
rankings in somewhat perfunctory manner as a reflection of
some preexisting excellence. Salmi’s approach in this respect
is very much similar to the organization he represents (The
World Bank). Although Salmi admits “methodological
limitations” of rankings, he states “world-class universities
are recognized in part for their superior outputs. They
produce well-qualified graduates who are in high demand on
the labor market; they conduct leading-edge research
published in top scientific journals; and in the case of science-
and-technology–oriented institutions, they contribute to
technical innovations through patents and licenses (Ibid: 5).”
The work of Salmi goes little further than to imply objective
reality behind the ranking systems, and it does not provide
deep reflections on their possible impact. Yet, it is one of the
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reference points in many other papers dealing with global
rankings.
The technical papers on the issues of rankings are plentiful.
They discuss concrete criteria of various academic rankings.
One of the most notable papers here is “Academic Ranking of
World Universities” written by the creators of the ARWU
ranking Nian Cai Liu and Ying Cheng (Liu, Cheng, 2005). The
paper provides the list of measurement indicators beyond the
ARWU rankings and explains the reasoning behind the choice
of these indicators. It also gives a brief historical overview of
the emergence of ARWU. The paper is especially valuable
because it gives the perspective of the people behind one of
the most important ranking systems.
A paper providing an important critical point on the ARWU
ranking is “Irreproducibility of the Results of the Shanghai
Academic Ranking of World Universities” by Razvan Florian
(Florian, 2007). The paper receives less attention that it
deserves. Yet, it puts forth a claim that the results of the
ARWU ranking are not reproducible independently, based on
the official criteria and the weights assigned to them.
Considering that the paper is methodologically sound, its
claims are a serious challenge to the ARWU ranking.
Anthony van Raan, one of the major critics of the ARWU
rankings, published an early critical account of the rankings.
In the paper, he pointed both technical and methodological
problems of ARWU. On the list of the problems identified are
non-matching references, institutional discrepancies, biases of
citation databases, and English language bias. Many of the
problems identified in van Raan’s study have also been
mentioned in later papers. The paper caused a fervent
exchange of opinions when Liu and Cheng pointed out
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inaccuracies in claims made by van Raan (Liu, Cheng, 2005).
This in turn led to van Raan’s publishing a response paper in
which he stood by his most important conclusions
emphasizing, in particular, the problems of citation databases
(van Raan, 2005). He stated that “Bibliometric analysis for
evaluation purposes or for studies of science in general is and
must be much more than just using what is readily available
in databases. This is a crucial element of advanced
bibliometric research, development and practical application
(Ibid: 112).”
Another critical point of view on ARWU is presented in the
paper “Should you believe in the Shanghai ranking?” by Jean-
Charles Billaut, Denis Bouyssou, and Philippe Vincke (Billaut,
Bouyssou, Vincke, 2010). The authors contend that the criteria
of the ARWU rankings “only very loosely connected with
what they intended to capture (Ibid: 249).” In addition, they
point out that the aggregation methodology of the ARWU
ranking is flawed. Although the paper provides a very good
criticism of ARWU, it does not go beyond the disagreement
with the ranking methodology. Since everyone is entitled to
their own opinion, a simple statement that criteria are not
robust enough is hardly a relevant point, considering that Liu
and Chang pre-empted such criticism by stating “Any
ranking is controversial, and no ranking is absolutely
objective (Liu, Chang, 2009: 3).”
Among the various ranking systems THE-QS, which later
evolved into the QS rankings, attracted most criticism by far.
In particular, the system of peer review was heavily criticized
based on its unreliability and fluctuations (see, Ioannidis et
al., 2007). Another often mentioned fault that the QS shares
with ARWU is the reliance on citation databases that due to
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their peculiarities undermine the importance of social sciences
and humanities (Rauhvargers, 2011: 64).
Neither the THE, nor the QS rankings have been analyzed
extensively in a separate account. Most of their
methodological advantages and faults are discussed in
comparative papers contrasting multiple ranking systems.
The relatively greater attention to the ARWU ranking may
have been due to its earlier appearance. The most important
subset of the works on methodology of various ranking, thus,
concerns the works that compare the principal ranking
systems. These works often aim either to claim advantages of
one ranking system over another or to compare their results.
“Comparing University Rankings (Aguillo et al, 2010)” is an
important article on the international rankings. Its results are
interesting in regards to the THE-QS ranking (the predecessor
of the QS ranking). The authors identified that the
reputational rankings tend to bias towards institutions of
certain countries, such as UK and Australia (Ibid: 255). At the
same time they concluded that the THE-QS and ARWU are
surprisingly similar when it concerns citation counts (Ibid).
This point is important as it demonstrates that the research
productivity is often calculated similarly by various rankings.
One of the earlier papers discussing the role of rankings is
“Dilemma of Ranking (2006)” by Philip Altbach. In the article
Altbach made multiple points that are still relevant to the
ranking issues. He pointed the quantity bias of ranking
measures stating that “the number of articles published does
not necessarily relate to the quality or impact of the articles
(Ibid: 2).” Furthermore, he identified natural science bias, lack
of consideration for teaching quality, and the exclusive
orientation of rankings towards research intensive
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universities as the principal problems of main ranking
systems.
Altbach reiterated his position in another article “The
Globalization of College and University Rankings (Altbach,
2012).” He again pointed to the research orientation of
ranking systems and the absence of reasonable teaching
measurement from the university rankings, as well as a
certain dominance of natural sciences. An important point
that Altbach made is that the rankings create new centers and
peripheries. The privileged position of some institutions
could be a result of advantages that have nothing to do with
the institutional quality. For instance, Hong Kong’s tradition
of English language academia, as well as the US and UK
access to global academic networks constitute important
advantages for ranking higher. According to Altbach “while
the barriers between centers and peripheries are more
permeable, they nonetheless remain formidable (Ibid: 30)”.
Ellen Hazelkorn’s paper on “the Impact of Global Rankings
on Higher Education Research and the Production of
Knowledge (Hazelkorn, 2009)” is another important source
for our analysis. Except for already traditional overview of
ranking methodologies and policy responses, Hazelkorn
provides an interesting opinion on how rankings reshape the
system of knowledge production. She distinguishes five main
impacts of rankings. First, there is the focus on narrow
definition of knowledge and scientific disciplines by which
Hazelkorn essentially means limited focus on harder sciences
as indexed by main citation databases. Another impact is
focus on traditional outputs which involves measurement of
quality as defined by narrow academic community rather
than society in general. She mentions “focus on bio-sciences
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and related (sub) disciplines (Ibid: 9),” the category in which
Hazelkorn puts multiple ideas such as head-hunting for
academic scholars, focus on measurable research and research
productivity. This idea somewhat parallels ideas elaborated in
third and fourth chapter of this dissertation. However,
Hazelkorn does not ponder on it in great detail. The issue of
“measuring ‘fundamental’ or ‘basic’ research (Ibid: 10)” refers
to the fact that rankings tend to privilege tangible scientific
research over intangible impact as that of humanities and
creative/cultural industries. Finally, she mentions “Building
World-Class Universities vs. World-Class Systems (Ibid)” as a
tendency to use one set of criteria to measure HEIs with
different roles and functions.
As the discussion above demonstrates there is a large number
of works dedicated to the analysis of rankings. Due to
limitations of space, only perfunctory analysis of the vast
body of articles is presented. However, up to the author’s
knowledge most of the fundamental works to date have been
reviewed above. Despite the vast amount of research
dedicated to analyses of academic rankings, there is a
surprising shortage of substantial works looking beyond the
immediate impacts of rankings. Most works on the topic are
in the form of research articles. These articles by virtue of
their format are unable to delve deeper into the issues
resulting from the immense influence of measurements in
academia. The few books that attempt to investigate impact of
the rankings in greater details do not go into much detail on
wider implications of rankings and measurements.
The main conclusions of various analyses are quite similar.
The same points are repeated by both established researchers
and newcomers to the field. Only some of these researchers
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go further than stating well-known points on wider effects of
rankings and ranking systems. For instance, rankings treat
humanities unfairly. This point has been raised by
Rauhvargers, Hazelkorn, Altbach, and others. However, what
does this situation mean for the future of the academic system
is beyond the scope of most analyses. In the same way, many
researchers have pointed out that rankings best measure
research activities and underplay teaching. Again, how this
situation affects and will possibly affect the academic system
is not elaborated. It is clear that most of the researchers try to
stay away from a speculative analysis of what the future will
bring. However, hypothesizing about prospective impact of
various incentives that rankings introduced to the academic
system is only a logical outcome of the previous analyses.
Furthermore, there is a certain tendency to treat university
rankings apart from other ranking systems. Most of the works
analyze either national and international higher education
institutions rankings or other rankings that in this thesis are
called “auxiliary”. The auxiliary rankings include, for
instance, journal rankings and individual research
productivity rankings (H-Index).  To the knowledge of this
author there are no papers that treat various rankings as
separate instances of a common system of measurements. Yet,
an analysis of auxiliary rankings is necessary to understand
effects of higher education rankings better. One reason for the
analysis is that higher education rankings often take into
account data from the auxiliary rankings. Another reason of
the auxiliary rankings; importance is that understanding
methodology of these rankings is essential in order to
highlight methodological particularities of university
rankings. Finally, a comprehensive picture of the changes that
rankings introduce into the academic system is only possible
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if incentives of both institutional and auxiliary rankings are
taken into account.
Finally, the whole range of literature on the academic
rankings is focused mostly on institutional and policy impacts
of international rankings. Since global rankings measure the
performance of higher education institutions, this approach
seems reasonable. However, this vision is somewhat limited.
The fact that the rankings create certain incentives for
institutions means that they create incentives that permeate
higher education institutions from top to bottom.
If institution participates in the global measurement race, it
has to goad its departments to perform well in this race as
well. This line of reasoning extends further. Institutional
departments also have an incentive to goad their faculty
performing well on particular indicators. Therefore, rankings
pervade all the levels of academic system from education
policy to recruitment decisions of departments. While some
references are made to the impact of rankings on the
individual choices, no systematic investigations have been
done in this direction. The focus of works that actually
investigate impacts of ranking on individual choices is mostly
on student choices, while the impact of rankings on
researcher choices is barely mentioned. This issue also refers
back to the necessity of analyzing institutional rankings
together with auxiliary rankings, which elucidate better the
effects measurements on the individual level.
1.3. Identifying the Problem: Structure and Methodology of
the Research.
In light of the issues mentioned in the previous sections, this
thesis aims to fill the existing gap in the research on academic
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rankings. To fulfill this goal, it is necessary to follow a
multidirectional research agenda. Thus, this research has to
address the following issues: elucidate interrelationships
between the principal institutional and auxiliary rankings,
analyze principal incentives that rankings create on various
levels of academic system and their relationships, and
hypothesize the impact that academic rankings have had and
will have on the transformation of the academic system.
The structure of the thesis is determined by these three goals.
To understand what kind of incentives academic rankings
create on various academic levels, it is necessary first to see
how the principal ranking systems work and how they
interact with various auxiliary rankings. The measurement
methodology of both principal and auxiliary ranking system
should, thus, be explained and analyzed. Once the task is
done, it is possible to proceed to the analysis of various
incentives that the rankings create. The dissertation will recap
main policy and institutional incentives, before proceeding to
outline individual incentives that rankings create. The
relationship between various incentive levels is another
important issue for the present analysis. In the final section of
the dissertation, the impact of the aggregated incentives of the
academic rankings on the direction of knowledge production
is analyzed and discussed.
To fill the aforementioned gaps the dissertation uses a variety
of research methods. These methods include surveys to
gather empirical data, game theory to construct behavioral
models, and a comparative analysis to contrast methodologies
of various rankings systems. The meta-theoretical framework
of the research is rational choice or methodological
individualism. The thesis assumes the importance of
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economic incentives for public, individual, and institutional
choices.
The thesis follows the inverted pyramid model of
organization. This means that it starts with an overview of the
sub-field of our research before proceeding to identify a
research question. The thesis proceeds from general to specific
issues eventually culminating with the elaboration of the
principal questions of our analysis. After the questions have
been tackled, the work returns to more general implications of
our findings. In the concluding chapter the inverted pyramid
is reversed as the work proceeds from analyzing immediate
implications of our finding to the meanings that these
findings have for the sub-field of our research.
It is necessary to explain the structure of this work in relation
to the inverted pyramid scheme identified above. The work
starts with an overview of the evolution of the European
system of higher education and knowledge production
throughout the history. This is the most general part of our
research and its aim is to demonstrate how the main features
of the academia have formed3. The section is important to
demonstrate how the academic rankings challenge the very
pillars on which the European system of knowledge
production has traditionally rested. The section is based
mostly on secondary historical literature, although some
primary sources are occasionally used. Higher education and
knowledge production are two systems that have
traditionally coevolved. The implication of the section is that
these systems have also been influenced by various socio-
political processes.
3 An extended version of the section was also published separately
(Dmitrishin, 2013a).
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The rest of the chapter identifies one process that currently
affects the system of higher education and knowledge
production – the emergence of global university rankings. The
literature review shows the state of research in the field, and
the current chapter outlines the research structure. The goal of
the research is to go beyond the immediate impact of the
rankings and see how the rankings affect knowledge
production as a system. Three main directions of our analysis
are: to identify the interactions between methodologies of
main ranking systems and auxiliary academic rankings; to
show how rankings affect incentives on multiple levels
(individual, institutional, policy), and how the various
incentives levels are connected; and to discern fundamental
impacts that rankings have and will have on international
academia. The next three chapters follow this tri-partite
analysis.
The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of history and
methodology of main ranking systems. The three main
sections of the chapter are: history of ranking systems,
methodology of main ranking systems, and overview of
auxiliary rankings. The section on the history of the ranking
systems is quite useful to set the global rankings in context
and show how their methodologies evolved out of previous
attempts at ranking higher education institutions. The second
section provides analysis of methodologies of the principal
ranking systems: THES, ARWU, and QS. Other ranking
systems are consciously left outside of the analysis. This is
done for two reasons. The first reason is that the three ranking
systems draw the most attention by far. The second reason is
that most university rankings employ a very similar mold of
analysis to the three ranking systems, and thus they are
redundant to the arguments of the thesis. Finally, the third
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section of the second chapter deals with rankings of journals
and individual researchers to show how the major academic
measurement systems are connected.
Although this material is quite well studied, the chapter goes
beyond traditional analyses in that it shows interactions and
fundamental similarity between the principal ranking systems
and auxiliary rankings. The effect that the rankings have on
the system of knowledge production could only be
understood if incentives from various rankings are analyzed
together to provide a complete picture of an incentive
network that the global system of measurements creates. The
results of the chapter are illustrated in the form of a scheme in
the final section.
The primary source of the analysis is the information
provided by the ranking systems themselves, which can be
found on their websites. A significant amount of information
is drawn from various secondary sources. In particular, the
information on methodological problems and tests of the
principal ranking systems is often drawn from various
articles. Similarly, the works of Hazelkorn, Rausvargers, and
others served as a useful reference on methods of various
rankings and their implications. Analytical comparisons
between the ranking systems are done primarily by the
author and constitute one of the original contributions of this
work. The scheme is also made by the author and aims to
provide a succinct overview of the relations between main
rankings, auxiliary rankings, and principal databases on
which the rankings are based.
The third chapter constitutes the theoretical nucleus of our
work. It is the largest chapter by volume, and it presents the
bulk of theoretical contributions that this dissertation makes.
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It is divided in six sections and utilizes various methods to
tackle the impact of rankings on the network of incentives in
the academia. The goal of the chapter is to demonstrate that
the rankings pervade various levels of decision making in the
academia. The combined effect of these incentives
significantly affects the direction of the knowledge production
system.
The first section aggregates evidence that good performance
in the rankings is extremely beneficial for higher educational
institutions and countries where these HEIs are located. The
section aims to demonstrate why there would be any
incentives to perform well in the rankings in the first place.
The reason for these incentives is actual economic benefits
associated with decent performance of national HEIs in
international rankings.
The second section opens the discussion of incentives that
rankings create on various levels. It shows that on the policy
level there are incentives for particular policies to improve the
performance of national higher education institutions in
international rankings. It identifies mergers, new flagship
institutions, excellence initiatives, and better funding of STEM
disciplines as the principal policy responses to the growing
importance of ranking systems. Examples from various
developed and developing countries are used to demonstrate
how these policy responses are implemented in practice. The
discussion of the section is not entirely new. Hazelkorn gave
multiple examples of policy responses on governmental levels
(Hazelkorn, 2011). In our case, however, the focus is mostly
on interactions between policy, institutional, and individual
incentive levels, rather than on measures taken by public
authorities in response to the rankings.
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The third section continues the discussion by showing how
policy incentives shape incentives on the institutional level.
Furthermore, the section discusses incentives peculiar to
institutions participating in the ranking race. An important
idea of the section is that the more an institution is engaged in
the global competition, the more it needs to follow the rules of
the game that the rankings create. The larger contribution of
particular disciplines, methodologies, and types of research
for ranking performance is elucidated in the section. Many
ideas of the section develop a well-known point that global
rankings measure certain fields and research cultures better
than others. Although this idea has long been wandering
around the ranking literature, its implications have not
heretofore been studied in depth. This thesis fills this gap by
providing original insights into the issue.
The fourth section continues the analysis of incentives that the
rankings create. It analyzes micro or individual level
incentives. It is one of the most important contributions of this
research, as except for student choices, the implications of
rankings for individual choices have not been researched as of
yet. The section studies the impact of rankings on individual
behavior through the prism of both institutional and policy
incentives of ranking systems. It demonstrates how multiple
incentive levels interact to determine and guide individual
choices. Except for the common conclusions that rankings
undermine humanities and disturb traditional balance of
teaching and research, the section finds other interesting
implications of the rankings for the system of knowledge
production. In particular, the tendency of rankings to
marginalize minor strands of research is brought to fore. This
process is elaborated on the case of heterodox economics. The
section demonstrates that rankings create a set of incentives to
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select more established research against marginal research
areas. While this does not seem to be an important problem, it
could potentially skew the system of knowledge production
in the direction of low-risk, low-yield research and
discriminate against bolder, riskier, but higher-yield projects.
To demonstrate how this process works in practice, the
section five presents a model where both individual and
institutional incentives are put together. Methods of game
theory are employed to illustrate behavioral choices under the
incentives that global academic rankings create. The model is
based on standard assumptions of rationality of the players,
where aggregate behavior is expected to yield predicted
outcomes. The payoffs are assigned randomly and are based
on the ordinal utility logics. The model attempts to analyze
recruitment choices of junior recruitment committees in
economics when faced with a choice of a candidate working
in mainstream economics strands, and a candidate working in
non-standard (heterodox) economics strands. It is shown that
the committee would prefer the mainstream candidate if the
ranking incentives are taken into account. Although the
section analyzes a very specific case, the logic of this scenario
can be extrapolated onto the larger institutional context. If an
institution or a department wishes to be ranked higher in
international rankings, it is better to opt for more established
research fields. This finding has important implications for
international academia, as it shows a certain skew in the
system of knowledge production. Whether this skew is
introduced by the rankings, or the rankings simply reflect the
preexisting skew is an important question that will have to be
investigated in the future.
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The sixth section of the third chapter is dedicated to the
empirical analysis of the game-theoretical model from the
previous section. To test whether the model could withstand
the reality check, we have conducted a series of surveys
aimed at graduate students in economics and members of
junior recruitment committees. The questions that the surveys
asked were related to the assumptions and conclusions of the
model. Although the assumptions were based on the
information provided in preceding sections, it was important
to see whether the actual situation would correspond to the
predictions of our model.
The surveys were conducted anonymously. Almost three
hundred responses from graduate students were registered.
The surveys aimed at wide geographical audiences. In line
with our assumptions that global higher education
institutions are more eager to participate in the system of
global competition, we had focused mostly on US, European,
and Chinese universities. Admittedly, this constitutes a
certain bias. However, keeping in mind that the majority of
academic research in economics is produced in these regions,
it is reasonable to focus on the regions in the surveys. The
distribution of respondents was equally wide. More than
thirty HEIs were randomly selected from a list of top
economics departments according to the RePEc list4.
The results of the survey largely confirmed the assumptions
of our model. Some discrepancies had to be analyzed and
explained in the section. The overall picture confirms a
selection bias against heterodox economics. How important
this bias is an open question, however. The main implication
4 RePEc/IDEAS, Top 25% Economics Departments,
http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.econdept.html
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of the survey is rather the existence of incentives, realized by
the principal game players, to select against marginal strands
of research, which in future could have detrimental effects on
the system of knowledge production.
Analysis of the possible impacts on the system of knowledge
production is conducted in the fourth chapter of the
dissertation. The chapter is divided into three sections,
reflecting the pyramid structure. It progresses from more
specific effects of rankings on international academia to more
general ones, culminating in an analysis of implications of the
effects identified in the previous chapter for the future of the
European higher education and knowledge production
model. The chapter presents a theoretical discussion and
proposes some scenarios of future directions of the
knowledge production.
The first section of the chapter discusses the problems and
potentials of rankings in relation to the findings of the
previous chapters. The skew in the system of knowledge
production is identified and possible scenarios of the future of
rankings are discussed. The chapter is thus reminiscent of
Teiler’s discussion of the future of the ranking systems (Teiler,
2011). Unlike Teiler, however, the discussion of the section is
rather specific and aims to show how diversification of
ranking systems could possible solve the skew that the system
of knowledge production currently has.
The second section of the chapter is rather more sociological.
It discusses construction of the order of power in international
academia and what it means for the future of knowledge
production. The rhetorical effect of rankings is the issue of
focus in the section. The section describes and dissects the
space of international academic discourse. Multiple ideas here
52
are borrowed from theoretical discourse analysis and
sociology of power. Among the questions that are asked in
the section are: who is allowed to speak in the academia,
whose voice is more important, and how knowledge is
shaped by various rules of discourse.
Finally, the third section of the fourth chapter is dedicated to
the impact of rankings on international academia on the
macro-level. It, thus, completes the hourglass schemes, that
started with a history of development of the system
production in Europe. The final section of the paper refers
back to the contours that the international academia had until
now, and explains how these contours are being gradually
diluted. The three main processes here are the demise of
humanities, fission of traditional academic roles, and
subjection of knowledge production to new social forces.
Without any exaggeration, the academic system is
undergoing revolutionary changes. The system of knowledge
production that was born out of philosophy and humanistic
reasoning is sidetracking its traditional basis in favor of more
sterile, technological solutions. The Humbolt system of unity
between teaching and research crumbles piece by piece. The
knowledge production itself is not subjected to direct political
guidance anymore; however, it is now in thrall of multiple
socio-economic processes that are often called “the market.”
The future of academia is unclear. The section tries to get a
gist of the numerous processes that will determine the future
of the academic system and make reasonable predictions.
The short outline of the dissertation presented in this section
shows a variety of problems that are being addressed and
multiple methods used to tackle them. At the core of our
discussion are global academic rankings. However, academic
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rankings are just a prism for a broader analysis. The
dissertation constantly refers back to wider issues
surrounding transformations of the global academia. It is only
in this context that the rankings could be understood outside
of their immediate impact. Although there is still much to be
done in this research field, the thesis provides a valuable
entry point for further analyses.
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Chapter 2. History and Methodology of Rankings in Higher
Education and Research.
2.1. History and Context of Global Ranking Systems.
We live in the world where everything is measured. Since the
project of Enlightenment, measuring has been the instrument
of choice in determining desirable parameters of a unit. The
mechanistic assumption behind the measures is that the social
system is perfectly comparable to the natural world; hence,
the attempts to measure all the forms of social relations
became commonplace in our society.
This tendency did not spare the educational system. For
decades there have been attempts to create a set of measures
to evaluate institutions of higher education and research
production. The first of these measures go back to the end of
the XIX century. In the US, the first measurements of higher
education system were conducted already in 1870, when the
Bureau of Education started to publish statistical data on US
universities (Snyder, 1993).
Another chapter in the story of measurements was opened in
1910 when James M. Cattell published a study of one
thousand prominent American scholars, including their
education and institutional affiliation (Cattell, 1921). He
developed his study by dividing the number of the prominent
scholars by the total number of faculty that each institution
had, opening a door for comparisons between these
institutions. By the second part of 20th century, higher
education rankings had become more prominent in the
American higher education discourse (Webster, 1984).
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In 1925, the first reputational ranking was published by
Raymon Hughes, then a president-emeritus of Miami
University. It was an innovative enterprise since it ranked not
only universities, but also academic disciplines (Hughes,
1925). However, it is in 1957 that Chesley Manley of Chicago
Tribune publishes a precursor to full-scale differential
rankings. The ranking divided US higher educational
institutions into six broad groups: best universities, co-ed
colleges, women’s colleges, law schools, men’s colleges, and
engineering schools (Michigan Alumnus, 1956: 321-323). And,
finally, in 1983 the US News and World Report (USNWR)
published a report “America’s Best Colleges” that would
become arguably the most influential college and university
ranking in the United States (Morse, 2008).
The popularity of university rankings in the United States
may be explained by confluence of two factors. On one hand,
a strong influence of positivist tradition led to a belief in
usefulness of social measurements. On the other hand, rising
costs of attending college created pressures of assuring the
best possible education choice for the money invested.
Nevertheless, United States was not the only country to toy
with measurements of universities’ performance. Already in
1900, Alick MacLean conducted investigation on prominent
personalities of the United Kingdom, including information
on the universities that they had attended (MacLean, 1900). In
1986, United Kingdom’s University Grants Committee started
a process of assessing research performance of its universities.
This process, called the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE),
has since been undertaken regularly on an approximately 5-
year basis. Since 2008, the results have been presented as a
league table.
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Still, it was in the United States that the system of national
rankings was developed the most. By the time other countries
started experimenting with rankings, the US had already had
a developed system of college and university rankings. It
came as a surprise then that the first of the global university
rankings came from China.
The first attempt at an international comparison of higher
education institutions (HEI) was made by the AsiaWeek
magazine. In 1997, it compiled a ranking of universities in
South-East Asia. Shrouded in a constant controversy and
having trouble obtaining data from its focus group, the
AsiaWeek ranking was discontinued in 2001 (Salmi, Saroyan,
2007: 40-41). According to Salmi and Saroyan “AsiaWeek
attributed the negative reactions partly to the fact that many
universities had taken offence to their low ranking and partly
to political motivations, as in the case of some Chinese
universities upset by the inclusion of Taiwanese universities
in the ranking (Ibid: 40).”
The AsiaWeek ranking paved the way for other exercises in
comparing higher education institutions. The work on
comparing performance of top Chinese universities to those
of the United States started already in 1998 at the Shanghai
Jiao Tong University (SJTU). According to Ben Wildavsky
“Shanghai Jiao Tong administrators, worried about the
university’s decline from its once-exalted position in
prerevolutionary days, began a series of planning meetings
aimed at assessing where the university stood compared to
others, particularly in the key area of research productivity
(Wildavsky, 2010: 112).” Nian Cai Liu, one of the authors of
the SJTU ranking, states that “From 1999 to 2001, Dr. Ying
Cheng, two other colleagues and [he] worked on the project
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of benchmarking top Chinese universities with four groups of
US universities, from the very top to ordinary research
universities, according to academic or research performance
and based on internationally comparable data (Liu, 2010:
146).”
This work led to publication in 2003 of the first global
university ranking – Academic  Ranking of World Universities
(ARWU) – that aimed to measure research performance of
international higher education institutions. The asserted goal
of this ranking was to provide Chinese universities with a
reference point for further development (Liu, 2009: 2-3).
Initially, the ranking was conducted under the aegis of
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and it is still often referred to
as the “Shanghai ranking”.
As the interest of Chinese knowledge policies lay
predominantly in the area of natural and applied sciences, the
methodology of ARWU ranking was specifically designed to
measure universities’ research in these disciplinary domains.
It ignored the disciplines of arts and humanities and
sidetracked social sciences. It also neglected indicators that
were not specifically connected with research. But, as has
been pointed out by its authors “Any ranking is controversial
and no ranking is absolutely objective (Liu, Cheng, 2005: 13).”
ARWU attracted a great deal of attention from various
stakeholders in higher education. It has been both praised and
criticized. However, the initial response was allegedly quite
positive. In the words of the authors “The Ranking Group
have received numerous emails, about one third of the emails
simply applaud ARWU, 60% of them are positive about
ARWU and offer suggestions on improving ARWU. Only
about 5% of the emails have negative views on ARWU (Ibid:
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2).” Peculiarly, many of the laudatory evaluations came from
the countries where ARWU’s highest ranked universities
were located.
Having had quickly realized that they tapped into a
goldmine, the authors of the ARWU ranking divorced
themselves from their institutional affiliation with the SJTU in
2009. The new institutional husk, Shanghai Ranking
Consultancy, strengthened ARWU’s claim to objectivity.
The immediate acceptance of ARWU both by its proponents
and its critics may be explained by two factors. In economic
terms, ARWU filled an empty market niche and satisfied
hitherto unidentified demand. In political terms, the elite
higher educational establishments that placed high in the
ranking were quick to accept ARWU’s legitimacy. This move
supplied ARWU with a reputation boost and cemented the
position of the ranking. In a backward loop it also cemented
the position of the high-ranking higher educational
establishments in the global system of knowledge production.
At the same time, the ARWU rankings were not spared of
strong criticism. Some noted the failure to evaluate teaching
quality of the universities, while others criticized
demonstrative disdain towards humanities and humanistic
social sciences. Complaints – as expected – came mostly from
the fringe and, thus, were easier to discard. According to
Helena Spongenberg “France has long called for a European
alternative to current global league tables, arguing that the
selection criteria of existing rankings favour Anglo-Saxon
higher education institutions to the disadvantage of French
and other European universities (Spongenberg, 2010).” The
bitterest defeat, however, is the one bordering on victory. The
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winners in the eyes of everyone but themselves set off to
redress a glaring injustice.
The precise moment that the British higher education
establishment started to work on alternative ranking system is
not known. However, the idea seems to have had been
looming in the shadows for a long time. According to Ben
WIldavsky, it was in the couloirs of Times Higher Education
(THE) that this idea first took shape (Wildavsky, 2010. 214-
215). As a partner in this tedious exercise, THE chose an
education consultancy Quacquarelli Symonds, in what was
the beginning of a wonderful but short lasting friendship.
The first Times Higher Education-Quacquarelli Symonds
(THE-QS) ranking saw light in 2004, just a year after the
release of ARWU. It applied different research methodology,
which drew heavily on universities’ reputation. The ranking
was more favorable to the European universities. However,
the principal benefits accrued to the universities of the United
Kingdom and to those of the UK’s former colonies.
However, the first mover advantage in the ranking race
belonged to ARWU, and the new ranking found itself
constantly struggling for legitimacy in the wary world of
international academia. This situation was exacerbated by the
fact that THE-QS propelled a disproportionate amount of
United Kingdom’s universities into the top positions.
Unlike its competitor the THE-QS ranking attempted to
measure the overall quality of international universities.
Despite ostensibly more developed methodology, critics were
fast to notice that the ranking placed unreasonably strong
emphasis on universities’ reputation. What did the reputation
have to do with the quality of the university was not
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reasonably explained. This question was constantly raised in
relations to the THE-QS and its successor rankings.
Furthermore, the placement of some universities was
questioned. University College London scored higher than
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Stanford University
and University of California, Berkeley ended up in relatively
low positions. For instance, Kings College London placed
fifteen positions above Berkeley. Commenting on this issue
Andrew Oswald stated that “The organizations who promote
such ideas should be unhappy themselves, and so should any
supine UK universities who endorse results they view as
untruthful (Oswald, 2007).”
Notwithstanding the criticism, the THE-QS ranking
performed an important function. It provided a credible
alternative to ARWU and, at the same time, fueled the ego of
some universities that were not as notable in the ARWU
ranking. This fruitful combination played into the hands of
THE-QS and allowed it to continue attracting international
attention.
The history of the THE-QS was not without its underwater
stones. In the period of 2009-2010, THE and QS parted ways,
opening the window for simpler abbreviations. The decision
apparently came from the management of Times Higher
Education. Among the reasons for divorced the management
stated that “the survey of academic opinion that makes up 40
per cent of the overall score in our rankings was deemed too
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small5” and that “our research measures favored the sciences
over the humanities6.”
In its quest to eliminate the factors irrelevant to universities’
performance and finally do justice to the humanities, THE
was quick to remarry to a reputable consulting firm Thomson
Reuters. Their offspring, Times Higher Education World
Universities Ranking (THEWUR), first appeared in 2010 and
immediately raised a couple of brows. The decrease of a
university’s reputation impact amounted to little more than
5% (now it constituted 34.5% of the final score). The
humanities also did not fare too well in the new ranking. In
fact, the THE ranking managed to drown humanities’
oriented universities even further.
The new THE ranking also garnered some positive reviews.
This time the responses were much less exalted, perhaps due
to growing weariness of jaded international public with
numerous rankings. Still, some commented positively on the
ranking.  David Willets, UK minister for universities and
science, gave a positive evaluation of the THE ranking saying
that “reputation counts for less this time, and the weight
accorded to quality in teaching and learning is greater7,” and
that “the inclusion of scaled data and research productivity
5 Ann Mroz, “Leader: Only the best for the best,” Times Higher Education, 5
November 2009,  http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/408968.article.
6 Ibid.
7 David Willets, “UK Universities Global Path in the World Rankings,” Times
Higher Education, 16 September 2010,
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2010-
11/world-ranking/analysis/uk-education.
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relative to size have played to the strengths of many of our
smaller universities8.”
Quacquarelli Symonds, at the same time, decided to carry on
with the old methodology, renaming the ranking
Quacquarelli Symonds World University Ranking (QSWUR).
QS did not make much amendments to the old methodology.
This obstinacy led to a strong criticism. Philip G. Altbach
stated that “The QS World University Rankings are the most
problematical. From the beginning, the QS has relied on
reputational indicators for half of its analysis […] Whether the
QS rankings should be taken seriously by the higher
education community is questionable (Altbach, 2012: 30).”  In
a similar vein David Blanchflower state in regard to the QS
ranking that “[their] results are based on an entirely flawed
methodology that underweights the quality of research and
overweights fluff9.”
Success of the first university rankings prompted various
parties to partake in the ranking business. In the last years,
more than a dozen of international rankings have been
produced with often puzzling ranking criteria. One of these
rankings, Global University Ranking, purportedly
independent ranking of universities connected with the
Russian academic establishment, managed to place
Lomonosov Moscow State University on the fifth place in the
world ahead of Harvard and Cambridge. Another peculiar
case, Professional Ranking of World Universities, sponsored
8 Ibid.
9 David Blanchflower, “The QS World University Rankings are a load of old
baloney,” New Statesman, 05 September 2011,
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/david-blanchflower/2011/09/world-
university-faculty.
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by French Ecole Nationale des Mines, launched some French
universities directly into the top 20.
Of course, there were also quite reputable attempts at making
new ranking systems. Leiden and SCImago rankings, for
instance, provide examples of well-designed measurement
systems. However, the rankings draw heavily on science-
indexed publications, thus practically ignoring research in
social sciences and humanities. Despite all its laurels, MIT’s
placement as the top research institution in humanities and
social sciences is somewhat questionable10.
Various institutions of the European Union have been active
in the field of international rankings since the rankings’
inception. Constant complains of the European universities
about perceived faults of the existing ranking systems
prompted the EU to develop its own ranking. This new
initiative came to be known as U-Multirank. The ranking
attempts to contest the uniform treatment of world
universities by other global rankings by taking into account
universities’ goals and missions, in addition to the traditional
set of measures (Van Vught, Ziegele, 2012).
Whatever has been done in the field of international rankings,
the dominance of ARWU, THE, and QS on the ranking
playground remains virtually unchallenged. Not only they
provide the most comprehensive assessment of the
international higher education system, but they also benefit
from the first-mover advantage. They are highly referenced
sources of information about global universities, and they
10 According to 2013 Leiden Ranking in the field of social sciences and
humanities.
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champion a particular order of prestige in international
education and research.
Martin Enserink, a science journalist, points to multiple cases
where ARWU provoked strong national responses. In one
case a disagreement over attribution of Nobel Prize winners
triggered a bitter conflict between two German universities
(Enserink, 2007). In another case, French authorities passed a
new law on universities, swayed by dismal performance of
French universities in the ARWU ranking (Ibid). Nicholas
Bowman and Michael Bastedo observed an even more
striking tendency of international rankings to lock an order of
power in the hierarchy of world universities (Bowman,
Bastedo, 2011).
The development of principal ranking systems is
characterized by their diversification and subdivision. THE,
for instance, offers not only a university ranking, but also
subject rankings, world reputation rankings, and a ranking of
universities under 50 years of age. Within the THEWUR,
separate rankings in six broad subject domains are available.
Similarly, QS now offers various subject rankings of world
universities, as well as separate university rankings for Asia
and Latin America. ARWU, so far resisted the lure of
diversification, although it also offers field rankings and
subject rankings.
The growing influence of ranking systems fostered the
emergence of international agencies and groups monitoring
quality of academic rankings. The first attempts of this sort go
back as far as 2002, when an International Ranking Expert
Group (IREG) emerged out of a joint initiative of UNESCO-
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CEPES and various private partners11. In 2004, IREG
organized its second conference with the Institute for Higher
Education Policy (IHEP) in Washington D.C. where the idea
of rankings evaluations was first bandied. This idea
developed further on the 2006 IREG Conference in Berlin.
Subsequent to Berlin conference a set of principles on ranking
higher education institutions was adopted. These principles
came to be known in academia as The Berlin Principles of
Ranking Higher Education Institutions or simply, the Berlin
Principles12.
The Berlin Principles aimed at creating a uniform system of
assessing major ranking systems based on multiple criteria.
The principal criteria of evaluation include purposes and
goals of rankings, design and weighting of indicators,
collection and processing of data, and presentation of ranking
results.  “It is expected that this initiative has set a framework
for the elaboration and dissemination of rankings — whether
they are national, regional, or global in scope — that
ultimately will lead to a system of continuous improvement
and refinement of the methodologies used to conduct these
rankings. Given the heterogeneity of methodologies of
rankings, these principles for good ranking practice will be
useful for the improvement and evaluation of ranking13,”
claims IREG’s press release.
11 IREG Observatory on Academic Rankings and Excellence, http://www.ireg-
observatory.org.
12 “Berlin Principles on Ranking Higher Education Institutions,” IREG, 20
May 2006, http://www.ireg-
observatory.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=41&Itemid=
48.
13 Ibid.
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Following the publication of the Berlin Principles there were
attempts to assess the major rankings’ correspondence to the
principles. Obviously, the first in line of offering its services
for a modest fee was the IREG itself. Purely voluntarily, as the
IREG website emphasizes, ranking functionaries can hire a
team of enthusiastic IREG experts and, provided the positive
evaluation, earn a much coveted badge of “IREG approved14.”
Although the IREG business somewhat resembles a simple
tool for making money, some authors see the emergence of
audit as a positive development. Rauhvargers suggests that
such audits may eventually resolve the problem of
irreproducibility of the main rankings mentioned above.
According to him “Experience to date [...] has shown that
frequent gaps in the published methodologies exist, and most
notably the explanation of how indicator values are calculated
from the raw data. As a result, those wishing to repeat the
calculation to verify the published result in the ranking table
have been unable to do so (Rauhvargers, 2013: 17)”.
The whole business that develops around university rankings
gradually entrenches itself in the international academic
environment. Ranking audits, ranking consultants and
university officers responsible for data provision are
individual cogs of this complex machinery. The rankings are a
new form of business feeding on the international academia.
Economic interests are a fecund ground for conflict.
Representatives of various interest groups often clash using
proxies as weapons. Ranking wars involve squabbles between
14 “IREG Ranking Audit starts with consultations,” IREG, 4 November 2010,
http://www.ireg-
observatory.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=112&Itemid
=137.
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various agents of the ranking business. An exchange of
reproaches between THE and QS following their divorce is
one such incident. Another instance is demonstrated by QS’s
criticism of the new EU ranking in that it “will be prone to
mission capture from continental universities which want
measures that display their regional or local missions to best
effect15”. Another example is ARWU patrons’ criticism of the
inconvenient Berlin Principles. Liu and Cheng stated that “It
has been concluded that some items of the Berlin Principles
about the selection of indicators cannot be transformed into
measurable criteria (Cheng, Liu, 2008: 206)”. Paradoxically,
this war of all against all may have a positive effect on the
development of ranking systems. David Jobbins claimed that
the ranking wars may spill into better quality of rankings. In
his words “It is evident the league table compilers are falling
over themselves to be seen to be responsive to their critics and
to the broader academic community16.”
The triumphant march of university rankings over the last
decade is an interesting phenomenon. In just some years
global rankings have changed from semi-private initiative of
bored scientists into an important playground of the higher
education industry with its winners, losers, side-kicks and
loudly-independent experts. This situation demands at least
an attempt at explanation.
Ellen Hazelkorn credited intensifying global competition with
the success of global rankings. In her opinion higher
15 “New University Ranking from the European Commission,” QS, 9 March
2010, http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings-articles/world-
university-rankings/new-university-ranking-european-commission.
16 David Jobbins, “First shots fired in ranking war,” University World News, 7
March 2010,
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20100305112613216.
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education is seen as the key factor of success in the emerging
knowledge economy (Hazelkorn, 2008). These ideas are
echoed in multiple other accounts17.
The obsession with knowledge economy of which the
university is the new proletarian started with a series of
reports by various international institutions, most prominent
of which was the World Bank. The first works on knowledge
society appeared already in the early 1990s. Peter Drucker
was one of the most vocal pioneers of the concept (Drucker,
1966). However, it was not until early 2000s that these ideas
took hold of international public imagination. United Nations
Millennium Summit and the World Summit on the Information
Society contributed significantly to the popularization of the
knowledge society ideas. A pithy summary of these ideas is
provided in World Bank report “Constructing Knowledge
Societies.” According to the report “Knowledge accumulation
and application have become major factors in economic
development and are increasingly at the core of a country’s
competitive advantage in the global economy (World Bank,
2002: xvii).” It went on to claim that “the role of tertiary
education in the construction of knowledge economies and
democratic societies is more inﬂuential than ever (Ibid: 1).”
The idea of strong interconnectedness between the higher
education and the knowledge economy caught on. Over the
first decade of the 2000s, it turned into an obsession.
Education, and higher education in particular, was seen as the
main driver of growth in the economy and as a shield against
precarious character of world economy. According to W.
Norton Grubb and Marvel Lazerson “The Education Gospel
therefore includes both a conception of economic and social
17 See, for instance, Wildavsky, 2010; Salmi, Saroyan, 2007.
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change and a vision of how to respond to that change through
education and training (Grubb, Lazerson, 2004: 2).”
The knowledge society narrative intersected with other trends
in the sector of higher education. Salmi and Saroyan associate
proliferation of rankings “with the massification, or
unprecedented increase in enrolments, in tertiary education
around the world [...] (Salmi, Saroyan, 2007: 35)” They state
that “the flood of cross border private and distance providers,
the trend towards internationalisation of tertiary education,
and the related increased stakeholders’ demand for greater
accountability, transparency and efficiency have all
contributed to increased incentives for quantifying quality
(Ibid).”
The emergence of international university rankings is a direct
result of growing importance of the knowledge society
narrative. The world of global economic competition
engenders fears of being left behind. Since knowledge is now
seen as the driver of economic growth, knowledge production
became another platform of international competition.
It comes as no surprise that the first system of measuring
universities performance came from China and was
developed with the encouragement of the Chinese state. In
many ways, the first ranking exercise was a test drive against
leading economic powerhouses where many centers of
advanced knowledge production are concentrated. It also
explains the fact that the ARWU ranking is strongly focused
on natural and applied sciences. These areas of knowledge
production have the highest applied potential and bring
tangible economic benefits.
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The story of global rankings is the story of evolving global
economy. Their emergence during the first part of 2000s
reflects the growing influence of higher education sector in
the international economic competition. Under the influence
of global marketplace, education becomes nothing more than
a product, and like any product it becomes subject to
cost/benefit calculations. In this perspective, consumers need
to choose the optimal product that would balance their
individual utilities against their costs. However imperfect,
global university rankings are indispensable in this
calculation. The rankings perform an important market
function, and they themselves are yet another market
product. The global rankings are now deeply entrenched in
the academic system. And since they will, most probably,
persist, it is imperative to understand what they measure and
how they work.
2.2. Methodology of main ranking systems.
In this section the methodologies of principal rankings
systems are explained in greater detail. Although the actual
data that is used to compile annual university rankings is not
disclosed, the measurement criteria can be consulted on the
rankings’ websites. The section concentrates solely on the
three principal rankings. This choice is based on two reasons.
First, the three rankings – THES, ARWU and QS – are the
most influential in the ranking business. Second,
methodologies of alternative ranking systems are often
similar to those of the three principal rankings. Thus, for the
purposes of our analysis, a detailed elaboration of the three
ranking systems would be enough to develop consequent
arguments of the thesis.
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The main thing that is necessary to understand is that no
single ranking system, regardless of what is claimed, directly
assesses the quality of higher education institutions.
University rankings assess quality indirectly, through a
number of proxies that may or may not reflect the real quality
of a higher education institution. The rift between the proxies
and the actual situation is a subject of numerous research
papers, discussions, and disagreements. According to
Rauhvargers “it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure and
quantify quality itself, and therefore rankings use various
proxies – some of which are rather distant from the actual
quality of teaching or research (Rauhvargers, 2011: 11).”
Another issue to keep in mind is the limited character of
proxies themselves. It is simply impossible to provide a
perfectly comparable system of various higher education
institutions based on any number of criteria. “How can the
activity of a university be reduced to a numerical value?
(Teichler, Shin, 2011: 76)” one essay asks. Its authors state that
“Anyone who works within a university setting knows only
too well that within the one institution, there are pockets of
high quality and pockets that are of concern to the institution.
Providing a single measure betrays the complexity of the
institution (Ibid: 76).”
There will always be a payoff between comparability of data
and precision of the institutional assessment. On one pole of
this dichotomy are simplest rankings of institutional
reputation like the “THE World Reputation Rankings18”. On
the other pole there are attempts to create rankings that
18 THE World Reputation Ranking,
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-
rankings/2013/reputation-ranking.
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would measure performance of a higher education institution
relative to its mission and goals. The most comprehensive
attempt to create such a ranking, the U-Multirank, will be a
yardstick against which the pros and cons of more sensitive
rankings will be judged.
The right of historical precedence belongs to the Academic
Ranking of World Universities. As the first ranking of its
kind, ARWU used a distinct set of measures. The main goal of
ARWU was to measure research output rather than
institutional quality. Therefore, ARWU’s methodology was
based on very clear indicators of research performance. The
clarity of ARWU was consistently praised. Richard Holmes,
for instance, stated that “Few people would argue with using
the Shanghai ARWU rankings to evaluate universities. Their
reliability and methodological stability make them an obvious
choice19.” Yet, it is quite easy to argue against the ARWU
rankings; the drawback of their clarity is a limited perspective
on higher educational institutions.
To measure the performance of international higher education
institutions, ARWU analyses the following criteria: quality of
education (10%), quality of faculty (40%), research output
(40%), and per capita performance (10%)20. At first glance, the
ranking provides a multifaceted overview of higher education
institutions that it ranks. However, it is important to
understand what exactly is meant under each separate
19 Richard Holmes, “Power and responsibility – The growing influence of
global rankings,” University World News, 01 July 2012,
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20120630083447805.
20 “Ranking Methodology of Academic Ranking of World Universities –
2013,” ARWU, http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU-Methodology-
2013.html
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criterion, and how the elusive qualities of HEIs are measured
in the ranking.
As has already been mentioned, every ranking uses proxies to
evaluate higher education institutions. ARWU’s measure for
quality of education, for instance, uses the proxy of “alumni
of an institution winning Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals21.”
ARWU does not use any other proxies for evaluating the
quality of education. Noble Prize is given in fields of Physics,
Chemistry, Physiology or Medicine, Literature, and Peace;
Fields medals are given in mathematics. This creates an
absurd situation where liberal arts colleges and universities
that specialize in teaching, and do not have any science
component, would actually score nil on the quality of
education in ARWU, save for those lucky few that educated a
couple of Nobel Prize winners.
The quality of faculty, a criterion that determines 40% of the
final score, merited a more thorough calculation in the ARWU
ranking. This criterion is constituted from two separate
proxies having equal weights. 20% of the score is brought in
by staff of an institution winning Nobel Prize or Fields Medal.
The other 20% is brought by highly cited researchers in 21
broad subject categories. Except for the persistent Nobel Prize
and Field medals fetishism, these indicators seem to fit well
into the overall purpose of the ARWU ranking. Since the
ranking is interested primarily in the research that HEIs are
doing, it is reasonable to focus on their sheer research
potential.
One problem of the ARWU’s approach is that the label
“quality of faculty” may be misleading. What ARWU
21 Ibid.
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measures is, at best, the ability of a HEI to attract academic
superstars. The presence of a Nobel/Fields medal laureate on
the academic staff of an institution would doubtfully increase
the quality of its faculty as a whole. However, it would bring
the scores to figure in the ARWU ranking. The second proxy,
highly cited researchers, is somewhat more accurate, as the
presence of such scholars among the institution’s faculty must
mean the higher quality of research performance of this
institution.
Outside of more fundamental concerns, there is an obvious
slant towards harder sciences in the ARWU’s quality of
faculty calculations. On one hand, the already mentioned
focus on Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals disqualifies any field
that does not have the fortune to be rewarded with these
distinctions. On the other hand, indiscriminate calculation of
citation numbers ignores subtle distinctions in citation
cultures between various disciplines.
Research output brings another 40% into the total score of an
institution on the ARWU ranking. This criterion is also split in
two. The first indicator is the amount of papers published in
Nature and Science, which brings 20% of the final score.
Another 20% are dedicated to the papers indexed in Science
Citation Index and Social Science Citation Index. Obviating
the evident criticism that both Nature and Science are
magazines that are focused exclusively on natural sciences,
ARWU states that “for institutions specialized in humanities
and social sciences such as London School of Economics,
[Nature and Science] is not considered, and the weight of
[Nature and Science] is relocated to other indicators22.” This
statement, however, leaves open the question what happens
22 Ibid.
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to the universities – like Brown University – that have a
historical tilt towards humanities and social sciences, yet also
conduct work in natural sciences. Calculation of their
performance on the same terms that of the more natural
science oriented institutions would seriously hinder their
standing in the rankings.
The quality of faculty and research output are the most
important criteria of the ARWU ranking that together
contribute 80% of the final score of an institution. These
criteria are subject to very similar biases of calculation. A
superficial acquaintance with the criteria is enough to see that
the research in humanities is completely ignored in the
ARWU rankings. Only research in social sciences and social
humanities has a bearing on the standing of an institution in
the ARWU. However, these disciplinary domains contribute
disproportionally less than natural sciences to the total score
of an institution.
According to Cheng “Many rankings are biased towards
universities with strong hard sciences while against those
specialized in social sciences and humanities (Cheng, 2010).”
He found that there are enormous differences in citation
behavior between disciplines, with per-faculty citations
standing at close to sixty in biological sciences, around thirty
in physics and mathematics, and just five in social and
behavior sciences (Ibid). In addition to this discrepancy, the
faculty in natural sciences tended to publish more papers than
the faculty in humanities. The differences in publishing
culture advantage the research in natural sciences over that in
social and behavioral sciences. Thus, the adjustment by
citation culture could strongly impact the final result of the
ARWU ranking.
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The final criterion, which brings the last 10% to the total
institutional score in ARWU, is the per-capita performance of
an institution. This indicator calculates the weighted average
scores of the previous indicators divided by the number of
full-time academic staff. According to ARWU, this indicator
should mitigate the size advantage of large research
institutions. In practice, it does not. Its weight is too small to
make up for unadjusted proxies of the previous criteria.
ARWU’s considerable bias towards larger institutions has
been continuously pointed out by various authors (Nokkala,
Heller-Schuh, Paier, 2011; Rauhvargers, 2011).
The ARWU ranking suffers from a series of flaws. Its
assessment of teaching quality is inadequate, to say the least.
Its proxy for faculty quality is also not satisfactory. The
ranking ignores humanities and undervalues social sciences.
Most importantly its choice of criteria leaves a distinct feeling
of arbitrariness. According to one report on ARWU’s
methodology “Our main conclusions are that the criteria that
are used are not relevant, that the aggregation methodology is
plagued by a number of major problems and that the whole
exercise suffers from an insufficient attention paid to
fundamental structuring issues (Billaut, Bouyssou, Vincke,
2010: 237)”.
In addition to obvious methodological problems, some
researches cast doubt on accuracy of the ARWU’s
measurements. Razvan Florian, for instance, attempted to
reproduce the results of ARWU, using the methodology
described by ARWU. He demonstrated that the results of the
ARWU ranking cannot be reproduced independently
(Florian, 2007).
77
Despite all the aforementioned flaws, the ARWU ranking may
be a quite useful tool, if it is used with utmost caution and
with an understanding of the criteria behind the ranking. It
does not measure an overall quality of a higher education
institution or its. It measures precisely what it states on the
list of its indicators. Still, rhetorical wrapping of its criteria
may be misleading.
The second ranking in order of historical emergence is the
THE-QS ranking. Since the infamous split with the Times
Higher Education, QS retained the methodology of the
original ranking. Hereby, the methodology described in the
next paragraphs refers both to the joint THE-QS ranking
produced in the period 2004-2009 and the QS World
University Rankings, produced since 2010. For simplicity, the
ranking will be simply abbreviated as the QS ranking.
The QS rankings came a year later than the ARWU rankings.
In response to the criticism of the ARWU ranking, some
adjustments were made to make the QS’s methodology more
representative. Unlike ARWU, the initial THE-QS rankings
aspired to measure the overall quality of a higher education
institution. This ambitious claim, however, was met with
certain skepticism due to peculiarities of the QS’s
methodology.
The final score of an institution in the QS ranking is composed
from six principal indicators: academic reputation, employer
reputation, faculty-student ratio, citations per faculty,
international faculty, and international students23. The
combination of the indicators is supposed to give a
23 “QS World University Rankings,” QS Intelligence Unit,
http://www.iu.qs.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/
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comprehensive overview of a higher educational institution.
Similarly to ARWU, these indicators are proxies for quality of
an institution, its faculty, and its students.
The most important indicator in the QS ranking is, by far, the
academic reputation of an institution. The ranking assigned
40% of the final score to this measure. The academic
reputation, also called academic peer review, is a measure
based on worldwide survey distributed to academics. The
selected academics are supposed to evaluate top 30
international and top 10 domestic HEIs in their field of
expertise, excluding their institution of provenance24. In other
words the academic reputation is nothing more than a
subjective interpretation of international research by the
representatives of the profession.
In a way the academic reputation indicator continues the
proud tradition of the historical rankings from the first part of
the 20th century. How well suited is this idea for the
beginning of the 21st century is arguable. Multiple researchers
commented on essential subjectivism of the peer-review
method and unclear criteria for the selection of peers. For
instance it was stated that “it is unlikely that any expert
possesses a global view of the inner workings of teaching at
institutions worldwide. Moreover, the expert selection
process of The Times is entirely unclear. […] In the absence of
any guarantee for protection from selection biases,
measurement validity can be very problematic (Ioannidis et
al. 2007)”.
24 “Academic Reputation,” QS Intelligence Unit,
http://www.iu.qs.com/university-rankings/rankings-indicators/methodology-
academic-reputation/
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Very similar issues plague another QS indicator: recruiter
review. The review was born literally from an academic
reputation’s rib. In the first QS ranking, half of the final score
belonged to the academic reputation. In 2005, 10% of the
academic reputation score was reassigned to the recruiter
review. The review is similarly based on a worldwide survey
of employers on the quality of graduates. This indicator, in
the opinion of the QS, should provide a reasonably good
estimate on the elusive teaching quality of an institution.
There are some problems with the measure. First, there is a
reasonable doubt about the employers’ ability to measure the
overall quality of a graduate. Second, the measure is quite
instrumental, as the quality of graduates in this case is
reduced to their ability to perform in a corporate
environment.
The next indicator of institutional performance in the QS
ranking is citations-per-faculty. Compared to other rankings,
this indicator has relatively less weight in the QS (20%). The
indicator includes the total number of citations per institution
for the last five years divided by the number of its full time
faculty.  The data for calculating the indicator is fetched from
the Scopus database. In fact, the indicator of citations-per-
faculty seems to be more sophisticated in the QS ranking than
in ARWU or the THE ranking. However, it is subject to very
similar faults. Various citations cultures are ignored in the QS
rankings as well. Institutions that are traditionally strong in
biomedical sciences, physics and mathematics would
inevitably gather higher scores than institutions specializing
in sciences and humanities, even if the latter produce
relatively more publications in their field of specialization.
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Faculty-student ratio is yet another controversial indicator in
the QS ranking system. In theory, the ratio is supposed to be a
proxy for teaching quality. However, how well the faculty-
student ratio actually measures teaching quality is open to
debate. The QS defends the indicator on the basis that “[it] is a
commonly used measure in many evaluations and rankings
around the world25,” although the QS also admits that “it is
not a satisfactory as a qualitative classroom evaluation as
might be considered for a domestic teaching assessment, but
it does speak to the notion of ‘commitment to teaching’,
which ought to correlate strongly, if not completely with the
level of teaching quality26.” Understaffed institutions may
indeed not perform as well as their more fortunate peers.
However, to assign 20% of the final score to this factor is a
questionable decision, considering that institutions with
various missions historically had different faculty-student
ratios.
The rest of the 10% in the final score calculation is assigned to
two very similar indicators. The first indicator, proportion of
international students, commands 5% of the score. The other
half belongs to the proportion of international faculty at an
institution. What do these proportions have to do with the
quality of an institution is a valid question. In a very remote
way the proportion of international students and faculty may
show popularity of a higher education institution with the
international public. This, of course, may be for the reasons
unrelated to the quality of the institution (for instance, low or
absent tuition fees or location in international hubs).
25 “Student Faculty Ratio,” QS Intelligence Unit,
http://www.iu.qs.com/university-rankings/rankings-indicators/methodology-
faculty-student/
26 Ibid.
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The QS ranking received strong criticism from the moment of
its inception. In addition to the usual points of undermining
humanities and social sciences, critics emphasized inherent
unreliability of the QS reputation surveys.
Arbitrary selection of peer-reviewers and large variability of
the final results attracted particularly strong criticism.
According to Philip Altbach, “[reputational indicator]
probably accounts for the significant variability in the QS
rankings over the years. In addition, QS queries employers,
introducing even more variability and unreliability into the
mix (Altbach, 2012: 30).” Another review stated that “Results
have been highly volatile. There have been many sharp rises
and falls, especially in the second half of the THES [QS] top
200 where small differences in metrics can generate large
rankings effects. Fudan in China has oscillated between 72
and 195, RMIT in Australia between 55 and 146. In the US,
Emory has risen from 173 to 56 and Purdue fell from 59 to 127
(Marginson, 2006: 5).”
The last important ranking system is another THE-QS splinter
ranking, Times Higher Education World University Ranking.
Published for the first time in 2010, it is the youngest of the
three major ranking systems. The THEWUR or THE ranking
revised its methodology after splitting from the QS. However,
there is a degree of correspondence between the two rankings
as THE actually retained some of the THE-QS ranking’s
indicators. There is also some correspondence between the
THE and the ARWU rankings, since THE partnered with
Thomas Reuters consulting, that also provides data for the
ARWU ranking. Thus, the THE ranking is a hybrid enterprise
combining features from the other principal ranking systems.
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The methodology of the THE ranking is based on 13 different
indicators grouped into five broad categories: industry
income, international diversity, teaching, research and
citations27. According to Phil Baty “The tables’ methodology
was determined only after 10 months of detailed consultation
with leading experts in global higher education: more than 50
senior figures across every continent provided extensive
feedback on our plans, amounting to more than 250 pages of
commentary28”. Like the QS ranking, THE uses z-scores to
normalize its results29.
The first thing that is immediately obvious behind a jumble of
multiple indicators is that the THE ranking also strongly
relies on institutional reputation. In the research category,
reputation amounts to 18% out of total 30%. In the teaching
category, reputation amounts to about 15% of the total 30%.
Combined these two indicators bring in 33% of the final score
in the ranking. Obviously, reputation is given a lower weight
in the THE than in the QS ranking. Yet, the reputational
scores are still the most influential part of the THE ranking,
followed closely by citation scores (32.5%).
Calculations of the reputation scores in both research and
teaching is based on the already familiar method of peer
surveys. It is thus subject to the same faults as the QS
rankings. Except for stating that the surveys are distributed
27 “The essential elements in our world-leading formula,” Times Higher
Education, http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-
rankings/2012-13/world-ranking/methodology.
28 “2010-2011 World University Rankings Methodology,” Times Higher
Education, 16 September 2010,
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2010-
11/world-ranking/methodology.
29 Ibid.
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on invitation-only basis and that at present THE has more
than 16000 responses at their disposal, the actual procedures
and contents of the THE surveys are not clear30. This is a
substantial omission, considering that the reputational scores
attracted significant criticism of the academic community.
The rest of the THE indicators are quite tricky. Their diversity
is supposed to provide a well-rounded assessment of an
educational institution. However, this renders the
methodology somewhat obscure, and it can often be
misleading. According to Andrejs Rauhvargers “the
description of the methodology used is less elaborate
compared to that of the THE-QS rankings and, indeed, does
not allow one to follow the calculation of the final scores from
the raw data (Rauhvargers, 2011: 32).”
After the combined reputation indicators, the next important
indicator is the citation score. The score is calculated on the
basis of data from the Thomson Reuters databases,
incidentally also the provider of data for the ARWU ranking.
Citations are gathered over the five year period from over
12000 journals and over 6 million articles31. The data is
normalized to reflect various citation rates among the
disciplines. However, the methodology of normalization is
not clarified. Additionally, THE ignores the fact that books
are a major method of publishing in humanities and that there
are on average less journals published in the disciplines of
social sciences and humanities.
Papers per academic and research staff (6%), research income
(6%) and industry income (2.5%) combine into another
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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important set of indicators. The indicators belong to different
categories, yet they are all proxies for research impact of the
university. Together they constitute 14.5% of the total score.
The two last indicators, research income and industry income,
favor the universities that are technical or natural science
focused, as social science institutions tend to have much less
cooperation with the industry.
From the analysis of the previous indicators, it is already
quite clear that the THE ranking favors the universities with
strong research culture and applied orientation. Pure research
indicators of the THE ranking constitute 38.5% of the final
score. Industrial orientation brings in another 8.5%. In total
these two scores sum up to 47%, and they influence heavily
the institutional standing in the ranking. The institutions that
are particularly advantaged under this system are those that
produce applied research. In other words, schools of
technology are bound to dominate the THE ranking with the
current methodology.
Similarly inclined to favor more research oriented institutions
are the indicators of teaching quality. In the order of
importance these indicators are the amount of PhD’s awarded
(6%), staff-to-student ratio (4.5%), doctorate-to-bachelor ratio
(2.25%), and institutional income per staff member (2.25%).
Both the amount of PhDs awarded and doctorate-to-bachelor
ratios favor larger institutions with high proportions of
graduate students.
The remaining 7.5% of the score is brought by the
international outlook of an institution. This category includes
three indicators: international students, international faculty,
and amount of papers having at least one international co-
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author. Except for the latter indicator, the internalization
measures are the vestige of the THE-QS joint enterprise.
In general, the analysis of the THE ranking shows that it is
disposed towards well-regarded, research-focused
institutions with strong applied potential. Since, the ranking
is size independent, it would not distinguish between larger
and smaller schools as long as they would have both
undergraduate and graduate student populations. The 2012
THE ranking is demonstrative in this case, placing a relatively
small research intensive school, California Institute of
Technology, on the first place.
Although, the indicators that THE uses are relatively clear,
the THE ranking seems to combine many faults of its
competitors. Like the ARWU ranking, it prioritizes natural
sciences, biomedical sciences, and mathematics. Unlike the
ARWU ranking, it gives a strong advantage to schools of
technology. Additionally, the ranking has inherited many
flaws of the joint THE-QS enterprise. Peer review scores,
internationalization assessment, and staff-student-ratio were
all heavily criticized by the academic community. Finally, a
plethora of indicators and occasional lack of explanation of
the exact data collection procedures makes the THE ranking
hardly intelligible and often misleading
Some experts raised additional points of criticism of the THE
ranking. A group of authors commented that “Several
individual indicators from the Times Higher Education
Survey (THES) data base the overall score, the reported staff-
to-student ratio, and the peer ratings—demonstrate
unacceptably high fluctuation from year to year. […] There
are far too many anomalies in the change scores of the various
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indices for them to be of use in the course of university
management (Bookstein et al., 2010: 295)”.
All of the three ranking systems that have been analyzed in
this chapter have their advantages and disadvantages. Being
the clearest and most accessible ranking, ARWU has a quite
limited perspective on the international higher education. The
QS ranking provides a more rounded overview of higher
education, yet it suffers from unreliable indicators and strong
fluctuations. The THE ranking, arguably the most
sophisticated, has an obvious bias towards applied research
institution and lacks necessary transparency. At this point of
time no ranking system is completely reliable in assessing the
state of global higher education. However, the rankings
continue to satisfy an important demand and they are bound
to stay in international spotlight.
It is important to note at this point that beyond the jumble of
indicators and numerous differences, the rankings have many
common attributes. All of the three major ranking systems are
based either on measurement of reputation or on
measurement of institutional research performance. These
two measurements are not as unrelated as they might seem.
The hidden connections between them will play an important
role in later chapters.
2.3. Auxiliary academic rankings.
The rankings of higher education institutions are well known
to the academic stakeholders and to the general public. Of
much less celebrity are specialized measurements of academic
performance. Yet, these specialized measurements are
extremely important for individual scholars and for the
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higher education institutions. In academia – much like in the
market – measurements become a pervasive fact of life.
One of the most important internal measurements within
higher education institutions is the research productivity of
academic staff. This measurement includes not only the sheer
amount of publications produced by individual members of
an institution, but also the perceived quality of these
publications. Obviously, the quality tends to evade
calculations. The proxy for the quality of research is the
amount of citations the published research receives, and the
quality of the journal where it was published.
The quality of academic journals is often determined through
rankings that group the plurality of research journals into
various tiers. These rankings are important for functioning of
the academic system. Together with global institutional
rankings, they stir the academic system in a particular
direction. The rankings of academic periodicals favor
publications in particular journals. The short overview of
methodology of these rankings is, thus, necessary to give the
full picture of the inner mechanisms of the ranking system.
The practice of ranking academic journals goes back to the
research of the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI), now
part of Thomson Reuters. ISI specialized in academic indexing
and analysis, in particular the journal’s impact factor. It also
maintained citation databases that later became part of the
Thomson Reuters’ portfolio of services. In fact, three of the
most important indexing services – Science Citation Index
(SCI), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), and the Arts and
Humanities Citation Index (AHCI) – are routinely used by both
THE and ARWU rankings in their calculations. Furthermore,
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ARWU also uses ISI Highly Cited Researchers Index, to
determine the highest cited researchers in various fields.
For a long time, impact factor based on citation indices served
as the main measure of the quality of academic publications.
According to David Pontille and Didier Tony, “Two events
have recently changed this situation: the development of
databases (typically Scopus and Google Scholar) which vie
with those of the ISI, and the rapid increase in loosely
correlated indices for measuring the importance and quality
of scientific productions (Pontille, Tony, 347).”  The impact
factor, however, still remains one of the most employed
instruments for calculation of the journal quality.
Impact factors are calculated each year as the average number
of citations per paper that a journal received in the preceding
two years. The impact factor of five, thus, would mean that a
given journal had on average five citations per article over the
two years preceding the calculation. The largest database for
the impact factor calculation is maintained by the Thomson
Reuters.
The impact factor is a simple and powerful proxy for
estimating the importance of a journal in its field. However,
its simplicity makes it unreliable and prone to various
manipulations. The impact factor depends strongly on how
fast papers get cited in various fields. Erjen Van Nierop
discovered great differences in rates of citations over the first
2-3 years since the publication of the article among various
disciplines (Nierop, 2009). The impact factor does not take
these differences into consideration. Hence, impact factors are
hardly comparable between disciplines.
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In addition, the impact factor does not discern quality of
separate articles in an academic journal, and it is seriously
skewed by occasional outliers. In 2004, 90% of the Nature
impact factor came from just a quarter of its publications.
Sometimes, a high impact factor could also be a function of a
single article. According to Bob Grant, a single article
published in Acta Crystallographica in 2008 raised its impact
factor to 49.9 from its usual impact of 1.5/2. This situation was
an outcome of one article in the journal cited over 6600 times
in various journals32. Obviously, it did not influence the long
term impact of the journal.
Specific editorial policies and coercive citations could also
skew the impact factor. One technique of promoting citations
is publishing articles with higher citation potential earlier in
the year, so as to gather more citations. Less subtle method of
increasing citation rates involves publishing a larger
proportion of review articles, which tend to gather more
citations. Finally, the outright champion in blunt self-
promotion is coercive citation, when authors are encouraged
to cite articles from the journal where their publication is
accepted; sometimes these articles have very little relevance to
these authors’ research.
The most established measurement of academic journal
quality is Thomson Reuters’ Journal Citation Reports (JCR)33.
It is the simplest measure of journal citation rates, based on
the impact factor. The JCR has been constantly criticized for
32 Bob Grant, “New impact factors yield surprises,” The Scientist, 21 June 2010,
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/29093/title/New-
impact-factors-yield-surprises/
33 Journal Citation Reports, http://thomsonreuters.com/journal-citation-
reports/
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low levels of transparency. According to one research team:
“When we examined the data in the Thomson Scientific
database, two things quickly became evident:  first, there were
numerous incorrect article-type designations. […] Second, the
numbers did not add up. The total number of citations for
each journal was substantially fewer than the number
published on the Thomson Scientific, Journal Citation Reports
(JCR) website […]. The difference in citation numbers was as
high as 19% for a given journal, and the impact factor
rankings of several journals were affected when the
calculation was done using the purchased data […] (Rossner,
Epps, Hill, 2007: 1092)”.
A more complex measure of the academic journal impact is
the Eigenfactor34. Eigenfactor was developed by Carl
Bergstorm, Jevin West and Marc Wiseman in order to
overcome the problems inherent to simple citation counts
(Bergstrom, West, Wiseman, 2008). According to the authors
“citation counts and impact factors do not account for where
citations come from: by these measures, citations from
prestigious journals are worth no more than citations from
lower-tier publications, and no attempt is made to adjust for
differences in ‘citation culture’ between journals and across
fields (Ibid: 11434)”. Eigenfactor, thus, calculates both an
amount of incoming citations and prestige of the academic
journals associated with them. The dataset for the calculations
is obtained from the Thomson Reuters ISI database.
The measurements that Bergstorm and his colleagues use
assign higher weights to citations in more influential
academic journals. The influence of journals is measured by
nothing else than how many other journals refer to the
34 The Eigenfactor, http://www.eigenfactor.org.
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primary journals, which leaves a distinct taste of tautology.
Bergstrom, however, claims that “simple algorithm” could
mitigate the circularity of the methodology. In his words
“Eigenfactor, accounts for the fact that a single citation from a
high­quality journal may be more valuable than multiple
citations from peripheral publications […] a citation from a
review article that has cursory references to large numbers of
papers counts for less than a citation from a research article
that cites only papers that are essentially related to its own
argument (Bergstorm, 2007: 314-315)”. The practical method
of analysis is apparently similar to the Google’s webpage
ranking. In other words, it involves tracing the network of
references and cross-references between the journals. The
method adjusts for differences in citation cultures, although
the effectiveness of this adjustment is arguable.
The Eigenfactor is somewhat more robust than simple citation
counts. However, it also poses certain questions. The
measurements are strongly influences by the size of a journal.
Doubling the size of a journal would, thus, double the score.
A rival system of measuring impact of academic journals is
the SCImago journal rank35. According to its authors “The SJR
indicator is computed over a journal citation network where
the nodes represent the scholarly journals in the database and
the directed connections among the nodes the citation
relationships among such journals (Pereira et al. 2009).” It is
obvious that SCImago is quite similar to the Eigenfactor in its
methodology. Its authors also credited Google’s Pagerank with
inspiration. Unlike the Eigenfactor, SCImago uses Scopus
database, maintained by Elsevier, for its calculations.
35 http://www.scimagojr.com/
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SCImago calculation algorithm is also somewhat different.
According to its authors, the process is the following one:
“First, each journal is assigned the same initial prestige value
1/N, where N is the number of journals in the database. Then
the iterative procedure begins. Each iteration assigns new
prestige values to each journal in accordance with three
criteria: (1) a minimum prestige value from simply being
included in the database; (2) a publication prestige given by
the number of papers included in the database; and (3) a
citation prestige given by the number and “importance” of
the citations received from other journals (Ibid)”. Eventually,
a stable state is reached, where journals are grouped in order
of impact.
Both SCImago and Eigenfactor were well received in the
academic community. They were praised for their transparent
methodology, sophistication, and more precise results.
According to one reviewer “The SCImago journal rank
indicator is a novel instrument for the evaluation of scientiﬁc
journals that may challenge the established premiership of the
journal IF in ranking scientiﬁc journals. It provides
unrestricted (open) access, is based on a larger source journal
database, and focuses on the quality of citations that a journal
receives by other journals, rather than the absolute number
(Falagas et al. 2008: 2626)”.
Still, the same authors exercise some caution about the new
measurements as “the sophisticated methodology used in the
calculation of the SJR indicator needs to be adequately
validated, and certain characteristics may need to be
reconsidered before deﬁnitive conclusions for its applicability
could be drawn (Ibid: 2627).”
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It is curious to note that both Eigenfactor and SCImago obtain
data from the same databases that the global rankings of
higher education institutions. The Eigenfactor uses Thomson
Reuters’ data, exactly like ARWU and THE rankings.
SCImago, in contrast, uses Scopus database, which is the
choice of the QS WUR.
The last important auxiliary ranking for our analysis is the H-
Index. The H-Index, unlike other rankings, measures research
production of individual scientists. Although Egenfactor,
SCImago and impact factor can also be used to estimate
productivity, H-Index is the only specialized measure of
individual research performance.
H-Index was conceived by Jorge Hirsch, a physicist at
University of California San Diego, initially to measure the
research productivity of researchers in theoretical physics
(Hirsch, 2005). However, Hirsch suggested that it may be
quite useful also for other disciplines (Ibid). Hirsch has stated
“I have proposed an easily computable index, h, which gives
an estimate of the importance, significance, and broad impact
of a scientist's cumulative research contributions. I suggest
that this index may provide a useful yardstick with which to
compare, in an unbiased way, different individuals
competing for the same resource when an important
evaluation criterion is scientific achievement (Ibid: 16572).” At
present the index can be used to measure performance of
individual researchers, research groups, and even separate
countries.
The H-index calculates both the number of papers that a
researcher publishes and the number of citations these papers
receive.  According to Hirsch “A scientist has index h if h of
his or her Np papers have at least h citations each and the
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other (Np – h) papers have ≤h citations each (16569).” A score
of 16, for instance, means that a researcher has published 16
papers, and each was cited at least 16 times.  The index does
not reflect differences in citation cultures between disciplines,
and it cannot be used to compare researchers of different
disciplines. In 2009-2010 in physics for instance the top 1% of
scientists receive more than 2000 citations per year, while for
the social sciences this number is barely higher than 15036.
An advantage of the H-Index is that it can be used with
different research and citation databases. Elsevier’s Scopus
and Thomson Reuter’s Web of Science, as well as other
databases are equally suitable for the calculation of H-Index.
However, calculation using different databases can also
produce divergent results. Lokman Meho and Kiduk Yang
investigated these differences through a comparative analysis
of H-Index results from three databases – Scopus, Web of
Science and Google Scholar. They came to the conclusion that
although Google Scholar calculates a much wider range of
publications (53% more than Scopus and Web of Science), it
also tends to index publications of lesser importance, such as
conference proceedings and presentations (Meho, Yang,
2007). In contrast, both Scopus and Web of Science provide a
more accurate picture of a scholar’s impact by calculating
publications of relatively higher importance (Ibid).
The H-Index attracted a lot of praise from the academic
community. It provides a more sophisticated and robust way
of calculating individual research impact than simple citation
counts. However, the criticism of H-Index was even more
vehement. Many of the crucial critical points were identified
36 Data from “Essential Science Indicators,” Thomson Reuters,
http://thomsonreuters.com/essential-science-indicators.
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in the articles of Alonso (Alonso et al., 2009) and Wendl
(Wendl, 2007).
Among the problems of the H-Index are possibilities for
manipulation, lack of distinction for multiple authors’ papers,
and constraining character of publication numbers. The H-
Index can be significantly increased by simple self-citations. It
does not discriminate between single and multiple authors
papers, nor accounts for various author weights. Finally, the
index constrains progression by the amount of publications
that author has. Thus, the authors with few publications of
extremely high impact will have a low H-Index irrespective of
their contribution to their fields. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for
instance, would have an H-Index of 3 (over his lifetime he
published only three works), despite his immense impact on
contemporary philosophy.
Like many other academic ranking, the H-Index also
discriminates against research in humanities and social
sciences. As has already been mentioned above, the index
does not make provision for various citation cultures. In
addition, the index counts books and papers equally, which
promotes research cultures that emphasize journal
publications. For this reason, any comparison of scholars in
different fields, using the index is practically impossible.
Finally, there were concerns of general character considering
the usefulness of the H-Index. Some authors have pointed out
the perfunctory character of both the H-Index and other
indicators that are used to evaluate individual research
performance. A group of researchers of the International
Mathematical Union stated that “The drive towards more
transparency and accountability in the academic world has
created a ‘culture of numbers’ in which institutions and
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individuals believe that fair decisions can be reached by
algorithmic evaluation of some statistical data; unable to
measure quality (the ultimate goal), decision-makers replace
quality by numbers that they can measure (cited in de la Pena,
2011: 52).” Alan Fersht commented that “The terrible legacy of
[the impact factor] is that it is being used to evaluate
scientists, rather than journals, which has become of
increasing concern to many of us. Judgment of individuals is,
of course, best done by in-depth analysis by expert scholars in
the subject area. But, some bureaucrats want a simple metric.
My experience of being on international review committees is
that more notice is taken of IF when they do not have the
knowledge to evaluate the science independently (Fersht,
2009: 6883)”.
The “in depth analysis by expert scholars” that Fersht
mentions is actually used more and more to evaluate both
quality of scientific journals and individual research
performance. In the most simplified form this method is
based on expert surveys. Hence, it is somewhat similar to the
reputational measures that the THE and QS rankings use to
evaluate research performance of universities. The main
concern of such surveys is the elimination of any subjective
bias.
Expert surveys compared to other indicators of academic
quality are a relatively reliable operation. A team of
researchers concluded in 2008 that “Compared to ISI-
generated bibliometrics, our tables are less noisy and
(probably) more securely based in expert judgements. The
high degree of expert consensus, especially at the top of the
list, across the three countries is encouraging. […] Our
headline message, however, is that expert judgments of
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journal rankings are robust and may be used confidently by
those tasked with grading  people, publications, or university
departments (McLean et al. 2009: 35)”.
In another case Alexander Serenko and Michael Dohan
compared reliability of expert surveys in comparison with the
journal impact method in the field of artificial intelligence
(Serenko, Dohan, 2011). Among their most important
conclusions are “The application of the expert survey journal
ranking method favors journals that publish more articles per
year (Ibid: 634)” and “The quality of a journal cannot be
determined based on its appearance in a single ranking list
developed with a single method (Ibid: 635).” They have also
noticed a lack of correlation in ranking of academic journals
between different approaches and the fact that “survey
respondents rely on their previous and current research areas
and over-rate the corresponding journals (Ibid)”. Concluding
the essay the authors cautioned that “In fact, the development
of journal ranking lists requires a great degree of expertise
and advance planning to ensure the validity of the ﬁndings
(Ibid: 636)”.
The expert survey method is still an imperfect measure of
quality. It does not eliminate a possibility of collective error,
partisan preferences, and fluctuations of public image. Most
importantly, its wider applications are questionable. It is not
clear what results would an expert survey achieve in case of
multicultural respondents. At the same time ignoring the
global audiences would lead to an Anglo-Saxon bias, the issue
that has already entrenched itself in the international
academia.
The expert surveys are growing in popularity, but they are
also costlier and more complicated to conduct. Hence, in the
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foreseeable future the most widespread measures of academic
quality are bound to be based on simple metrics. These
measurements are already used in a wide variety of
derivative rankings that collectively constitute a nightmare of
an aspiring scholar.
The most important derivative of the citation counts and
concurrent measures are academic journal tiers. Tiers are
groupings of journals along the lines of their perceived
quality, which is usually based on the amount of citations
they receive. Accordingly, tier-1 journals would be the most
regarded in the discipline, tier-2 journals would be less
important and so on ad infinitum. The importance of the tiers
comes from the fact that they are often used in academic
decision making. For instance, criteria for the employment of
new faculty may include a requirement of publications in tier-
1 academic journals.
The methods of grouping academic journals into tiers are
different, yet predominantly refer to the amount of articles a
journal publishes and amount of citations that the article
receive. Usually a database is used to determine impact of
journals in particular fields. Then, according to their impact,
the journals are arranged into a ranking, which in turn is
divided into multiple tiers. The rankings are produced for
various disciplines and disciplinary domains. Anne-Wil
Harzing, for instance, publishes a thorough overview of
various journal quality lists, their structure and comparison37.
Except for intentional tinkering with ranking results, all the
rankings based on citation counts are susceptible to common
37 Anne-Wil Harzing, “Journal Quality List,”
http://www.harzing.com/jql.htm.
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errors. A paper, for instance, may present an extremely
arguable or even provocative point of view and many
scholars would cite it in an attempt to rebuke it. In this case,
the paper would be counted as having the same impact as
more influential scholarly works. Methods papers and review
papers are usually cited more. The former are used as a
methodological set-up in works of other scholars, and the
latter are used to confirm a similar opinion. Various solutions
have been proposed to mitigate these shortcomings of the
rankings. However, such improvements are ought to
complicate the calculation algorithms and, so far, have only
had a limited success.
The factual information presented above needs thorough
systematization. Various rankings have been identified so far.
The three principal groups of rankings are the rankings of
higher education institutions, the rankings of academic
journals, and the rankings of scholars. Although seemingly
unrelated, all of the rankings use the same databases and
similar methods. They can, thus, be seen as various elements
of one system with the same internal logic and similar effects
on the process of knowledge production.
Two indicators of the ARWU ranking, contributing 40% of the
final score, intersect largely with the calculations of the
auxiliary rankings. These indicators are the highly cited
researchers and the amount of papers indexed in Science
Citation Index and Social Science Citation Index. Similarly,
citations per faculty contribute 20% to the total score of the QS
ranking. Even more strikingly, the THE ranking’s indicator of
research influence – “the single most influential of the 13
indicators” – is identical in its calculation method to the
calculation of academic journals’ influence. Peculiar to both
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THE and QS rankings is the expert survey method, which is
also used for creating auxiliary rankings.
The superficial connections are just the top of the iceberg.
Deeper analysis reveals that most of the rankings, including
both higher education institutions rankings and the auxiliary
rankings, are based on the same datasets. By far, the most
influential among these datasets are Elsevier’s Scopus and
Thompson Reuter’s ISI. Google Scholar is occasionally used
for ranking academic journals, but it is far behind in
popularity compared with the Scopus and the ISI.
The most striking conclusion of the ranking analysis,
however, is that they seem to steer the system of the
knowledge production in a particular direction. The success
of higher education institutions, academic journals, and
individual scholars depends on the same principal criterion.
This criterion is the sheer amount of research produced. And
as long as minimum quality standards are observed, the
system tends to prefer quantity over quality.
The more papers the institution produces the higher it will be
placed, the more papers a journal publishes the more will be
its influence, and the more papers a scholar publishes the
higher is his H-Index. Most rankings do not make much
distinction for the quality of scholarly works. Of more
importance is the sheer amount of the works produced and
their notoriety in the academic world. This notoriety could be
due to a number of reasons, not necessarily connected with a
scientific impact of the work.
This conclusion is supported by the analysis of Tobias Opthof
and Loet Leydesdorff (Opthof, Leydesdorff, 2011). According
to the authors “none of the citation-based indicators is able to
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discriminate between the categories “good” and “excellent
(Ibid: 6).” This means that for simple metrics quantity is more
important than quality. Similarly Toutkoushian and Weber
state in this respect that “Although one would think that the
optimal construct of institutional research productivity
should reflect the quality of research produced, most
currently used metrics are based on the quantity of research
produced (Weber, Toutkoushian, 2011: 128)”.
The implications of this analysis are quite important. More
and more countries are using ranking metrics as official tools
of evaluating research. David Pontille claims that rankings
become important tools of research assessment for various
national organizations (Pontille, Torny, 2010). Rankings
dominate more and more in the decision taking processes of
institutions, journals and individuals38. Thus, the system of
knowledge production in its current form creates a set of new
incentives for scholarly production. These incentives impact
the traditional academic system in various ways, changing its
dynamics. In the next chapter the implications of these
incentive changes are analyzed in greater detail.
38 Monastersky, Richard. The Number That’s Devouring Science. Chronicle of
Higher Education. October 14, 2005. http://chronicle.com/article/The-
Number-That-s-Devouring/26481
102
Scheme 1. Relationships between academic rankings.
University
Rankings
Journal
Rankings
Scholars
Rankings
Scopus                ISI
Database      Database
103
Chapter 3. University Rankings and Incentives: Theoretical
and Empirical Investigation.
3.1. Benefits of Performing in University Rankings.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how academic
rankings affect incentives on various levels. It starts by
examining the implications of academic rankings for public
policies in higher education and knowledge production. It
then proceeds to an analysis of the impact of the rankings on
institutional incentives, with particular attention to hiring
strategies. Finally, implications of rankings for individual
incentives and choices are elaborated.
According to Ellen Hazelkorn “Almost regardless of which
strategy is adopted, rankings in their brief life have already
left an enduring legacy and transformed quality assurance
and research assessment exercises into tools pursuing world-
class excellence. They underpin an almost universal drive by
governments around the world to restructure [higher
education] system, concentrate resources into more efficient,
productive and visible ‘Centres of Excellence’, and drive
differentiation (Hazelkorn, 2009: 8)”.
Except for reputation and prestige, higher position of national
higher education institutions in global university rankings
provides tangible economic advantages for countries. Prestige
of a domestic higher education system allows attracting more
students, including international students into domestic
higher education institutions. International students in many
countries (e.g. UK, USA, Netherlands, Russia) usually pay
higher fees than domestic students, thus directly benefitting
national economy. This is only a part of total benefits that
accrue to the nations with good education systems. The
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potential flow of international talent – both students and
researchers – allows these nations to retain the best and
brightest from less fortunate countries. Talented students
would then work for the benefit of a national economy.  The
reverse side of this advantage is a possibility of retaining the
domestic talent, which could otherwise wander abroad in
search of better educational opportunities. Hence, both actual
and perceived prestige of the national academy prevents the
brain drain and creates prerequisites for better
competitiveness in the global economy.
Finally, number of international students and staff is per-se a
factor in some rankings. This is a part of the general rationale
for the global higher education competition. To put it in the
most basic terms, the more international talent a country
attracts the better it fares in the rankings. The more talented
researchers there are in the country, the more credited are its
educational institutions. The more international students
there are in the country, the more widespread will be the
reputation and influence of domestic higher education
institutions.
Reinforcing this situation is the fact that better positioned
universities have more chances to attract funding from
national, regional and international sources. European Union
research grants could serve as an example here. Policy makers
are rarely inclined to carry out an in-depth analysis of
institutional performance. They usually want simple metrics –
readily provided by the rankings – to make their decisions. If
a European higher education institution could demonstrate
good performance in major international rankings, its chances
to secure European Union funding increase. This creates an
incentive for higher education institutions to perform well in
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university rankings, and for national governments to provide
more resources to their HEIs.
In many ways, the situation has a circular logic. The
institutions that have better reputations are ought to perform
better, while those that are not as lucky are desperate to do
anything to retain escaping talent. Jamil Salmi called this
situation “The Red Queen Effect” – a tribute to one Lewis
Carroll’s allegories – which implies that even to stay in one
place countries and their higher education institutions should
run as hard as they can (Salmi, 2010).
“There is a strong perception among HE leaders –
underpinned by growing international evidence – that
rankings help maintain and build institutional position and
reputation, good students use rankings to ‘shortlist’
university choice, especially at the post-graduate level, and
stakeholders use rankings to influence their own decisions
about funding, sponsorship and employee recruitment
(Hazelkorn, 2008: 199).” Considerable benefits that are
associated with good performance in university rankings
create incentives for actions on various social levels, starting
with the level of national policies and ending with personal
choices of scholars.
3.2. Policy Incentives of University Rankings.
On the most general level, academic rankings strongly
influence higher education policies. Although, the impact of
rankings is often treated dismissively, there is copious
evidence that the rankings have stimulated reforms of higher
education sector in both developed and developing countries.
The role of the rankings themselves in these reforms is often
not emphasized. Yet, the direction of higher education
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reforms clearly indicates strong influence on higher education
of either rankings themselves, or underlying systemic
tendencies that the rankings reflect.
What could be the impact of the academic ranking system on
a disinterested policy maker? Obviously, the position of
national higher education institutions in the rankings reflects
relative prestige of the national academia in the global higher
education order. This position is based on both objective and
subjective perceptions. Since a large part of ranking
calculations is actually determined by reputational surveys,
well-known institutions would have an advantage over the
lesser known ones. This is compounded by an additional
advantage to the institutions that use English language, if
only because such institutions would be better known to
international reviewers.
Another part of the ranking scores is actually research
productivity and impact. The English language bias would
also be present here, as the majority of journals indexed by
Thomson Reuters and Scopus database are in English.
However, leaving the biases aside, the research productivity
scores should be focused on to produce better performance in
the rankings. If compounded by research reputation (an
important part of the THE ranking), the policies pertaining to
research production alone could significantly influence the
position of national higher education and research institutions
in global rankings.
The simplest strategy of improving the research score of an
institution is an institutional merger. Under this scenario
multiple higher education institutions are clumped together
to create a new institution. Since the sheer research output of
the new institution would be higher, it will raise in all the
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corresponding measurements. The mergers of different higher
education institutions are more feasible in a higher education
system dominated by public HEIs. It is harder to convince
private schools to merge, whatever is the national benefit.
At the first glance the mergers are too cumbersome to
implement. Yet, they became a very popular part of higher
educational policies in the last decade. There are at least three
national cases that demonstrate wide adoption of the merger
policy. Since the appearance of global university rankings the
amount of higher education mergers increased.
In Russia, over the last decade the wave of mergers swept
through the higher educational sector. Flagship state
universities were used as bases for incorporating a range of
smaller institutions. The new elite – so called federal
universities – are now competing for unprecedented funding
from the public budget in an attempt to catch up with the
global academic system. The mergers provided a prelude for
the Blitzkrieg policy of the Russian state that has as its goal
wedging five Russian HEIs into the top-100 of global
universities39.
In a somewhat less disturbing manner, the last decade saw an
emergence of various merger projects in France. In 2009, three
separate institutions in the city of Strasbourg merged to form
a new institution, University of Strasbourg. The institution
became a strong contender to the status of one of the best
European universities, often entering into the global top-100
in the university rankings. The example of Strasbourg led to
an emergence of multiple merger projects. In Paris alone,
39 The Order of the President of Russia from 7 of May 2012, No 599 “Measures
on Realization of Public Policy in the Areas of Education and Science.”
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seven alliances of the universities have been formed with a
long-term objective of complete integration. These projects
include Sorbonne Université, Paris Sciences et Lettres, Paris
Novi Mundi etc.
To assume that the mergers are an exclusive lot of countries
with once lustrous academic traditions that hold strong
revanchist sentiment would be quite wrong. United Kingdom
was quick to jump on the bandwagon of the global merger
trends. In 2007, University of Paisley merged with the Bell
College to form one of the largest Scottish institutions of
higher education. According to Malcolm Tight thirty percent
of UK higher education institutions were involved in mergers
in the period between 1994 and 2010 (Tight, 2013).
Obviously, the mergers are not caused by university rankings
alone, but the rankings do create incentives to enlarge higher
educational institutions, especially for the countries that aim
to place their HEIs among the world’s best40. While bigger
does not necessarily mean better, in the global academic
system bigger higher education institutions are more
noticeable.
The enlargement processes are a part of a trend where
national governments invest considerable amounts of public
resources into higher education institutions that have a
potential of representing the country in global academic
system. According to Ellen Hazelkorn “Many governments
are taking steps to restructure their higher education systems
and institutions, creating greater vertical or reputation
40 See, for instance: Labi, Aisha. “University Mergers Sweep Across Europe,”
The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2 of January, 2011.
http://chronicle.com/article/University-Mergers-Sweep/125781/
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differentiation based on concentrating resources in a small
number of elite universities. France, Germany, Russia, Spain,
China, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Finland, India, Japan,
Singapore, Vietnam and Latvia – among many other countries
– have all launched initiatives with the primary objective of
creating “world-class” or flagship universities, often using
indicators promoted by rankings to define excellence
(Hazelkorn, 2013: 5).”
One way in which this process manifests itself are various
excellence policies. In the most basic form, an excellence
policy entails the creation of government fund that singles out
institutions having world leading potential to give them a
financial boost and increase their competitiveness. The idea
behind such policies is that only few national universities
have a good chance of becoming a part of international
research elite and figuring in the global rankings; hence, in
order to create the widest national representation, resources
should be concentrated in the few institutions that would be
able to become globally competitive. The downside of the
situation is that the money for funding the national elite is
drawn from the rest of the educational system. The ultimate
result of these actions is a growing inequality among the
higher education institutions and high cost of failure in case
national champions would underperform relative to
expectations.
The German Universities Excellence Initiative is a good example
of an excellence policy. “The Excellence Initiative aims to
promote top-level research and to improve the quality of
German universities and research institutions in general, thus
making Germany a more attractive research location, making
it more internationally competitive and focusing attention on
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the outstanding achievements of Germany universities and
the German scientific community41,” says the official
description of the initiative. The excellence initiative selected
11 out of 140 German universities, as well as multiple
graduate schools, for increased funding to become the leading
national centers of research. Over the period of 2006-2017, 4.6
billion Euros will be awarded to these research centers42.
The initiative has attracted increased media attention that
called the winners “elite universities” and “German Ivy
League43.” How good such an initiative will be for Germany, a
country that traditionally prided itself on the equality of its
universities, remains to be seen. The concerns about the
initiative grew even stronger after the publication of a report
that claimed that the “The Excellence Initiative has not
reached its goal44.”
Despite all the concerns, the German example has been
followed by quite a few countries. In Spain, notwithstanding
the global financial crisis, resources are, apparently, abundant
for the deserving few. In 2008, the Spanish government
launched the program Campus of International Excellence, as a
part of the University Strategy 2015. Almost 600 million euros
of the program are supposed to be invested into the
41 “Excellence Initiative,” Deutsche Forschungsgemenischaft,
http://www.dfg.de/en/research_funding/programmes/excellence_initiative.
42 “General Information,” Deutsche Forschungsgemenischaft,
http://www.dfg.de/en/research_funding/programmes/excellence_initiative/ge
neral_information/index.html.
43 Gretchen Vogerl, “A German Ivy League Takes Shape,” Science Magazine,
13 October 2006, http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2006/10/13-01.html.
44 “Excellence Initiative fails to produce diversity,” Wissenschaft Zentrum
Berlin, 12 June 2012, http://www.wzb.eu/en/press-release/excellence-
initiative-fails-to-produce-diversity.
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development of elite Spanish universities. According to
Marius Rubiralta and Luis Delgado, officials of the Spanish
ministry of education, “CEI’s overarching goal is to make
Spanish university campuses among the best in Europe, to
promote their international renown and enhance the strengths
of the Spanish university system. It aims to improve the
quality of teaching and research in Spanish universities, as
well as to achieve advances in innovation (Rubiralta, Delgado,
2010: 3)”.
Only time will tell, whether the lucky winners of the Spanish
university excellence initiative will be able to reach the
coveted positions of global research elite, but the program is
off to a very ambitious start. A dozen of national institutions
have already been selected to benefit from the program and
launch extensive educational reforms (Ibid).
The race for excellence did not spare France. According to
Ellen Hazelkorn “In 2008, the government launched the €8bn
Operation Campus, the objective of which was to establish ten
regional centres of excellence by merging universities,
research organisations and grandes écoles to enhance capacity
and visibility […]. In 2009, the government announced
additional funding under the €35bn Investments for the
Future programme (also known as the Big Loan, because the
money was raised on the financial markets) […] The flagship
component of the Big Loan was a €7.7bn Excellence Initiative
(Idex) with the emphasis on creating a group of 5-10 world-
class research and higher education clusters that could rival
those elsewhere in Europe and the United States (Hazelkorn,
2013).”
Another strategy for breaking into the global higher
education elite is the creation of new HEIs from scratch. This
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strategy is especially popular in the countries that are saddled
with bureaucratic obstacles that prevent fast modernization of
their higher education sector. In this case, there is an incentive
to create a higher education institution with a special status,
an experiment whose example may be used to modernize the
rest of the system.
Promising role models for these new institutions are new
higher education institutions of South-East Asia. Although
most of them antedate the global ranking system, they were
immensely successful in breaking into the global research
elite in just a few decades. These institutions usually have a
natural science focus and considerable graduate populations.
The most illustrious examples of these paragon institutions
are Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,
Pohang University of Science and Technology, and Nanyang
Technological University.
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology is one
example of the greenfield strategy. Created in Saudi Arabia in
2009, the university could already boast an endowment of 20
billion USD45. The university pursues the modernizing
mission typical for such institutions. Unlike other HEIs in
Saudi Arabia, the KAUST is a mixed-gender school, with no
religious policing on its campus46, which is an attempt to
model the university along new lines. The university is aimed
at providing an example for the rest of the country. It is
actively recruiting international students and professors. A
45 Jeffrey Mervis, “KAUST Names Jean-Lou Chameau As Its Next President,”
Science Magazine, 19 February 2013,
http://news.sciencemag.org/2013/02/kaust-names-jean-lou-chameau-its-next-
president.
46 “Saudis open hi-tech science oasis,” BBC, 23 September 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8270601.stm.
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recent appointment of Jean-Lou Chameau, a former president
of CalTech, as its dean demonstrates the university’s global
ambition47.
Another notable enterprise in creating new higher education
institutions is the Russia’s Skolkovo campus. The flagship
project of the campus is Skolkovo Institute of Technology,
often abbreviated as Skoltech. The new institution, created in
cooperation with MIT, is supposed to lead the Russian higher
education sector in the fields of science and technology.
According to its website, “Skoltech will educate global leaders
in innovation, advance scientific knowledge, and foster new
technologies to address critical issues facing Russia and the
world48”. Considering, that technological institutions tend to
fare very well in the international rankings, Skoltech has a
great potential to knock on the door of global research elite.
However, the ability of flagship institutions to improve the
higher education sector in their home countries
singlehandedly is arguable.
Increased funding of elite universities and creation of national
champions in higher education are important policy
tendencies created by the pressures of global competition. The
global rankings provide significant incentives for
intensification of these processes. After the emergence of the
first university ranking systems, performance of national
education institutions became an issue of major concern for
policy makers.
47 Jeffrey Mervis, “KAUST Names Jean-Lou Chameau As Its Next President,”
Science Magazine, 19 February 2013,
http://news.sciencemag.org/2013/02/kaust-names-jean-lou-chameau-its-next-
president.
48 “About Skoltech,” The Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology,
http://www.skoltech.ru/about-skoltech.
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Nevertheless, the aforementioned tendencies are not the most
important issue affecting the global system of knowledge
production. By far the most concerning tendency of the recent
years is a new disenfranchised status of humanities and
humanistic social sciences. The policy incentives that the
rankings create work strongly against the disciplines of
humanities. There are few reasons to support disciplinary
domains that do not contribute or contribute less to
performance measures of national higher education
institutions. According to Paul Thomson, “We are now living
in a decade that is driven by metrics and measures, it’s a
highly polarised academic environment in which we work
and there has been an assumption that the science,
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) subjects
have somehow been deemed to be superior or of greater
national economic interest than the arts and the humanities49.”
The advent of global university rankings coincided with
unprecedented cuts of funding for social sciences and
humanities. The logic of rankings fits well with the discourse
of global economic competitiveness and market-oriented
education. So vehement was the criticism of the “useless”
humanities and the praise of applied education that economic
statistics was completely ignored. The international trade in
creative goods and services amounted to 424.4 billion in 2005,
or 3.4% of the world trade (UNCTAD, 2008: 5). In the EU,
creative industries, nourished predominantly by humanities
graduates, contribute 2.6% of its GDP. According to a EU
report on creative industries “The economic contribution of
the cultural & creative sector is also higher than that of the
49 Paul Thompson, “Are the Arts and Humanities Relevant to Society?”
Intervention at Warwick Higher Education Summit, 28 of January 2012,
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/knowledge/culture/artandhumanities.
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sector of food, beverages and tobacco manufacturing (1.9%),
the textile  industry (0.5%) and the chemicals, rubber and
plastic products industry (2.3%) (KEA, 2006: 65).”
In the United Kingdom alone, the sector contributes 5.8% of
gross value added to the economy and employs millions of
people (UNCTAD, 2008: 30). It is in the creative sector that a
large number of humanities graduates find employment.
However, the numbers did not matter when in 2010 the UK
government decided to cut down the funding of humanities
and social sciences. The funding cuts came as a part of the
general reduction of spending on education sector. Unlike the
other disciplinary domains, humanities lost 100% of its
funding50. While the funding of STEM disciplines in the UK
remained almost the same, arts and humanities – as well as
social sciences – were virtually abandoned to fend off for
themselves.
In a less drastic manner, other countries also experienced cuts
of funding for humanities and social sciences. In the USA, the
National Endowment for Humanities (NEH) and National
Endowment for Arts (NEA) have been experiencing gradual
funding cuts over the last decade. For the 2012 fiscal year
alone, the funding to the endowments was cut by 13%, from
168 to 146 million USD51. The pressure on humanities and
social sciences even forced some universities to close
programs in these disciplinary domains. In the widely
discussed case of SUNY-Albany five humanities departments
50 Hannah Richardson, “Humanities to lose English universities teaching
grant,” BBC, 26 October 2010 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-
11627843.
51 “Federal Arts Funding,” DC Advocates for the Arts,
http://dcadvocatesforthearts.org/federalcutstofy12dcartsfunding.
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were closed in 201052. Similarly, the US’s National Science
Foundation cancelled political science grants starting from
201353.
The trend for cutting the funding for humanities is
ubiquitous. In the Netherlands 30 programs in humanities
(mostly in languages) have been eradicated over the last
years54. In Canada, the Ontario province cut 42 million from
funding of social sciences and humanities55. Obviously, a lot
of these choices were made under the pressures of global
financial crisis. The decision to ditch humanities in the first
line of budget cuts is indicative of the wider trend to prioritize
STEM disciplines.
The analysis of the problems that humanities and social
sciences are facing at present does not suggest in any way that
the situation is directly engendered by the global rankings.
The distrust to humanities is an ongoing trend that goes back
to earlier times. Nevertheless, the impact of the global
rankings lies in the creation of incentives for acceleration and
52 Margot Adler, “Cuts To University's Humanities Program Draw Outcry,”
16 November 2010, National Public Radio,
http://www.npr.org/2010/11/15/131336270/cuts-to-university-s-humanities-
program-draw-outcry.
53 Beth Mole, “NSF cancels political-science grant cycle,” Nature, 2 of August
2013, http://www.nature.com/news/nsf-cancels-political-science-grant-cycle-
1.13501.
54 Robert Visscher, “Languages and humanities courses axed as cuts force
universities to prioritise,”
28 March 2012, University World News,
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=2012032719094144.
55 Adela Talbot, “Cuts cause pain, but not panic,” 19 January 2012,Western
News,
http://communications.uwo.ca/western_news/stories/2012/January/cuts_caus
e_pain_but_not_panic.html.
117
intensification of this tendency. The main problem of
humanities is that their impact is intangible; hence, it is very
hard to measure. This difficulty spreads to the measurements
of the humanities’ research output. How could a quality of a
philosophy book measured? By the amount of citations it
would probably be equal to an average science paper. Until
the adequate measurement criteria are conceived for
humanities and social sciences, they will always be at a
disadvantage compared to more applied disciplines.
3. 3. Institutional Incentives of University Rankings.
The next level on which rankings create new incentives is the
level of higher education institutions. On this level HEIs are
faced with incentives to improve their standing in global
rankings. The benefits of these improvements are increased
funding, better quality of students and researchers, and
elevated prestige.
Hazelkorn conducted empirical research on perceptions of
HE institutions regarding influence that the rankings have.
She found that “HE leaders believe rankings are influencing
key stakeholders in ways which were unanticipated […]
Because rankings are often perceived as providing a
shorthand ‘quality mark’ by users and stakeholders, HE
leaders fear key stakeholders are drawing broad brush-stroke
conclusions which are used to either justify or refuse funding,
collaboration and accreditation (Hazelkorn, 2011: 91).” Hence,
there are incentives for the institutions to improve their
positions in the ranking race. “Because of the circle of benefit
which rankings are perceived to bring, they are driving and
incentivizing institutional decision-making and academic
behavior (Ibid: 190)”
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Attracting world-class researchers is an obvious incentive,
pre-dating the ranking times. However, in the era of global
ranking this incentive may lead to curious institutional
policies. An institution that wishes to rank higher may, for
instance, try to attract highly cited researchers that are far past
their prime. At first glance, research output of such scientist
may not be extremely copious. Nevertheless, having Nobel
Prize laureates or Fields Medal winners raises the rank of an
institution by a simple fact of having them.
Nobel laureates may be a rare commodity, but by the same
reasoning higher education institutions have an incentive to
attract distinguished scientists that may not produce much
research anymore. Big names, even if they publish few articles
per year are normally well cited and hence beneficial for their
institutions. This is a minor point, as the situation is rather a
way for some researchers to acquire a comfortable teaching
position, especially if there is a mandatory retirement plan at
their home universities. Examples are numerous here.
A more important set of strategies involves incentives
connected with numbers of faculty members. Many ranking
criteria involve calculations of faculty ratios. For instance,
both THE and QS rankings use faculty/student ratio as a
measure of teaching quality. The rankings, however, usually
take into account only full-time staff. Therefore, by playing
with definitions of full-time staff universities can achieve
widely divergent results. Marny Scully, director of policy and
analysis of the University of Toronto, demonstrated how
using the same data for faculty/student ratios could produce
results in the range from 6 to 39 students per one faculty
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member56. This situation according to her stems from the way
both full-time faculty and students are counted.
Another strategy engendered by global rankings is creating a
particular faculty structure. In some rankings, the amount of
research, produced by a higher education institution, is
divided by number of its full-time faculty members. Higher
education institutions have an incentive of reducing the
number of full-time faculty members only to those professors
that have the highest research output. At first glance, this
trend does not present much concern. Should not high
research productivity of the faculty be encouraged? However,
in the absence of other limiting criteria, the trend could take a
rather perverse form. In practice this situation could lead, for
instance, to growing difficulty of obtaining tenure. The
universities need to be sure that the new faculty will produce
acceptable research output. Thus, the necessity to trace back
productivity of every scholar expresses itself in a larger
number of intermediate positions that an aspirant scholar has
to pass before obtaining tenure.
Another feature of the situation is a trend towards separation
of research and teaching, with the former having more
privileged status. Since the quality of education is not
measured in much depth in the global rankings, the HEIs are
skewed towards favoring research over education. In the end,
performance of a university is largely measured by its
research output, and there are no incentives to invest more
into teaching. Faculty hiring committees at large universities
56 Marny Scully, “University Rankings and Faculty Data,” University of
Toronto, 18 July 2008,  http://www.utoronto.ca/about-uoft/measuring-our-
performance/university-rankings-and-faculty-data.htm.
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tend to give preference to scholars that are good at research,
rather than those that are good at teaching. The two are not
necessarily exclusive, but the natural constraint of time often
forces to excel at one activity only.
Higher education institutions do their best to create the
necessary incentives to encourage research productivity. One
strategy involves decreasing required contact hours between
faculty and students, freeing more time for the faculty to do
their research. British universities are particularly famous for
this tactics, with students at leading universities rarely
actually seeing big names that a university boasts in real life.
Less radical strategy includes dumping the majority of a
teaching load onto adjunct faculty. In this scenario,
universities rely heavily on adjuncts to teach most basic
courses, while leaving only advanced graduate seminars to
their senior faculty.
Within this new system of institutional policies and
structures, internal hierarchies arise between various
disciplines. Institutional incentives converge to promote
heavier investment into natural and biological sciences.
Humanities, due to the predicament of not contributing much
to the institutional standing in global university rankings, are
relegated to lower position of importance. According to
Rauhvargers “If attempts are made to improve research
performance solely to improve ranking scores, this may lead
to the one sided support of research in medicine and sciences
at the expense of the social sciences and by completely
excluding research in the humanities (Rauhvargers, 2011:
66)”.
Finally, on the ultimate level of zoom, even within separate
disciplines rankings create a set of incentives for particular
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choices. On the institutional level, these incentives encourage
prioritizing more scientifically oriented disciplinary domains.
Among the social science disciplines, economics has a
particularly privileged status. Obviously, there are many
factors that contribute to this status of economics: its
applicability and policy potential, its capacity to provide
prognoses and forecasts, and its relative technical simplicity.
However representative all these claims of reality is arguable.
Until the latest financial crisis the reputation of economics as
a discipline had remained untarnished, but it has diminished
since. Beyond the grander claims, however, economics has
another advantage over many social science disciplines,
which, so far, has been overlooked.
In its citation culture, the discipline of economics comes the
closest to natural and biological sciences. Precluding possible
objections, it is necessary to admit that citation rates between
economics and other sciences are still incomparable. Yet, in
contrast with other social sciences and humanities, economics
has a more active publication culture. Most of research output
of the discipline comes from papers and conference
proceedings. The situation is very different in humanities and
humanistic social sciences, where books and established
journals still play the predominant role. The same is true for
citation cultures. On average economists tend to cite much
more often than scholars in other social disciplines.
These features of economic scholarship may not seem
important, yet they contribute immensely to a bigger
institutional picture. The distinct culture of research renders
economics better suited for ranking measurements, which for
higher education institutions means a higher placement in
general and specialized rankings. The measurements of
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institutional performance in social disciplines tend to be
lumped together under the label “social sciences.”
Furthermore, humanities are often added to the cocktail
diluting the individual contributions of various disciplines. In
this scholarly panache, economics can singlehandedly pull up
the standing of an individual institution in the global
rankings.
The evidence for this situation is that institutions having
strong economic research components tend to be ranked
much better than their less economics-oriented peers.
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, pertaining mostly
to the Pompeu Fabra University, is consistently ranked
among the top economics institutions in the world. The school
has figured prominently in multiple specialized rankings. In
RePEc rankings it has been placed between 15 and 20 best
economics institutions in the world, and among the top 15
economics departments57. Similarly, an independent study by
a group of economists placed the school 3rd in Europe
(Lubrano et al. 2003).
The question is, however, not how high the Barcelona GSE
has been ranked, but what does it mean for the Pompeu Fabra
University. Since most of the faculty at the school hold joint
appointments with the faculty of Economic and Business
Science, their research output is counted as a part of the social
science production of the university. Subsequently, Pompeu
Fabra University is ranked among the top social science
57 “Top Economics Institutions,” RePEc,
http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.inst.all.html.
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institutions in the world58, and as the top social science
institution in Spain. Considering that it is one of the smallest
universities in the country that has only four social science
departments, the situation demonstrates immense advantages
of having strong economics research orientation.
Obviously, economics is not the only strength of the UPF.
However, its only other faculty that figured in some
international rankings is the faculty of political and social
sciences. A curious peculiarity of the faculty is that it has a
strong culture of quantitative research. Quantitative social
science, modeled along the lines pioneered by economics, is
another gross donor to institutional standing in global
rankings. Quantitative social research gradually converges
with economics, forming multiple border fields including
political economy, institutional economics, labor and
demographic studies.
It is striking how similar the research culture is between
seemingly different fields of computer science, economics,
and quantitative social science. There is a strong output
orientation (publish or perish), most of the research
production, especially at the junior level, is done in form of
research papers, presentation papers, and journal
publications. Citations are relatively widespread. Such a
situation contrasts with humanities and humanistic social
science approaches. Foucault, for instance, famously supplied
only a few citations to his copious volumes. Obviously, for the
global system of measurements, quantitatively oriented
disciplines are suited much better. This situation refers back
58 “University Subject Ranking,” QS,
http://www.topuniversities.com/node/4538/ranking-details/university-
subject-rankings/2013.
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to the tendency of global rankings to privilege particular
research and citation cultures.
Books are a relatively rare form of publishing in quantitative
disciplines, which is partly an outcome of quantitative
research specifics. Unlike qualitative research, where
arguments are based on laborious rhetorical constructions,
quantitative research relies on modeling and collection of data
to support the model.  This produces concise publications,
where the largest part of text is dedicated to an explanation of
a model. The format is obviously much better suited to fit the
fast pace of publications and citations demanded by the
global measurement system. Consequently, there is an
incentive for higher education institutions to encourage
quantitative research even within social sciences.
Academic rankings create new incentives even within the
same discipline. The case of economics is once again quite
illustrative in this regard. Since institutional position in
rankings is determined mostly by the amount of research it
produces and amount of citation it receives, the incentive is to
hire scholars that would not only be productive, but also be
able to publish their research and attract the largest public to
read their product. All the other factors being equal, the larger
is their peer audience, the more opportunities there are to
publish research and the more attention a scholarly work will
receive. In the discipline of economics, the largest peer
audiences are in mainstream strands of economics. Thus, for
an institution that wants to assure measurable productivity, it
is much more beneficial to hire a scholar working in
mainstream economics, at least in the short term.
Before proceeding to illustrate this idea in more detail, it is
necessary to give a brief overview of the current situation in
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the discipline of economics. Unlike many other social sciences
where a variety of different approaches and methodologies
are vying for dominance, the scores in economics were settled
some time ago. The bloodstained victors of hard-fought
intellectual campaigns are neoclassical economics and
neoclassical synthesis.  The two approaches are somewhat
different in that the latter attempts to integrate Keynesian
macroeconomic ideas with those of neoclassical approaches.
The resulting progeny is a loosely riveted system using
mostly neoclassical models for microeconomic analysis and
Keynesian models for macroeconomic analysis. It is necessary
to mention that the mainstream economics is not totally
homogeneous; however, it is cohesive enough for purposes of
this analysis.
As the mainstream approaches prevailed, alternative strands
of economics thought have been mostly moved to the fringe
of economic discourse. These strands were branded
“heterodox economics,” and they include approaches as
varied as institutional economics, econophysics, and feminist
economics. According to Robert Solow “there are always
dissenting fringes within academic economics. Marxism is
only the most persistent. There is an Austrian persuasion (a
sort of extreme individualism), there are post-Keynesians and
neo-Ricardians, and there are many other people who just
don't like what is going on in the mainstream59.”
Yet, evolutionary and institutional approaches, which until
quite recently had been lumped together with other
heterodox approaches, gradually get more and more accepted
59 Robert Solow, “The Wide Wide World of Wealth,” The New York Times, 20
March 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/20/books/the-wide-wide-
world-of-wealth.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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by the mainstream economics. Despite constant attempts to
present the ascendance of mainstream economics to
dominance as a proof of its superior quality, there is little
evidence that heterodox economic approaches are strongly
inferior to those of mainstream economics. The state of
economics scholarship is a result of a particular discursive
and political situation rather than the inherent superiority of
one of the approaches.
The situation in economics is directly relevant to the issues of
our analysis. Since there is no proof that heterodox economic
approaches are worse in their explanation of social reality, an
objective system of knowledge production would not
discriminate between the two. In other words, for a higher
education institution there should be no difference whether to
hire a heterodox or an orthodox economist. Yet, economics
faculties of higher education institutions include only a small
number of dissenting economists. Naturally, the main reason
for this is the discursive dominance of mainstream
approaches that already tilts the higher education system
towards particular choices. However, global ranking system
creates additional incentives for furthering this tendency.
The idea can be well illustrated on a hypothetical faculty
recruitment event. The assumption is that there are only two
candidates for a junior faculty position, one working in
mainstream economics and other, in heterodox economic
strands. Assuming that the institution is neutral in its
preferences, and the candidates have comparable
qualifications, the institution would be indifferent in its
choice, provided no other incentives would affect its choice.
That is precisely where the ranking system comes into play.
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Since rankings stimulate particular forms of research
productivity, there is a certain advantage for a higher
education institution to favor those researchers that would
produce more papers and more citations irrelevant of the
quality of these publications. Two factors would be
considered at this point.
The first factor is that there are more mainstream economic
journals. A team of researchers identified 64 heterodox
journals among the 254 economic journals analyzed (Lee,
Cronin, McConnell, Dean, 2010). However, in the
RePEc/IDEAS ranking, depending on definition of the
discipline, there are only 50-100 heterodox journals out of
120860. Thus, there are more articles published in mainstream
economic strands, and more possibilities to get accepted for at
least a minor journal (it is necessary to keep in mind that
university rankings do not take into account quality of a
journal).
The second factor is that there are larger audiences in
mainstream economics. Thus, ceteris paribus, larger citation
numbers can be expected for every publication. The research
of Lee, Grijalva, and Nowell support this idea. According to
the authors “This is the situation in economics where the
population of mainstream journals and articles is quite large
compared to heterodox journals and articles, with the
outcome that many mainstream journals have impact factor
scores four or five times that of any heterodox journal. The
situation is further skewed in that articles in heterodox
journals cite mainstream journals whereas articles in
mainstream journals do not cite heterodox journals. Thus
population size combined with the one-sided academic
60 http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.simple.html.
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engagement between mainstream and heterodox economics
pushes the SSCI impact factor scores towards mainstream
journals (Lee, Grijalva, Nowel, 2010: 1348).”  Under these
circumstances, at least for the initial part of an economist
career, it is better to pick a mainstream economist over the
heterodox one.
Even if the heterodox economist demonstrates outstanding
talent, for the first part of his career they would simply have
less opportunities for publishing their output. Their ideas
may create a breakthrough in some years, but over a short
time period it is reasonable to estimate lower research outputs
as defined by principal university rankings.
For any neutral institution, thus, recruitment would be
strongly tilted towards the mainstream choice. If the
heterodox economist would prove their worth, their
recruitment may not pose a problem in the future. The first
few years, however, are essential for the start of any research
career. Thus the fact that the entrance to academic market is
simpler only due to the choice of research topic should
strongly affect individual choices. This idea provides an
excellent entry into the next chapter of this work.
3.4. Individual Incentives of Global University Rankings.
It may seem unusual to analyze individual incentives when
global academic rankings are concerned. Most rankings aim
to measure the performance of higher education institutions,
journals, research groups, or departments. Only few rankings
measure individual research performance, like the H-Index.
However, the impact of the H-Index on individual incentives
is most straightforward. The other rankings affect individual
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incentives indirectly, through governmental policies and
institutional behavior.
There are three main ways in which rankings create new
incentives for individual choices. On the junior level,
government investment into harder disciplines would
engender incentives for applicants to choose better funded
disciplines. On the level of specialization, the incentives are to
choose those specializations that are more supported by an
institution.
Finally, on the graduate level even within particular
disciplines, there are incentives to opt for a particular research
topic. University rankings reinforce these incentives
indirectly, through incentives to which governments,
institutions and departments are subjected.
On the macro level, increased government funding of some
fields and disciplinary domains creates incentives for
choosing to study disciplines that are better funded. A high
school graduate wishing to pursue English literature would
doubtfully change his mind to go into natural sciences, but a
person choosing between history and economics may. How
strong is the sway of increased funding in natural sciences
and decreased funding in humanities would be an interesting
topic for a separate investigation. However, an importance of
funding for sustaining particular disciplinary domains has
already been demonstrated in history.
The case of Area Studies illustrates this point quite well. The
discipline of Area Studies emerged in the United States
shortly after the World War II. It was supported through
generous funding of major American foundations, including
Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, and Carnegie
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Foundation. The funding inflow was enormous. According to
David Szanton “between 1951 and 1966, the Ford Foundation
invested more than $270 million in Area Studies training,
research, and related programs (Szanton, 2002:
Introduction).” The situation led to an emergence of a
flourishing research area, popular among social science
scholars.
The fall of the discipline, however, was as abrupt as its ascent.
In the 1970s, new interdisciplinary approaches emerged that
challenged the dominance of area studies. As these
approaches gained currency, the funding for the discipline of
Area Studies declined, reducing the field to few maverick
programs. Obviously, the case of Area Studies is very
particular. However, it demonstrates how simple fluctuations
in funding and policies could erase entire disciplines.
Academic rankings, at present, create a set of incentives for
eliminating whole disciplines both through policy choices and
individual choices of students. All other things being equal, a
rational applicant would choose a program that is better
funded and supported. The closure of multiple humanities
departments at the State University of New York is alarming
evidence to the plausibility of this scenario.
Academic rankings also create additional incentives in the
growing division between teaching and research. As was
explained in the previous section, the rankings create
incentives for privileging research staff over teaching staff. As
the global rankings do not measure teaching quality to any
reasonable degree, investment in teaching becomes a luxury
that few institutions and individuals can afford. While most
graduate schools have an obligatory teaching component as a
part of higher level training, there are numerous incentives to
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tilt the personal emphasis of graduate students towards
research.
Individual time constraints leave only a limited amount of
time to invest into developing either teaching or research
qualifications. Unfortunately, the more time is invested into
one activity, the less time there is to invest into the other.
Since research activities are privileged at most universities,
there is an incentive for graduate students to invest more
effort into developing their research skills. Potentially, this
may lead to a situation where teaching and research would
simply become separate activities in the academic system.
Paradoxically, university rankings may also contribute to a
decreasing quality of research. Since, research productivity is
often measured as research output, there is a slight skew
towards producing copious amounts of research papers,
rather than developing a single problem in depth. Obviously,
it does not mean that the incentive is to produce research of
the lowest quality; to be published a paper needs to satisfy
minimum requirements. However, there is no reason to
develop the paper further, once the minimum acceptance
standards are reached. In this sense, the trend of modern
system of measurements is towards quantity rather than
quality. The skew could be corrected, however, if a more
sensitive system of measurements will eventually emerge.
The incentives that rankings create on the level of individual
institutions reinforce another alarming trend of strongly
privileging quantitative research over other approaches. The
majority of political science departments at prominent
universities overwhelmingly support research in quantitative
methods, political economy, and quantitative comparative
analysis. Since such research is better suited to the global
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measurements system, it contributes more to the standing of
individual institutions in the global academic hierarchy.
According to Chalmers Johnson “What happened in political
science was, I believe, an attempt erroneously to duplicate
what had occurred in economics. What happened in
economics was to take the American economy as a model and
then mathematize it and reify it as the way all economies
ought to be. Rational choice theory is the attempt to do
something like that with American democracy. A political
science Ph.D. today has been increasingly defined in terms of
an ability in rational choice theory, game theory, the
manipulation of economic models, and the formal creation of
models in which the mode of analysis is deductive rather than
inductive (JRPI, 2005).
The situation strongly affects incentives of individual
researchers. A scholar of political science, for instance, has an
incentive to choose quantitative specializations. Since research
in political economy is better funded than research in political
philosophy, it is more reasonable to specialize in political
economy. The associated prestige of quantitative social
research leads to better funding of research projects, better job
prospects, and better opportunities for scholars opting to do
the quantitative specializations. This situation strongly tilts
the system of knowledge production in the social sciences
towards highly formalistic deductive research, and sculpts
social science on the model of natural sciences in their
research and publication culture.
Even within individual disciplines global rankings create
incentives to choose some research topics over others. On this
level, incentives also work through a proxy. However, these
are not policy and institutional incentives but departmental
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incentives. After all, it is on this level that decisions to
promote individual researchers are taken. To explain how it
works, let us return to the thought experiment that was
described in the previous chapter. In particular, the
experiment portrays a selection committee of junior faculty at
a hypothetical economic department.
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, in the case of
selection between the two candidates for junior faculty
positions, there is an incentive to choose a person working in
the mainstream economic strands. The incentive comes from a
reasonable assumption that, all other things being equal,
mainstream researchers will have more chances to publish
their research. Hence, they will be more productive. Whether
this assumption will prove correct in each individual case is
not important, as, in large selection group, it should work.
At this point it is necessary to elaborate the situation with
individual opportunities for publishing in the discipline of
economics. In the previous section, the assumption that
mainstream economists have more opportunities for
publication was taken for granted. It seems reasonable that
since a large majority of economists work in mainstream
economic approaches there are more options for publication
and scholarly audiences are wider. This situation, however,
needs to be put in real numbers.
Indirect evidence of the utter dominance of mainstream
approaches in economic sciences is that the Journal of
Economic Literature out of 19 primary subcategories of
economics dedicates only one section (Section JEL: B5) to
heterodox economic approaches. Within this category many
dissimilar strands of economics are lumped together,
including Austrian economics, Evolutionary economics,
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Feminist economics, institutional economics, Marxian
economics, Socialist economics, and Sraffian economics.
Considering that in addition to the seven fields of heterodox
economics, The New Palgrave Dictionary adds another
dozen, it is surprising that only one category is dedicated to
the heterodox strands of thought.
Classification indexes are just labels put on research. To
understand what the situation in the publishing world is, it is
necessary to see what the actual opportunities for publishing
are available to heterodox economists. The preliminary
analysis is enough to demonstrate that the publishing
opportunities are not equal between the sub-disciplines.
RePEc, for instance lists more than 1000 journals on its
website. It is hard to determine how many of these journals
would be open to publish heterodox articles, but in a
comprehensive study aimed to equalize the impact of
heterodox and orthodox journals, Frederic S. Lee found only
69 heterodox journals. The simple comparison is staggering.
Furthermore, if we take into account, that of these 69 journals
the majority publishes articles on the border of mainstream
acceptance (e.g. institutional economics), and does not
publish more radical heterodox ideas, we have a situation
where some heterodox economics strands have only a
handful of journals for publication.
Obviously, nothing prevents a heterodox economist
publishing in mainstream economics journals. Academia is
supposed to be an environment open for contestation and
criticism. In practice, the situation is not as objective as it may
seem.
In 2008, Jack Reardon, a professor of Hamlin University,
conducted an investigation of barriers of entry to the
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mainstream journals by heterodox economists (Reardon,
2008).  He conducted a survey of more than 1000 heterodox
economists, aimed at calculating acceptance rates of
heterodox papers to mainstream economics journals. Reardon
found that “A total of 95 percent of the mainstream papers
sent to mainstream journals were accepted, whereas no
heterodox papers submitted to mainstream journals were
accepted as is, after 1990 (Ibid: 189)”. He concluded that: “The
evidence overwhelmingly supports the existence of an
ideological entry barrier. This barrier goes beyond the normal
competitive nature of journal publishing, that is limited
journal pages constricting the number of ‘‘good papers’’ that
can be published, suggesting that there is an insidious
ideological entry barrier preventing heterodox ideas from
being published (Ibid: 185).”
Implications of this situation are quite important for
individual choices of research topics. A junior economist with
research interest in non-standard economic strands has an
incentive to shun this interest in favor of more mainstream
approaches. Assuming that the junior researcher has nearly
perfect information about the preferences of the selection
committees, and the researcher is dedicated to an academic
career, there is a disincentive to choose heterodox economics
research topics. The second assumption is quite important for
the following reason: if alternative career pursuits are
considered, the behavior of selection committees is not as
crucial.
Since for an academic economist employment is a critical part
of the career choice, few economists would choose to pursue
non-mainstream economics research. This is especially valid
for junior scholars, as the first academic employment is
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extremely important both for the future academic career, and
for staying in the academia altogether.
Continuing the thought experiment, an average junior
economist has two options: either to work extremely hard to
excel among their peers – which is complicated by the fact
that opportunities for presenting and publishing research are
scarcer – or to switch to more mainstream economics topics,
at least for the initial part of his career. Other things being
equal, a rational junior scholar would choose the second
option. The result is well summarized by Subrick and
Beaulier, “A heterodox economist who only publishes in
heterodox journals (because she cannot get articles published
in mainstream journals) has less prospects for academic
success.  In response, the heterodox economist does not
pursue her true interest.  Instead, she writes articles
acceptable for a more mainstream audience […] meaning that
the intellectual products of heterodox economists differ little
from mainstream articles (Beaulier, Subrick: 2012: 1),”
although they later attempt to contest the claim for the case of
Austrian economics.
As has been demonstrated, the rankings contribute to the
emergence of new incentives in the system of knowledge
production. The incentives are present on various levels, from
the level of policy making to the level of personal choices of
research topics. These incentives tilt knowledge production in
a particular direction. It does not mean that the rankings
single-handedly push academia towards certain choices. As
we have seen, some of the processes that started to intensify
with the advent of global rankings have their roots in history.
However, the global rankings do play a role in privileging
certain research topics over others.
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On the level of policy making and the level of institutional
behavior, effects of global academic rankings are well
researched.  However, on the micro-level the effect of global
ranking system has not been studied so far. The common
assumption is that since rankings measure mostly
institutional performance, they do not penetrate to the level of
individual decision making. As this chapter has demonstrated
this assumption is not correct. Although incentives that the
rankings create are more subtle, they are present on the level
of individual choices. We have all the necessary information
to demonstrate this effect both theoretically and empirically.
3.5. Schemes and Models.
In this section, the conclusions of the previous sections are put
together in a form of simple game-theoretical model. The
model demonstrates how the global measurement system
contributes to choices on the individual level. Before
proceeding to illustrate the model, let us put all the levels on
which global academic rankings produce new incentives in a
format of a single scheme. The scheme would give an
opportunity to position the sketchy narrative in a single
system and elucidate the links between various incentive
levels.
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Scheme 2: The Rankings and Incentives on Various Levels.
Let us briefly summarize the incentives that ranking create at
various levels. At the most general level, the level of policy
making, rankings create incentives to pursue certain policy
strategies. The simplest way to improve the position of
domestic institutions in the rankings is to merge various
higher education institutions into larger entities. Since many
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rankings have a substantial size bias, this strategy could
significantly improve the position of domestic higher
education institutions in the global academic hierarchy.
Similarly, some countries may attempt to break into the global
academic elite by creating new institutions that suit
particularly well to the global system of measurements. This
move is particularly suitable for countries ridden by
bureaucratic inefficiencies, where the new flagship
institutions could serve as motors of growth for the rest of the
educational sector. These higher education institutions
usually have a natural science and technology emphasis and
large graduate populations.
A more sophisticated strategy that national policy makers are
tempted to pursue is redistribution of resources towards
hand-picked centers of education. This strategy often goes
under the label of various excellence initiatives. The rationale
behind the strategy is that it is impossible to have all of the
higher education institutions in the global elite, and it is
reasonable to concentrate the resources in a handful of
institutions that have a shot at global leadership. This is one
of distributive strategies, as the money for the higher
education elite usually comes from other economic sectors.
The most important distributive incentive, however, is the
shift of funding from “softer” scholarly pursuits, such as
social sciences and humanities into sciences and engineering,
the fields that are more efficient from the perspective of global
measurement system. Since sciences, by virtue of a very
particular research and social culture, have a better-
measurable impact, it is only logical to invest more resources
into their development and promotion.
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On the level of institutions incentives for particular choices
are equally affected by global rankings. Among the minor
incentives are head hunting for distinguished faculty, if only
to have the names nominally on the faculty, and tinkering
with the data, so as to come out favorably in criteria with
wide margins of oscillation. Another incentive on the
institutional level is to invest more into research activities
rather than teaching. This tendency could manifest itself in
various forms. The recruitment process may give preference
to faculty more oriented towards research; teaching load and
auxiliary activities of scholars with high research productivity
may be reduced.
A more significant set of incentives concerns distribution of
resources within a higher education institution. These
incentives mimic to some extent the policy incentive of
shifting funding towards the STEM fields. In a similar
manner, a higher education institution that wants to place
high in the rankings has an incentive to promote certain types
of research. The most obvious incentive is to promote STEM
disciplines. However, the dynamics of a higher education
institution is more complex and often restricts drastic shifts of
funding. A more elaborated strategy is to support research
that contributes more to institutional performance. On the
level of faculty, this could involve favoring quantitative
research with better measurable research production. On the
level of department, this could involve favoring more
mainstream research topics over riskier pursuits.
It is at this point that incentives on various levels start to
merge affecting one another. For instance, better funding of
STEM disciplines on the policy level may affect institutional
decisions to invest more into particular disciplines. The very
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same policy decision may skew the choices of majors and
careers by undecided students. Various excellence initiatives
may stimulate a student to opt for a more centrally located
rather than local higher education institution. The race for
excellence may also stimulate institutions to use strategies
that would present them in the most favorable light to the
policy makers that distribute funding.
The most interesting aspect of interaction between incentive
levels can be observed on the institutional-personal axis.
While policy choices impact higher education institutions in a
very straightforward manner, institutional, faculty and
departmental decisions often have very nuanced implications.
In the end, all of these decisions are driven by the same logic
of global competition, expressed in a simple system of
measurements.
An institution that wants to perform better in any ranking
system has a strong incentive to boost up its research profile.
This translates into the levels of faculties and departments as
a requirement to increase their research productivity, if they
want to receive more funding. Departments are the basic
recruiting units of the institution. Thus, in their recruitment
policies they have an incentive to prioritize people with
strong research profiles, whatever is their teaching record.
The system is so pervasive that the potential applicants are
perfectly informed about this preference. Therefore, in their
graduate studies they have an incentive to dedicate more time
to research activities rather than their teaching activities. This
is one of the ways institutional incentives translate into
personal incentives.
Much more complex is the institutional incentive of
prioritizing certain types of research, since it can work on
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different levels. For instance, on the institutional level, better
funding of STEM disciplines may create an incentive for a
potential applicant to choose a particular specialty for
institutions with structured curricula, or choose a particular
major for institutions where curriculum is flexible. Obviously,
this process would only work at the margin. A person
majoring in English would not switch to biochemistry, but a
person majoring in the philosophy of science could decide to
follow a more scientific pathway.
Another set of choices is engendered by an incentive to
promote quantitative over qualitative research.  The trend is
so ubiquitous that even in humanities there are constant
attempts to introduce quantitative methodologies of research
as exemplified by the case of experimental philosophy. This
incentive is particularly important for the departments that
stand on the methodological fringe, for instance in the field of
social sciences. Among the leading research institutions in
social science, there are just a handful of departments that still
have a strong qualitative research program. The preference
for quantitative research leads to a better availability of
resources to pursue this choice (e.g. supervisors, specialized
software) and fostering of quantitative research. Under these
circumstances, students have an incentive to choose
quantitative methodologies in their research topics.
Finally, the most intricate relationship between institutional
and personal incentives can be spotted on the level of
departmental recruiting procedures. As was mentioned
before, research productivity is paramount to the success of a
potential employee. However, it is not only the productivity
that matters, but also what kind of research a person does.
The system of academic rankings creates incentives to choose
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more traditional research topics over more radical projects.
This happens primarily due to the fact that more established
topics have wider academic constituencies and better
publication opportunities, which serve as a good
approximation of higher research output of a potential
employee working in traditional research fields.
To illustrate how this process works, it is necessary to
construct a simple model. This model is based on game theory
methods. The case for the game is the hypothetical
recruitment event that was discussed in the institutional
incentives section. In this section, however, both individual
and institutional incentives are put together in order to make
a visual demonstration of the ideas that have been discussed
in the previous paragraphs. The game reflects an interaction
between two levels of incentives: individual incentives and
institutional incentives.
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Scheme 3. Interactions between Incentives.
The assumptions of the game are as follows. There are two
players in the game. The first player is a graduate student
choosing a research topic. The second player is a selection
committee, recruiting junior faculty members. The committee
acts as a unit, representing interests of a department. The
order of moves is not important. Each of the players has two
choices for a total of four outcomes of the game.
The first player is a graduate student in economics that could
opt for two large strands of economics research. One strand
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includes all the various mainstream topics of research. The
other strand includes any of the heterodox research topics. It
is assumed that the student has a preference for heterodox
research in the discipline. This latter assumption is not
necessary as the model would work equally well for a neutral
actor. However, the assumption that the student has
preferences for heterodox research would allow
demonstrating the point of the section better. The student is
rational and aims to maximize his payoff.
The second player is a recruitment committee for junior
faculty. The committee selects between two candidates that
are absolutely equal. The only difference is the strand of
economics in which they are working. Unlike the graduate
student, the selection committee is ideologically neutral
between the two candidates. If the neutrality assumption is
removed, the game would not illustrate the point of the
section clearly. The committee is rational and acts to
maximize the payoff from its choices.
The payoffs of the game are random numbers. The numbers
themselves do not matter, as long as the order of preferences
is observed. Let us first model the preferences of the players.
Orthodox Committee
Student Orthodox Heterodox
Heterodox
Model 1. Preferences of Players.
1
2 1                2
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As we defined that the student has a preference for the
heterodox research, we put his payoff for choosing the
heterodox topics at 2, and his payoff for choosing orthodox
topics at 1, independently from the actions of the second
player. The base of the second player is the payoff of 1, as we
assume that the committee is initially perfectly neutral in its
preferences. The payoffs, however, should be modified using
the information of provided previously to complete the game.
In order to do that, we need to combine the two players in one
game.
Committee
Orthodox Heterodox
Orthodox
Student
Heterodox
Model 2. Student’s Preferences taking into account the
Committee’s decision.
Since we assume that the goal of the student is to secure
academic employment, his payoffs are strongly affected by
the fact whether he is selected or not. The student is selected if
the committee choice between heterodox and orthodox
economists corresponds to the student’s research choice. In
other words, the students gets selected if he chooses to work
in heterodox strand and the committee chooses a heterodox
2 0
1 3
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economist, or if the student chooses orthodox strand and the
committee also chooses orthodox economist. The other two
outcomes are negative for the student. Hence, one point is
added to initial preferences of the student if he gets chosen,
and one point is detracted if he does not get the job. The
biggest payoff that the student can get here is if he chooses
the heterodox research strand, and the committee still chooses
the student. It is, however, not the dominant strategy, as the
student is unsure whether the committee will necessary
choose the heterodox option.
Committee
Orthodox                Heterodox
Orthodox
Student
Heterodox
Model 3. Combined Preferences of Players.
Since we assumed that the committee is ideologically neutral,
it does not have a clear preference towards one or the other
strand of economics. However, if it chooses the orthodox
option, it will have an extra benefit of X, rendered by the fact
that, other things being equal, orthodox candidate has more
opportunities to get published and larger audiences.
Therefore, X is an added advantage of choosing the orthodox
economist. As long as X is bigger than 0, the committee has a
dominant strategy to follow. The system of academic
2; 1+X 0; 1
1; 1+X 3; 1
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rankings, actually, makes X a positive number. In the global
competition of measurements even a marginally higher
productivity is paramount to success.
The committee, thus, has a dominant strategy to follow. This
strategy is to choose the orthodox option. Since both players
are perfectly informed about the preferences of each other,
there is only one equilibrium in the game. This equilibrium
happens in the upper left quadrant. Knowing that the
dominant strategy of the potential selection committee is to go
for the orthodox option, the student is better off to choose an
orthodox topic for research. Obviously, this outcome is valid
only in case our assumptions hold true. For the selection
committee, the assumptions are plausible due to better
payoffs in every case that the orthodox candidate is selected
among the two equal candidates. For the student, the
assumption is plausible only if he is neutral or has a moderate
preference towards heterodox research. If the preference
towards heterodox research is stronger, the student may opt
for doing this research even if his odds of getting employed
are at significant risk.
The model demonstrates interrelations between the incentives
that the academic ranking system creates on institutional and
individual level. Obviously, the rankings do not determine all
the choices that are made within academic system.
Nevertheless, they introduce certain incentives that pervade
academic decision making on various levels. Through these
incentives, rankings contribute to a tilt of the academic system
towards certain choices. This tilt may be negligible in
individual cases, but in aggregate it significantly affects the
system of knowledge production.
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3.6. Empirical Testing.
In the previous sections of the chapter, the main discussion
developed around the incentives that the global academic
ranking system creates on various levels. The crux of the
discussion centered on the intersection of institutional and
individual incentives. The model of the previous section
showed how incentives for institutional behavior can affect
individual choices and steer knowledge production in a
particular direction.
The model alone is unable to determine whether the actual
situation is exactly as predicted. Some empirical confirmation
is necessary to show that both institutional and individual
behavior confirms the predictions of the model. In order to
confirm the prediction that the model made, we conducted
two surveys aimed at both institutional and individual actors.
The first survey targeted graduate students. The aim of the
survey was to find out which factors contribute to the choice
of research topics by the students. Among the factors that
figured in the survey were some directly relevant to our
research. We assumed, for instance, that securing an
employment was as important as pursuing a particular
research topic for a graduate student. There were multiple
questions that aimed to elucidate this particular relation.
Another survey that was crucial to confirm the predictions of
the model was a survey of recruiting committees’ members.
The survey aimed to find out which factors were most
important for the committee in a potential employee. Through
this survey we attempted to confirm the importance of
research productivity to the selection process.
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The surveys were sent to a set of institutions selected
randomly out of top departments as ranked by
RePEc/IDEAS61. Two European, one Australian, one Israeli,
and one South-Asian university were added by the author to
increase diversity. The surveys were completely anonymous.
The student surveys were divided into seven batches to
prevent tampering with the results and notice any statistical
irregularities. The faculty surveys, due to a smaller size of the
respondent group were divided into two batches.
Hundreds of invitations have been sent to both students and
senior staff of the universities. The final result comprised 301
response by the students, and 75 responses by the faculty. The
survey is far from being completely representative of the
academic system. However, it allows seeing the trends and
forming an idea of whether the predictions of the model are
correct.
In general, the results of the surveys confirm the predictions
of the model. Before proceeding to the more crucial points, let
us provide a general picture of what the survey
demonstrated. First, let us see the results of the student
survey.
More than half of the respondents (52.7%) conduct their
research in the field of microeconomics. The second most
important research area is macroeconomics (29.07%).
Research in econometrics, international economics, and
political economy was done by 10-20% of respondents. Most
importantly, only 5.8% of respondents do research in various
strands of heterodox economics, despite the fact that survey
61 The complete list of the surveyed institutions can be consulted in the
appendix 3.
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included some of the departments with significant presence of
heterodox economics faculty. In a larger selection of the
faculties, the number would most probably decrease. What
this means is that very few graduate students, at present, do
research in heterodox economics.
The factors that mattered in the selection of topics for the
research are interesting to look at in this respect. Although the
leading factor in absolute importance is personal interest
(9.14/10), it is followed closely by career/employment
prospects factor (6.32/10) and relevance/popularity of the
topic factor (6.27/10). These numbers suggest that among the
leading factors that determine the choice of student topics are
the factors connected with market and discursive value of the
research. The emphasis on market value speaks to the
importance of finding employment as one of the main
priorities of a graduate student and confirms the preferences
of the student player in our model. The importance of
discourse value of any research is discussed in detail in the
fourth chapter of the dissertation. The leading importance of
the personal interest in combination with the fact that only
5.8% students conducting research in heterodox economics
may be interpreted as a general lack of interest towards the
discipline. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that
graduate students undergo the selection process on their
application to a graduate school. In this process potential
students interested in heterodox economics could be either
sieved out or, in rare cases, encouraged to change their topic
later. The latter parts of the survey demonstrate that the
interest to heterodox economics is much stronger than the
number suggests.
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The student survey demonstrated an almost perfect
awareness of the graduate students about the preferences of
the junior recruitment committees. The students identified
that the main factors that contribute to the employability of
the potential candidate are research productivity (8.86/10),
research topic quality (8.61/10), and research fit to the
recruiting department (7.87/10). An almost perfect correlation
in the order of preferences between the student survey and
the professors survey (in response to the same question),
confirms that the student player is almost perfectly informed
about the actions of the committee player. Curious outcome of
the survey is that both students (4.54) and professors (3.16)
identified teaching experience as the least important factor in
the selection of the junior faculty. This fact evidences to the
failing status of teaching and prioritization of research in the
academia.
The next two questions of the survey aimed to elucidate the
order of preferences in the choice between a research topic
and a possibility to find employment. When the question was
put in a softer way (changing the research topic if alternative
provided better prospects) 56% of the students confirmed
their willingness to do so. However, when the stronger
version of the question was put (changing the research topic
in which the student is interested, if it compromised
employment prospects), only around 53% confirmed their
willingness to change their topic for the one that would be
better for finding employment. Only 6.4% of students
decidedly declined changing their research topic in the softer
version of the question, and only 5.7% did so with the
stronger version. Although this situation is not a rule, a slight
majority of the students would be willing to change their
research if an alternative provided better employment
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prospects or their current research would compromise these
prospects. The results confirm the unwillingness of the
student player to choose the topic that would negatively
affect employment chances.
Finally, the last set of questions concerned students’ attitudes
towards heterodox economics. This is an indirect test of the
leanings of the current academic system. Considering that
only around six percent of the respondents do research in
heterodox economics, it is reasonable to suspect that the
amount of people interested in the discipline would waver
around this number. However, the results of the survey are
quite surprising. More than 57% of respondents replied that
they either have or had interest in heterodox economics.
Furthermore more than 54% of respondents confirmed that
they either would be interested (23.8%) or would consider
(30.7%) doing research in heterodox economics strands.
Although it is necessary to make an adjustment for
institutional economics, mentioned among heterodox
economics strands, which could have pulled the positive
response up somewhat, the result is still surprising. The
discrepancy between students that are doing research in
heterodox economics strands, and those that would be
interested in doing such research is also interesting. The
explanation towards which the dissertation leans most is that
problematic status of heterodox economics, relatively worse
career prospects in the discipline, and complications in
getting published contribute to this outcome. And although
not among the most important reasons, the respondents that
would not do research in heterodox economics identified
worse career prospects (21%), lower chances of publishing
(21%), and reputation of heterodox economics (21%) as some
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of the reasons they would not do heterodox economics
research.
Not less interesting are the results of the recruiting committee
faculty. The surveyed faculty have identified their main
research areas as microeconomics (52.38%), macroeconomics
(34.91%), and econometrics (20.63%). Only 6.34% of
respondents work in heterodox economics strands.
As has already been mentioned, the preferences of the faculty
for the recruitment of the young faculty are well-understood
by the potential applicants. Among the main factors that
influence the recruitment are research topic quality (8.99/10),
research productivity (8.95/10), and research topic fit to the
profile of the department (6.17/10).
The faculty confirmed that they could predict the research
productivity of the potential candidate. More than 86%
replied that they either could, or could rather predict the
research productivity. This point is quite important for our
model, since of its main assumption was that the recruitment
committee is aware of the lower research productivity of
heterodox candidates. Obviously, this fact does not imply that
the recruitment committee could necessarily predict
heterodox economists producing less research. However, the
following responses suggest so.
More than 67% of the faculty affirmed unwillingness to
recruit heterodox economics candidates. Only 15% claimed
that they would be willing to recruit a heterodox student. In
part the situation could be explained by a certain bias towards
heterodox economics. This is confirmed by the fact that
among the reasons for their unwillingness to recruit a
heterodox researcher the faculty claimed the reputation of
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heterodox economics (26.8%). Aside for the ideological
concerns, however, the main reasons for the plight of the
heterodox student are lower predicted research productivity
(48.77%) and unpredictable academic performance (46.33%).
In sum, the survey results overwhelmingly confirm both the
assumptions and the conclusions of our game. The student
player is well informed about the preferences of the recruiting
committee. The student player is willing to change the
research topic if necessary for getting employment. Among
the two candidates the recruiting committee would select the
candidate with higher research productivity. The committee
is aware that heterodox candidates have lower research
productivity. This means that almost every recruiting game
would proceed along the lines of the outlined scenario. The
rankings reinforce new values in the academia, and these
values work against marginal strands of research.
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Chapter 4. Beyond Academic Rankings.
4.1. Wider Implications and the Future of Rankings.
The discussion of the previous chapter focused on incentives
that rankings add into the academic system and effects that
these incentives have. The main conclusion of the previous
section was that the rankings work on the margin. In other
words, rankings often provide only marginal incentives to
follow certain choices. If an institution has a strong
humanities department, it would not be tempted to shift more
funding to STEM disciplines. Similarly, department strong in
qualitative methodologies would not be likely to invest more
into developing quantitative research culture.  On the
individual level, an ideologically motivated scholar would
probably not change their research topic either.
Why are the marginal incentives that rankings create
important?  The answer to this question lies in the fact that,
although an effect of marginal incentives might not be crucial
in each separate case, in aggregate these effects could
contribute to a significant tilt in the academic system. Scholars
who are strongly resolved to pursue heterodox economics
research would pursue this research even if it will
detrimentally affect their employment chances. However, an
unresolved graduate student would be strongly tempted to
reorient his research towards more orthodox topics. To make
an analogy with the political process, those are undecided
voters that usually crucially affect the outcome of any
campaign. In the academia, the undecided mass of students is
also critical to determine the direction of knowledge
production.
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The effect becomes stronger the more national or institutional
involvement in global competition is. On the policy level, the
more the country is involved in the international brain race,
the more it will be likely to pay attention to measurements.
Hence, for the countries that are at the core of the system or
trying to position themselves close to the core, rankings create
stronger incentives.
China, for instance, could serve as a good example of country
acting in accord with the ranking incentives. Large amounts
of Chinese research funding go to the STEM disciplines62, in
particular to science and technology studies. Chinese
institutions on par with the government put strong efforts
towards repatriation of the brightest scientists from abroad63.
New research centers, with a strong tilt towards science and
technology and a large ratio of graduate students, are created
(Litao, Jinjing, 2009).
The same is valid for higher education institutions. The more
an institution is involved in the global competition, the
stronger is the effect of the incentives that rankings create.
This is valid on multiple levels. An institution that does not
value participation in the global competition would not be
likely to pay much attention to the incentives. However, for
top institutions that are resolved to remain among the global
elite incentives of the rankings are crucial. Their policies and
choices ought to reflect the logic of the ranking system.
62 “China urged to seize on new tech revolution,” China Daily, 30 October
2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-
10/30/content_15856766.htm.
63 “China plans to attract more overseas Chinese scholars in next 5 years,”
Global Times, 27 August 2011,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/672861/China-plans-to-attract-
more-overseas-Chinese-scholars-in-next-5-years.aspx.
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According to Bowman and Bastedo “Rankings are likely to
inﬂuence those who are vulnerable to status hierarchy
produced by rankings, and that hierarchy of perceived value
generates resources for research universities (Bowman,
Bastedo, 2010: 19).”
The same situation is valid for top departments and schools.
For these schools creating the product that the rankings value
most is essential to their institutional status. Returning to the
example of economics, the leading economics schools would
have a strong disincentive to hire economists working in
heterodox strands simply because their predicted research
productivity is lower.
A quick analysis of the leading economic departments
confirms this point. Lee, Grijalva, and Nowell have compiled
the ranking of economics departments of the US universities
with a meaningful presence of heterodox economists (Lee,
Grijalva, Nowell, 2010). In total 27 economics departments
were ranked, including such powerhouses as UC Berkeley
and NYU. The ranking includes number of heterodox
economists on the faculty of an institution and their
importance index, the percentage that the heterodox
economists contribute to the total productivity of a
department. If we compare this ranking with the general
ranking of economic departments provided by RePEc/IDEAS,
which calculates the overall impact of academic departments
based on traditional citation counts, interesting results
emerge.
In the heterodox ranking there are twelve university
departments where heterodox economics research constitutes
relatively high input of total research productivity (more than
30%). Out of these departments only 1 department, that of UC
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Riverside was ranked among 25% of university departments
in the US in 2013. The curious fact among the rest of the 27
departments is that there is an almost perfect inverse
correlation between how much heterodox research is being
done at the department and how high it is placed. Even
relatively strong institutions, figuring prominently in global
university rankings, have relatively badly ranked university
departments in economics, if these departments produce
heterodox economics research. Relatively well ranked
universities with high proportion of heterodox research
include University of Massachusetts Amherst, Northeastern
University, University of Utah, University of Nebraska-
Linkoln, and Temple University. None of these universities’
economics departments figure in the top-233 economics
departments rated by RePEc, although relative to their
position in the world university rankings they should be
around the top-100.
Elite economics departments deserve special mention. Out of
top fifty world universities, the schools that have meaningful
heterodox presence number a disappointing four: University
of Michigan, UC Berkeley, New York University, and
University of Washington-St. Louis.  Each of these
universities has only two faculty members working in
orthodox fields and their contribution to overall research
productivity of their departments is relatively low. The vast
majority of other top economics schools and departments
have virtually no heterodox economists. In sum, among the
faculty of the very best economics departments in the United
States the presence of heterodox economists is negligible.
This analytic exercise does not completely prove a tilt against
heterodox economics. Correlation does not mean causation.
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However, the fact that a huge chunk of economics research is
underrepresented in virtually all top universities is quite
interesting. Furthermore, the situation where departments
with high heterodox research activity are not included even in
a relatively large selection of top economic institutions is
somewhat puzzling.
The system has a circular logic. The more non-standard
economics strands are sidetracked, the more profound this
trend becomes. There will be more and more economists
working in mainstream fields of economics, which would
make the field even more dominant. At the same time, there
will be less and less economists working in non-standard
economics sub-fields, which threatens the field with
extinction and creates a risk of rigidifying the discipline.
The trend would similarly reflect on the availability of
supervisors. The more mainstream economists the system
produces, the more they dominate economics departments.
The predominance of mainstream economists in economics
departments could lead to the situation where even if a
potential graduate student would like to do research in non-
standard strands of economics, they might have a problem
simply finding a suitable supervisor. Furthermore, as at the
first degree level the role of a supervisor is critical in the
choice of research topic, the supply of people that would be
willing to do research in non-standard economics could be
undercut at the source.
It is reasonable to ask how this information is important for
the system of knowledge production. After all, heterodox
economics strands have never been extremely popular with
the majority of economists. The rankings, in this respect, just
add further incentives for marginalization of already
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marginal fields of study. It is not even clear to what extent the
rankings contribute to the demise of non-standard economics
strands. The only thing that follows directly from our analysis
is that there are these new incentives for marginalization.
Therefore, in large numbers these incentives would have
some effect on the economics discipline.
The sad fate of heterodox economics aside, the importance of
this discovery lies rather in the fact that the marginalization
process could be extrapolated on wider situation in the
international academia. If economics and other quantitative
disciplines contribute more to the standing of an institution in
international rankings, why not invest more resources into
these disciplines? If in political science, political economy
research brings better measurable results than in political
philosophy, why not promote the specialization in political
economy? That is, of course, if social sciences and humanities
are to be supported at all. In the end, natural and life sciences,
as well as mathematics and computer science give a rather
considerable advantage for the institutions that choose to
specialize in these fields. Relatively young technological
schools, such as HKUST, showed well the direction to go in
case an institution wants to break into top ranks.
The process of marginalization works on multiple levels. On
the level of the country, it sidetracks less known institutions
in favor of more prominent and recognized ones. This is
especially dangerous for up-and-coming institutions that did
not have enough time to demonstrate their potential. If such
institutions are not in focus of government policies, their
growth may be stunted by their inability to compete on par
with their more established peers.
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On the level of higher education institutions, marginalization
manifests itself in better support for particular departments.
This means that there are strong incentives to invest into the
departments that are better suited to position their higher
education institution among the global universities elite.
Again, this situation is more dangerous for institutions that
have relatively weak departments in the disciplines less
favored by the rankings. There is no reason to support a
young department of literature during the time that it needs
to grow stronger, when the resources could be invested into
department that could give an immediate benefit.
Furthermore, to make matters worse there is a disincentive to
found new departments in humanistic disciplines, because
resources that need to be invested into this endeavor would
give a relatively better payoff in STEM departments.
On the level of faculties and departments there is an incentive
to promote fields and disciplines that suit better to the system
of measurements devised by various rankings. The alliance
between social sciences and humanities is ditched in favor of
the alliance between social sciences and sciences, with
quantitative and experimental methodologies taking
precedence over qualitative methodologies.
On the level of individual disciplines, less popular fields of
inquiry are being marginalized in favor of more prominent
ones. Bigger audiences usually mean more citations and
better publication opportunities. To survive in a fast paced
environment of international competition, it is reasonable to
support those fields that could yield the best measurable
performance. The culture of numbers dominates the
academia.
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A whole culture of research production – that of publishing
comprehensive works – is being sidelines in favor of fast track
production of easily digestible research. The culture of fast
research gives precedence to speed over depth. The logic of
this situation is to produce the most citations in the shortest
period of time. Although it is not the rule, it usually means
that a researcher has to publish new research in copious
quantities, without investing too much into its quality. As
soon as research is publishable, it is a publish-or-perish
situation.
The book is badly suited to this fast environment. Its larger
size decreases the potential readership. Consequently, the
book might yield lower citation counts. Considering that the
effort that needs to be invested into producing a book is often
higher, there is a disincentive to publish comprehensive
investigations in any field. More and more disciplines engage
in this fast paced research production. The example of our
own investigation is telling. In the literature review section, it
was shown that there are only a few books written on the
topic of rankings, despite a vast amount of articles dedicated
to the topic. The void, produced by the decrease of
comprehensive works, is filled by collections of articles or
multi-author works. These surrogates partly fulfill the
demand for a deeper treatment of the topic. However, they
lack the coherence of a single author investigation.
The process of marginalization restructures the academia in
unprecedented ways, and the rankings are a pivotal part of
this process. The skew in the system of knowledge production
might have been in the academia for a long time.
Nevertheless, it is the rankings that reinforce and further this
skew.
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Since rankings play such an important role in directing the
system of knowledge production, the hopes to rectify the
skew are connected to further development of ranking
systems. As rankings become more nuanced, the
marginalization process might cease to exist. Multiple
bundles have to be overcome before this scenario would
realize itself.
The first bundle is the development of more sensitive proxies
for measuring research in various disciplinary domains. The
development of more sensitive proxies could rectify the
situation where various disciplinary domains are represented
unequally, thus eliminating the skew towards STEM
disciplines. This is, possibly, the most complicated problem to
solve on the way to more accurate ranking systems.
Developing more sensitive proxies does not mean simple
normalization counts. Normalization counts do not tend to
produce accurate results by themselves. They have both
temporal and field bias (Rauhvargers, 2011: 64). The impact of
research should be judged on the impacts outside of simple
citation counts. The merits of any research should be analyzed
on the basis of a research’s contribution to its field and to its
stakeholder community. It is necessary to admit that, at
present, there is no system of measurements sophisticated
enough to measure research impacts across various fields.
Furthermore, development of proxies for such system is a
cumbersome process that ought to rely on complicated
algorithms. Any such algorithm would invariably complicate
measurements and render them less transparent.
In the absence of more accurate proxies, the possible solution
to the ranking dilemma is a further diversification and
fragmentation of ranking systems. The ultimate result of such
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development is a plethora of rankings measuring each
discipline or disciplinary domain with a set of proxies
uniquely suited to this discipline. In theory, development of
ranking systems along these lines could create a quite
accurate system of measurements in the absence of more
sensitive proxies. Drawbacks of this solution are a possible
informational congestion and lack of possibilities for wider
comparisons between fields and disciplines.
Another bundle that needs to be overcome in the
development of ranking systems is devising better
measurements of teaching. There are no simple solutions in
this direction either. An accurate set of criteria to measure
teaching quality is hard to devise. There might even be the
case where a certain differentiation between disciplines
would be necessary, since not every discipline is equally
teaching intensive. Unlike measurements of research quality,
measurements of teaching quality are practically absent. The
claims of principal ranking systems that such proxies as the
number of Nobel Prize winners or the employers’ reviews are
legitimate measures of teaching quality are ludicrous.
Measuring teaching quality in such way is akin to measuring
knowledge by the success with which graduates are able to
climb a tree. Considering how simple it is to devise at least
some sort of proxies for measuring teaching quality, it is
surprising that there is still no hint of such developments in
principal ranking systems.
One obvious method of measuring teaching quality is to
conduct surveys among the students. It is a seemingly
cumbersome procedure; however, many schools already have
the results of students’ surveys. Although there is no reason
to believe that this data would be readily available, there is
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also no reason to believe the contrary. A certain reluctance to
use this approach may be connected to an old fashioned
distrust to student evaluations. An attempt to introduce a
website for measuring teaching quality in the UK, for
instance, caused uproar in the British academic community64.
Including student survey as a part of university evaluation
could be a controversial move for major ranking systems.
More complex systems of teaching quality evaluation may
include a combination of student and self-assessment,
accompanied by various proxies. Among the possible proxies
are progress of students’ performance, employers’
satisfaction, and alumni success. Obviously, any such
evaluation would need thorough elaboration. However, in the
current situation, any sort of teaching assessment would
invariably be better than the proxies already in use.
Finally, one of the most tangled bundles to deal with is
devising reliable measures for comparison between
institutions with different institutional missions. In other
words measuring research and teaching intensive universities
with the same set of measurements is somewhat problematic.
This is not only a problem of teaching versus research. This is
an issue involving institutions that may have widely
divergent objectives. A US public university, for instance,
may fulfill functions of a research university and a
community university at the same time. The two missions
evoke widely different institutional behaviors. A focus on
solving community problems may disadvantage a university
in the international competition. At present, good universities
64 Chris Parr, “We Are Not Dancing Bears,” Times Higher Education, 13 June
2013, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/06/13/british-professors-
object-website-ranks-them.
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are incentivized to pay less attention to any of their missions
other than research. However, this situation is potentially
dangerous in that it directs universities in one direction, while
sidelining any benefit that they could bring into other
pursuits.
The problem of uniform treatment is the most complicated
problem to overcome. In the United States, for instance, there
are separate rankings for comprehensive universities and
liberal arts colleges65. Since these institutions pursue
divergent missions such move is well justified. However, this
is once again the strategy of diversification. If the rankings
would be diversified in the direction of both discipline
specificity and institutional specificity, the result could be an
overwhelming number of rankings that is too confusing to be
employed for any meaningful purpose. Alternatives are not
quite clear. The U-Multirank66 might present an example of
sensitive adjustable ranking. However, it remains to be seen
how well it will manage to tackle the diversification problem.
On the basis of everything that has been said above we can
outline various scenarios of further developments. Two main
axes that should be taken into account are whether rankings
will diversify and whether they will continue to play a
prominent role in the higher education. The rankings are here
to stay, as every other article is keen to underline. However, it
does not mean that their significance will remain the same.
Similarly, the problems of the rankings would not necessarily
65 See, “USNWR National Liberal Arts College Ranking,”
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-
colleges/rankings/national-liberal-arts-colleges; “USNWR National
University Ranking,” http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-
colleges/rankings/national-universities.
66 See, “U-Multirank,: http://www.u-multirank.eu.
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lead to a significant diversification of rankings and ranking
systems. Four possible scenarios emerge out of the two axes.
In the first scenario, the rankings will continue to play a
prominent role in individual and policy choices and they will
not significantly increase in number or diversify their
methodology. Alternatively, there may be some degree of
diversification, but the principal ranking systems would
dominate public discourse and will not employ more complex
methodologies. In this case, the tendencies that we have
identified above are bound to become stronger and stronger.
It is quite likely that in this scenario the research university
would dominate the future academia. Marginalization
tendencies would intensify further, and very few universities
would be enticed to engage in riskier pursuits. The role of
teaching will continue to decrease in significance, with the
academic profession possibly split between those doing
teaching and those doing research. Humanities and social
sciences would be further sidetracked. Humanities may be
squeezed out of academia altogether, or confined to a limited
set of institutions that would be able to afford maintaining
them. Social sciences would become increasingly similar to
harder sciences, employing precise quantitative
methodologies. The culture of research will be dominated by
fast research products with quantity and measurable output
prioritized over more comprehensive pursuits.
The second scenario is possible if the rankings will continue
to be prominent, but their diversification and methodological
sophistication will ensue. In this case, the development of
ranking systems may rectify the current skew in the system of
knowledge production. The universities will be assessed in
accordance with their missions. The prioritization of research
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will not be as strong as it is currently and other academic
activities, including teaching and governance, will be valued
by the measurement system. The trend towards dividing
teaching and research might be stifled. Research impacts
would be assessed within the frames of corresponding
research cultures, and fast research would be confined to
specific disciplines. There are two complications in this
scenario. First, in order to rectify all the tilts in the system of
knowledge production, it is necessary that the rankings take
into account various university missions, teaching quality,
and research cultures. If any of these factors is not taken into
account, the corresponding skew will persist in academia.
Another problem is that under the current system certain
tendencies have already entrenched themselves in academia.
Even if rankings will develop more sensitive measures for
each disciplinary domain, it would not rectify the fact that
social science department are staffed with quantitative
scientists. Whatever the development of ranking systems will
be, the current trends are and are bound to dominate the
academic system at least in the nearest future.
Finally, scenarios three and four could be merged together.
Both scenarios imply passing ranking hype and faltering
significance of rankings in the international academia.
Although this scenario may seem unlikely, academic rankings
are a relatively recent addition to the academic system. As we
have shown in the first chapter, although rankings go back in
history, they hardly had much impact on academia until
recently. Obviously, rankings perform a certain function in
academic system. They benchmark higher education
institutions against each other and provide a digestible
informational product for a quick comparison of institutions.
However, beyond a plethora of imperfections in
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measurements, it is questionable whether rankings do a good
job in comparing HEIs. If ranking systems will continue to
stagnate in their methodologies, there is a good chance that
rankings would cease to be used as comparison instruments
as their faults will be gradually understood. It is hard to make
a prognosis on what will substitute rankings as a
measurement mechanism in this case, but the academic
system had managed to survive without the rankings for
quite a long time. Obviously, this scenario would also suffer
from the tilts that rankings have already introduced, and
normalization of knowledge production will be a slow and
gradual process.
This last scenario raises a wider question. This question is
whether rankings fulfill their stated goals and how good they
fulfill these goals. To answer the question, it is necessary to
understand rhetoric and functions of rankings. The next
section is dedicated to analyzing rhetoric components of
academic rankings.
4.2. Rhetoric of Academic Rankings.
Although it may seem somewhat strange to see academic
rankings through the prism of their rhetorical functions,
rankings have a strong discursive component. From their very
origin, the rankings were intrinsically tied to various social
discourses. The first rankings were occupied with answering
the question, “Which institutions train the elite of the
nation?”. The emergence of the first rankings is tied to nature
vs. nurture debates (Myers, Robe, 2009: 7). The rankings
themselves were used in the arguments of which factors
contribute to the development of eminent individuals.
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The first global ranking, created by Shanghai Jiao Tong
University, was also wrapped in a very particular discourse.
This time it was the discourse of global competition. It was
through the prism of the global competition discourse that
Liu and his associated tried to assess the global educational
system. The fact that competitiveness was assessed mostly
through the prism of mathematics, natural sciences and
engineering is, in itself, telling of social perceptions in the
country that came up with the research.
Here we see an example of how discourse crystallizes into
particular products, and how these products, in turn,
determine further development of various discourses. The
skewed vision of goals and objectives of higher education led
to a skewed ranking that served as a reference point for other
rankings. Progressive unfolding of this vision led to global
universities’ being judged by the criteria that were initially
supposed to serve a very limited purpose and very limited
national objectives. This created a new discourse of higher
educational quality based on a particular set of criteria.
As this discourse set in, university rankings moved from a
purely referential point to one of the determining factors to
consider in the actions of global HEIs. This happened as
rankings started to be employed in considerations of various
choices on policy, institutional, and individual levels. As soon
as concrete material benefits appeared, university rankings
became an important factor in the world of higher education.
That is how one specific discourse created a product through
which initially the discourse became a part of everyday life in
the academia. Before the emergence of the first rankings, the
trends that are now common in the academia – such as
marginalization of certain disciplines, side-lining of teaching,
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and demise of humanities – were far less pronounced or
inexistent.
The success of crystallization of the ranking discourse raises
an interesting sociological problem. As was mentioned in one
of the previous chapters, some scholars claimed that the first
rankings imposed a particular order of power on the global
academic system (Bowman, Bastedo, 2011; Marginson, 2009).
In other words, the first rankings had actually determined
which universities belonged to the global elite and which did
not. Furthermore, they set the order of influence among
higher education institutions. New and lower ranking HEIs in
this system would need much more effort to rise up the
ladder than those that are already well positioned. Important
concepts to understand this situation are “path-dependence”
and “first-mover advantage”.
Let us see on concrete examples how this system works. The
first global ranking, ARWU, listed hundreds of world
universities according to their performance over a set of
ostensibly objective criteria. As has been shown, the criteria
were quite basic and tailored to a few disciplines. However,
the very form of the ranking suggested an order of quality,
which for those that were not willing to go deeper into the
details was taken for granted. In addition to expected brands
of quality – such as Oxford, Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and
Cambridge – there were a lot of other universities that, albeit
known to experts in their fields, would not necessarily be
placed higher than their peers by the vast majority of experts.
Some results were quite unexpected, for instance relatively
weak performance of Russian, French and German
universities. However, the bulk of the system was created.
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The sheer weight of the universities ranked in the top-100 –
these were mostly large, comprehensive universities – was
enough to legitimize the system in its original state. The top
ranked universities had a vested interest in the system and its
promotion. They could use the rankings to raise funding,
attract more students and better professors, etc. In the long
term, supporting the ranking was profitable for them. Hence,
even if they disapproved of the ranking, top ranked HEIs
emphasized their performance and lent it a certain discursive
legitimacy. At this point of time, everyone who had contact
with the first ranking had an approximate idea of how the
main universities are positioned and to which tier they
belong.
One year later, the THE-QS ranking appeared. This ranking
was based on very different criteria. This time the ranking did
not state that it had a very limited scope and purpose. On the
other hand, it was supposed to be a comprehensive ranking of
global educational quality. It was based on a wider set of
criteria and, most importantly, on the reputation of HEIs.
Although scholars are reputed to have broad knowledge of
their fields, it is doubtful that every scholar has the whole
international education system in view. Hence, there is a
strong possibility that the ARWU ranking could have
influenced certain choices and categorizations, whether due
to scholar’s familiarity with the previous ranking or due to
the discourse that ARWU spread with respect to top ranking
universities.
Bowman and Bastedo identified a significant “anchoring
effect” in the THE rankings. In simple terms, the anchoring
effect means that the institutional order set by the earlier
rankings influence the peer assessment in the later rankings.
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The authors found “that anchoring effects exert a substantial
influence on future reputational assessments, raising
substantial concerns about the validity and reliability of the
reputational scores used by ranking agencies to sort and
stratify institutions by quality (Bowman, Bastedo, 2011: 432)”.
The authors also mention other researchers that found similar
effects for other rankings (Stake, 2006; Bastedo, Bowman,
2010). If the anchoring effect can be observed in the above-
mentioned cases, it is reasonable to assume its existence in the
case of the earlier ARWU and the following THE-QS ranking.
The two ranking systems cemented the order of power in the
global academia. And at this point it is hard to judge whether
they come close to describing the objective situation, or the
situation is a matter of chance. If, before the ascent of the
rankings, people could argue whether University of Michigan
is better than Humboldt University, or whether the University
of Wisconsin-Madison is better than the University of
Groeningen, after the appearance of the rankings both
Michigan and UWM were far ahead of their competitors in
the ranking game.
Although the concrete numbers are yet to be provided, better
performance in the rankings is reckoned to provide tangible
benefits to well performing universities (Hazelkorn, 2011).
The universities that had been ranked at the top of the global
academic order, thus received more resources than the rest to
entrench themselves even further among the very best.
Considering that the first rankings had dominated the field
for years, there were plenty of time for the existing academic
order of power to become iron clad. Less well ranked
universities did not get the same amount of tangible and
intangible benefits accruing to their positions. To them the
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ascent up the ranking ladder was and still is a battle against
considerable odds.
Although institutionalization of the ranking discourse and
strong influence of this discourse on higher education and
research is a critical issue, there is another side to the rhetoric
of rankings. This side concerns primarily presentations of
rankings and the actual rhetorical component of the ranking
business. Although aspiring to be treated as an objective
representation of the international academic system, rankings
are seriously flawed in their methodologies. Some ranking
providers actually admit their shortcomings in one way or
another (Liu, Cheng, 2005: 13). However, the topic of
shortcomings is an uncomfortable one and is rarely put on the
table as often as their advantages.
An important part of the rankings discourse is how much
credibility is given to individual rankings. ARWU ranking is
usually given much credibility in the higher education
discourse. Despite already mentioned problems with
reproducing the ranking results, ARWU benefits from clear
and simple methodology. Negative side of ARWU is the
limited character of its measurements. ARWU ignores
teaching and underrepresents universities’ performance in
humanities and social sciences. This information, however,
could hardly be found on the website of ARWU. Instead the
website is full of laudatory comments on the ranking67.
Although the creators of the ARWU ranking admit its
limitations – and point to the limitations of other rankings at
67 After the initial paragraph, the ARWU self-description concentrates mostly
on praise of the ranking. See, “About ARWU,”
http://www.shanghairanking.com/aboutarwu.html.
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the same time – they never fail to emphasize positive features
of their ranking such as “carefully selected, nonsubjective
criteria (Liu, Cheng, 2005: 135),” and “internationally
comparable data that most users can verify in some way
(Ibid)”. The website of the ARWU rankings does not mention
neither the limitations of the rankings nor that its main
objective is measuring solely research performance in some
very limited research areas. The impression that the website
creates is that the ranking actually provides a comprehensive
picture of international academic system. Thus, the careful
admittance of the obvious by the creators of the ARWU
ranking does not really reflect on its objectivist rhetoric.
Similarly, the websites of both the THE and QS rankings
mention only positive reviews. THE prides itself on no less
than “the most comprehensive and balanced comparisons
available, which are trusted by students, academics,
university leaders, industry and governments68.” QS tries to
convince us that its ranking is “among the most trusted
university rankings available69.” It does not sound surprising.
However, it is interesting that even in the description of the
methodology none of the rankings mention their limited
scope or subjective character of their measures. All of the
main rankings, thus, are trying to make an impression that
they provide a comprehensive and objective overview of the
international academic system.
68 “THE World University Rankings 2012-2013,”
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-
13/world-ranking.
69 “QS World University Rankings 2012,”
http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-
rankings/2012.
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This situation would not matter much if most of the ranking
consumers cared to go into details of the ranking
methodologies and figure out what rankings measure and
what they do not measure. However, digging into ranking
methodologies is a labor intensive activity. That is why
credibility of the rankings is strongly influenced by expert
opinions.
In a perfectly objective world the ranking providers would
tell exactly what their rankings measure. However, detailed
description of what rankings measure and what they do not
measure would probably scare away any person that would
like to use the rankings to assess anything. Thus, the rankings
have to keep the mask of objectivity. Even despite the fact that
experts could easily see the multiple drawbacks of every
ranking system, in the eyes of the general population
rankings represent reality, at least to a certain degree. The
extent to which university rankings are trusted is determined
by the opinions that are prevalent among experts. Thus, the
criticism that QS ranking evoked made this ranking less
trustworthy for the general population. The fact that other
experts have noticed a relative objectivity of the ARWU
rankings increased its general credibility and trustworthiness.
It is here, however, that the distinction between what is said
and what is understood becomes more obvious. Although
ARWU is indeed a quite transparent and methodologically
clear ranking, the limited choice of criteria diminishes its
value significantly. To put it in a simple example, a ranking
that would measure universities by the size of their student
body would be clear and transparent. However, it would
hardly show an objective picture of the international
academic system. According to this ranking the best
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university in the world would be Indira Ghandi National
Open University with over four million enrolled students70.
Princeton with its 8000 student and California Institute of
Technology with little more than 2000 students would
probably be somewhere at the end of the ranking. Hence, the
expert evaluation of the ARWU as clear and transparent is
misleading to the wider population and endows a limited
ranking with poor methodology with a sign of quality that
allows it to thrive. The QS ranking, on the other hand, has a
very subjective methodology. However, it does not
necessarily mean that it represents the international academic
system worse than its competitors.
An indirect proof that the credibility of rankings plays an
extremely important role in the ranking business is the
divorce of the THE and QS rankings. A strong criticism of the
THE-QS ranking from the international academic community
lowered its prestige among the general population,
undermining the customer base. The response of the THE was
the creation of a new ranking, unburdened by the reputation
of the previous ranking. The THE management has
continuously made emphasis on the fact that the QS ranking
was severely criticized, and that in the new THE rankings the
previous drawbacks would be liquidated71. Although the
reality turned out to be much less rosy than promised, the
THE rankings, so far, drew less criticism from international
experts. Although they offered some improvements over the
old THE-QS model, these improvements are overshadowed
by the amount of methodological measurements that THE
retained. Milder criticism in this case can be explained in part
70 “Profile of IGNOU,” http://www.ignou.ac.in/ignou/aboutignou/profile/2.
71 Ann Mroz, “Leader: Only the best for the best,” Times Higher Education, 5
November 2009, http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/408968.article.
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by the QS taking the bulk of the critical comments, shielding
the very similar THE ranking from a wave of criticism.
The rhetoric of university rankings transforms into rhetoric on
lower levels. These levels include individual and institutional
rhetoric. The institutional level of the rhetoric was already
mentioned earlier in this section. Performance of universities
in global rankings carries tangible economic benefits. Despite
a great deal of criticism, thus, it is beneficial for an institution
to emphasize its performance in various rankings; especially,
if it involves progression to higher levels. The descent down
the ranking ladder is also not especially harmful, as long as
the institution still occupies a decent spot. The memory of the
general population is quite short when it concerns ranking
performance, and, except for a bunch of experts, few hold the
whole history of ranking position changes in their head.
Therefore, it is enough for a university to mention just the
current results in order to de-emphasize its decline in various
ranking tables.
The system has circular logic. By communicating their
performance in various rankings, universities increase
legitimacy of these rankings. Since many of the academic
powerhouses are mentioned in the rankings, the legitimacy of
the ranking systems is backed by leading names in the
academia. The more reputable the ranking system, the more
likely a higher education institution would be to mention its
success. Few universities would pass the opportunity to
emphasize their “world leading” status by pointing to
ARWU, THE WUR, or QSWUR. Much smaller number of
universities would be tempted to do so by referring to the
Global Universities Ranking, in which the Moscow State
University somehow came fifth. Despite criticism of global
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university rankings, the leading universities themselves
support and nourish them. This is especially valid of the three
principal ranking systems that are so far ahead of their rivals
that they not only measure but also shape the global academy
The final rhetorical component of rankings could be seen on
the individual level. Here as well rankings create and
conserve a particular power order. The most basic component
of this order is legitimization of the order of discourse. In
other words, the rankings build a hierarchical research
structure where some scientific centers are privileged over
others. An institution in the higher levels of ranking hierarchy
has more rhetorical weight than a university in the lower
levels of the same hierarchy. This might not be valid for the
top-200 world universities, although even there a certain
effect should exist.
Such universities as Harvard, Stanford, UCL or Cambridge
would have more weight in dissemination and promotion of
their research results than the University of Buchurest or the
University of Dehli. Although this situation seems reasonable
at first sight, this also means that whatever research Harvard
will do, it will mostly be well regarded in the international
community. For secondary universities, however, only truly
groundbreaking research would catch some spotlight.
The problem here is the fact that the value of research does
not necessarily relates to its intrinsic characteristics. Quite
often research value is determined by recognition of a narrow
scientific community. This community has its superstars and
outsiders. In case of prestigious world universities, their
research product would be better valued, even if it has the
same intrinsic potential as that of secondary universities.
Thus, secondary universities have to jump over the top to
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gain the recognition and impetus for promoting their
research. In this way, university rankings contribute to
preserving the very order that they created.
The individual rhetorical component of this discourse
concerns the legitimacy of a speaker. In other words, who is
speaking – in terms of institutional affiliation – determines
how much attention is paid to the speaker. In constantly
growing research fields and enterprises, individual
reputations tend to become blurred. It is practically
impossible for a professional researcher to know other
researchers outside of their specialization, even within the
same discipline. However, advanced research often involves
information not only from within the narrow specialization of
an individual researcher, but also from related disciplines.
Institutional reputation comes to fore in the decisions
concerning the source for such information. All other things
being equal, it is simpler to keep an eye on the research done
in leading research institutions than that in secondary ones.
Scholars who are affiliated to the prestigious institutions,
thus, attract more attention to their research.
This situation leads to a reputation building in the scientific
community. More attention means more recognition in the
international scientific community. The message gets less
attention than the messenger itself. A scholar affiliated with
the Harvard University would carry more weight by means of
this affiliation alone than a peer from lesser institutions, even
if the research of the latter has better potential. The
implications of this situation are manifold, from wider
audiences at various conferences and congresses, and higher
credibility given to the research, to higher citation numbers.
This latter implication is especially important as it speaks
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back to the circularity of the whole ranking system. To put it
in a simple scheme: the higher ranked the university is the
more attention its research and individual researchers receive;
the more attention the research receives, the more it is cited;
the more citations are on the university research product, the
higher this university is placed in academic rankings. The
academic power order is ironclad on all the levels of the
academic system, and the rankings play an important role in
its maintenance.
4.3. Prognosis of Trends in Global Academia.
The analysis of the previous chapters showed how global
academic rankings contribute to shaping of the knowledge
production system. Multiple processes converge in creating a
new mold of academic system. The rankings are just one of
the elements that define future trends of the academia. One
thing is for sure: despite strong resilience of the academic
system, the last decades laid the basis for revolutionary
changes in the system of knowledge production. In over
seven hundred years, the system did not change as much as it
did in the last two decades. The future will see further
intensification of these trends.
The three core processes that change the face of the global
academic systems are the demise of humanities, separation
between teaching and learning, and homogenization of
dominant knowledge paradigms. Each of these trends is
important enough to deserve a separate treatment. Together
they are bound to change the landscape of global academia
drastically. In the following part of the section it is shown
how this processes change the traditional system of
knowledge production.
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The European university was born out of the preceding
traditions of monastic schools. The original universities had
three higher faculties: law, theology, and medicine. Out of the
three faculties only one belonged to science disciplines of
today. Two faculties, theology and law, belonged to an
intersection between humanities and social sciences.
Furthermore, the lower faculty of the Arts (or Philosophy)
gave instruction predominantly in humanities.
Except for medicine and medical sciences, the modern
sciences mostly emerged out of philosophical enterprises. In
fact, many lustrous minds of early sciences, such as
Copernicus, Bacon, and Galileo, were known as natural
philosophers rather than scientists.
Prestige of philosophy and humanities kept growing long
after scientific disciplines dissociated themselves from their
humanistic ancestry. This trend was mostly due to the fact
that elites around the world were often educated in the liberal
curriculum. In the British Empire, for instance, education in
classics was a prerequisite for social advancement. According
to Turner “a knowledge of classical languages and the
experience of a classical education, of not necessarily any
powerful knowledge of the classics, constituted one of the
chief defining factors in the education of gentlemen who
could in one way or another claim to belong to the social and
political elite throughout Great Britain. Education in the
classics was thus an avenue for social advancement, even if
often modestly so (Turner, 2005: 161).”
Nineteenth century, as well as the first half of the Twentieth
century, saw reputation of humanities and social sciences
rising to unprecedented levels. Many important insights of
inner workings of human behavior and social world were
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made during this time. In Philosophy, Kant, Fichte, Hegel,
Pierce, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein were among many
philosophers that provided important perspectives on human
condition. In what would later become social sciences, Comte,
Weber, Marx, and Durkheim laid foundations for further
explorations of society and social relations. In incipient
psychological investigations, Wundt, Freud, and Pavlov
determined the agenda of inquiries into individual and social
behavior.
Prestige and significance of humanities persisted well into the
late twentieth century. Academia, however, had been for a
long time harboring a split that came to fore recently.
In 1959, Charles P. Snow, a British chemist and literary figure,
gave a lecture at Cambridge in which he lamented the
growing division and lack of communication between
scientists and men of letters72. The topic, which came to be
variously known as The Great Divide or The Two Cultures,
generated a long lasting polemics; it led to sharp intellectual
exchanges, disciplinary introspections, and even setting up of
a specialized institution73. Certain mistrust between men of
the two different intellectual pursuits ventured well into the
21st century and provided inspiration for an occasional
squabble, dispute, or prank74.
In the battle between sciences and humanities, rankings took
the side of sciences. Perhaps, this was due to the objective fact
that knowledge production in sciences better yields to
measurements, or, maybe, it was due to the fact that the
72 The lecture was later published in book form (See, Snow, 2001).
73 Michigan State University set up the Lyman Briggs College for this
purpose.
74 For a more thorough elaboration of the topic see, Dmitrishin, 2013b.
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original ranking aimed to measure productivity in sciences
and mathematics. Whatever the reason is, rankings had tilted
the balance in academia towards sciences. Humanities, the
pillars of the modern system of knowledge production, are
slowly giving more ground to sciences in the academia.
Of course, the downslide of humanities may be just a
temporary trend. Once humanities were the pillars of elite
education, and their status may be regained in the future.
However, the logic of the academic system, at present, works
against humanities and humanistic social sciences. The trend
is so strong that it would likely persist into the future, even if
the current anti-humanities skew will be corrected.
The core problem of humanities and social sciences is that
they are seen as uncompetitive in the era of global market75.
While harder sciences, medicine, and engineering bring
tangible benefits, humanities and social sciences have a less
tangible impact. Thus the two fields are often seen as a vestige
of another era when education served different purposes. As
long as education continues to get more and more expensive,
humanities and humanistic social sciences would hardly be a
popular choice for a practical mind.
Yet, humanities are not as impractical as they are often
perceived. Humanities constitute the backbone of the creative
industry sector, which contributes significantly to the global
economy. One example of the influence of humanities on the
creative sector is a number of talented artists that have been
over the years produced by Goldsmiths, University of
75 See, for instance, Nicholas Christakis, “Let’s Shake Up Social Sciences,”
New York Times,  19 July 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/lets-shake-up-the-
social-sciences.html?_r=4&.
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London. The university has almost singlehandedly created
the bulk of British young modern artists. However, looking at
humanities just as the nursery of creative industries is not
completely correct. English contributes to formation of writers
and journalists; History creates professionals of cultural
sector; Law is a foundation upon which social structures are
built. In sum, humanities contribute to the tertiary sector of
economy – the most dynamic component of the global
competition.
The problem of humanities is the failure to emphasize their
own potential. Toby Miller claims that humanities split into
two major camps (Miller, 2012). According to him,
“Humanities one” carry a long tradition of elite education and
focus mostly on learning for the sake of learning. In his
opinion, this part of humanities is extremely unpractical, yet it
dominates humanities agenda and how humanities are
perceived. “Humanities two” are a part of humanities that is
practically oriented. As an example here Miller gives
Communication Studies, which has a long tradition of
nourishing media industries. “Humanities two” grew out of
the spread of humanities in public universities, where
students had more practical concerns. Thus, “Humanities
two” have a market orientation where humanistic skills and
education is channeled into the market sector to provide
tangible impact. The second group of humanities has much
lesser influence over the general academic rhetoric. Miller
believes that the two fields should merge, creating the new
humanities education that would have a strong applied
potential.
Regardless of whether Miller’s ideas reflect the real situation
or not, there is a real threat to the humanities, unless they
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would prove their worth in the market society. With public
universities’ budgets being cut from year to year, humanities
are liable to undergo the strongest cuts. Soon, humanities
could indeed be affordable only to the chosen few. This
situation concerns both universities – as only the well-
endowed institutions would be able to afford maintaining
strong humanities departments – and the students – as only
those that would be able to afford private education could get
a humanities degree. The concern exacerbates the concern of
Miller, as more practical humanities taught at public
universities have the highest risk of disappearing, leaving
only the theoretical humanities of the elite schools. Whatever
the future will be, humanities are slowly retreating to the
background of higher education. This process retracts one of
the core pillars of global academia, changing the academic
landscape drastically.
The unity of teaching and research had been another
fundamental characteristic of the academic world until
recently. “Traditionally, teaching and research have gone
hand in hand; however, the balance has been tipping.
Teaching has not only been undervalued and marginalized,
but is in danger of being seen as a negative attribute by
institutions and their departments76,” states Keith Gull in his
comments on the British education system. However, not only
Britain experiences a decrease in the importance of teaching in
higher education institutions. For the reasons outlined in the
previous chapters, teaching is seriously disadvantaged
against research in the contemporary system of higher
76 Keith Gull, “The chasm between teaching and research,” New Scientist, 26
March 2010, http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/thesword/2010/03/academy-
the-chasm-between-teac.html.
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education. The consequences of this trend may be as
significant for higher education as the demise of humanities.
The unity of teaching and research was enshrined into the
European higher education model by Wilhelm von
Humboldt. Humboldtian model is well known for its practical
orientation and applied research concentration. Relatively less
known is the fact that the Humboldtian model considered
teaching one of the cornerstones of education and science.
According to Ian McNeely “Humboldt found that academies
had produced little signiﬁcant research, whereas many of
Germany’s brightest thinkers taught in its universities. This
recognition helped convince Humboldt to combine academic
research with the university’s historic teaching mission.
Synthesizing the best of both modernity and tradition, he
forged the world’s most dynamic and inﬂuential intellectual
institution (McNeely, 2002: 33)”. In the heart of the model was
the idea of teaching through research. This idea found its
realization in the concept of seminar, an advanced level class
where students interact with a tutor to solve practical research
problems. The Humbodtian reform was imitated by
universities around the world, especially in the United States.
Johns Hopkins, UC Berkeley, University of Chicago and
UCLA were founded upon the Humboldtian model (Albriton,
2006: 7-9).
According to Albriton “The ideal of the university, based
upon Humboldt’s philosophy, is one where there was
freedom of teaching and learning and unity of teaching and
research. Humboldt also stressed Bildung (the overall
education of the individual) versus Ausbildung (education
specifically geared towards employment). The research and
teaching is determined by professors but the students are free
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to determine the overall direction of their studies (Ibid: 2-3)”.
The importance of combining research and teaching came
from the principle of developing rather than maintaining
existing knowledge. In the dialogue between the professor
and the students, thus, new directions of academic research
could be born. Until recently, the unity of teaching and
research had defined the international academic landscape.
The situation changed somewhat in the recent past. More and
more emphasis in the academia is put on research rather than
teaching. Again, the reasons behind this shift are analyzed in
the previous chapters. A more pertinent question here is the
consequences of this shift. Global institutions of higher
learning are constantly engaged in the race for prestige and
recognition. As defined by the current system of
measurements, this prestige comes mostly from research. And
while some countries still have the resources to fund both
teaching and research – although latter definitely gets better
funded – other countries find themselves in a position to
barely able to afford investment into teaching.
A notorious example of this situation is UK. The country that
traditionally prides itself on the quality of its higher
education, gave up the teaching component of its higher
education in all but rhetoric. Stripped bare of contact hours,
British universities model evolved into something close to
extra-mural studies. All but the richest universities place
emphasis on individual studying. In practice, it means that
despite the growing tuition fees, students in the UK have few
chances to experience face-to-face interaction with their
professors. At the same time, British universities are
extremely research intensive. Although the cuts on teaching
responsibilities are covered by individual study skill rhetoric,
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UK is experiencing precisely the situation that the ranking
model predicts. To be able to keep up in global competition
against their better funded peers over the ocean, UK has
sacrificed some of the basic functions of its academic system.
With massive investments into research and hardly any
investment into teaching, UK’s professors have an incentive
to concentrate on research. In this system, the students cover
the bill for the research rather than their own education. In
return they get degrees from reputable institutions that they
could use to obtain employment. The system brings
considerable benefit to the UK, as prestige of its universities
allows attracting international students who contribute to
UK’s budget. However, sustainability of the system in the
long run is questionable, since prestige is not the only
determinant of educational choice. US, in this sense, allows
for both prestige and the quality of teaching.
The United States is also experiencing the skew in favor of
research, which is perpetuated by the ranking system.
However, being in a more favorable position, US universities
do not experience such drastic changes as their peers in the
UK. This situation is due to three main reasons. First, US
universities are, on average, better funded. Over the years,
many private universities have accumulated large
endowments that allow them to be self-sustainable in matters
of teaching and research. Public universities are not so lucky.
Yet, the favorable position of US in the global academia still
allows these universities to have an influx of funding from
various sources. Second, many universities in the US have
traditionally relied on adjunct professors to do basic teaching,
while freeing the more advanced scholars for a few graduate
seminars and research work. Finally, there is a traditional
191
division between teaching-oriented liberal arts colleges and
research oriented public and private universities. Separate
national rankings for the two types of schools allow both to
concentrate on their respective missions. LARCs in this
respect conduct mostly undergraduate education feeding
research universities with students for graduate school.
The situation in the US is not ideal. Although there are many
well-funded universities, the latest trend was the decrease of
funding towards social sciences and humanities by various
foundations. The recent decrease of funding for NEH and
NEA, as well as cancellation of the political science funding of
the NSF, show that the US was not spared the worldwide
trend of sidetracking humanities and social sciences.
Considering that foundations play an important role in
funding US higher education and research, the situation
causes certain concerns. Helga Nowotny, commenting on the
issue, went as far as to claim that “In the US, the social
sciences and humanities are under attack77.”
The rest of the countries are not as favorably positioned. In
particular, countries that are runners up of global competition
would hardly be able to invest a lot of resources into teaching.
If they want to catch up with the leading countries, then at
least under the current system they would have to re-route
most of their resources into the research intensive activities.
What it means for the Humboldt model remains to be seen.
However, the traditional model of education based on the
unity of teaching and research gradually fades into the past,
77 Helga Nowotny, Shifting horizons for Europe's social sciences and
humanities, The Guardian, 23 September 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2013/sep/23/europe-
social-sciences-humanities.
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leaving a vacuum that a new model of higher education will
have to fill out.
Another major shift, which the system of higher education
and knowledge production faces, concerns strengthening of
dominant paradigms and marginalization of their
alternatives. How this process works was elaborated in
previous chapters. Marginalization of contesting knowledge
paradigms is nothing new. Inconvenient knowledge has
always been pushed out of the principal communications
channels. Academia in this respect did not provide any
exception. Since the origins of the European university, its
agenda has been defined by dominant social powers. In
Medieval times it was the Church; in modern history, the
state or imperial interest; and in contemporary history, the
ideology defined acceptable and unacceptable knowledge.
Trespassers risked penalties that varied from social ostracism
to institutionalized violence.
The novelty of the last decades, however, was the purported
death of ideology. Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the end of
history, which in our case translates into the end of
constraining factors on the system of knowledge production
(Fukuyama, 1992). The plight of academia however was not
resolved. What happened was a simple transition from
varyingly direct political control to the indirect control of the
market. For a short period of time after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the system went through a period of relative
liberalization where multiple paradigms competed. However,
as time passed by, the grip of the market on knowledge
production gradually increased. That process was reflected in
part by the emergence of global university rankings. Rankings
were both a product of the market and the outcome of a
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market type competition in academia. It is good to remember
here that the first ranking emerged out of comparisons in
disciplines that had strong market potential.
The central factor of a university’s performance in the
international rankings is its research activity, measured as the
amount of publications in top academic journals. These
journals are measured and ranked in turn. Cross-referencing
between top journals and top universities creates a closed
system where certain forms of knowledge are more valuable
for the university’s standing. This situation affects and
structures many decisions that universities take on a daily
basis.
An example from the discipline of economics might be useful
to put this discussion in context. Top journals in the field of
economics are specialized in the neoclassical synthesis. A
person that works in heterodox strains of economic thought
has few chances to publish an article in those periodicals. This
could affect the standing of such individuals on the global
academic market, as they are less beneficial to the university’s
standing in the rankings and, thus, are in less demand.
Needless to say that few top universities would be too willing
to take heterodox economists, if they have a choice. This
affects personal incentives for the choice of research areas by
individual scientists. And those few that still challenge
dominant paradigms are at a rhetorical disadvantage, since
they often have to opt for less prestigious places for
conducting their research.
Rauhvargers states that “National or regional higher
education policy makers increasingly consult ranking results
when deciding on the allocation of resources or the structure
of higher education systems (Rauhvargers, 2011: 20)”.This
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creates a situation where all the incentives work to privilege
scientific production that contributes to a university’s
standing in the rankings.
What are the problems with prioritizing production of certain
knowledge? The potential dangers of such prioritization are
that the knowledge produced by universities is not selected
on its merits, but on its suitability to accepted socio-political
paradigms. Free competition of ideas is being restricted, and
university rankings constitute just one element in the system
of such restrictions.
The mechanisms of assuring universities compliance with
dominant socio-political ideologies have become more and
more sophisticated in the last centuries. Yet, they still perform
the same function they performed in the Middle-Ages. That is
to keep the social system on a certain track.
The difference of the new system of domination lies in
principally new mechanisms of assuring compliance. There is
no forced compliance or any form of violence involved in the
production of knowledge. In the traditional sense, no obvious
penalties are enforced on those who choose to pursue
knowledge paradigms different from the mainstream.
However, that does not mean that knowledge production is
completely independent. The place of penalties is now
occupied by positive incentives. In fact, penalties themselves
are nothing else but negative incentives. The politics of stick is
substituted by the politics of carrot. Yet, the effect is very
similar. Those that do not comply with the demands of the
social system are marginalized, both personally – their ability
to communicate through dominant channels is hindered, and
their reputation is undermined – and professionally – their
research gets less attention or even discredited. The final
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outcome is the same: scholars who choose to disobey
dominant social realities loose benefits associated with
compliance.
Obviously, this system could pose multiple dangers.
Whatever sort of knowledge is being produced under the
current social system, it is used to take practical political
decisions. These decisions may not be optimal for the social
system. However, since the alternatives are marginalized, no
serious attempts are made to consider contesting paradigms.
In other words, dominant paradigm does not admit the
possibility of being wrong. Marketplace is supposed to take
optimal decisions, even if the optimality of these decisions is
just theoretic.
The dominance of certain social paradigms is not necessarily
detrimental to the society. Existence of principal paradigms is
necessary to maintain social cohesion and balance. Without
some vision of the social system, accepted by large segments
of society, it is impossible to stabilize social system and
provide a political course. Any political decision is based on a
compromise around a common set of believes. In this respect,
dominance of certain paradigms in academic system is one of
the necessary self-preserving tendencies of the social system.
Market based social system, thus, needs knowledge
production to be closely aligned with the principles of the
market.
It is interesting to see how this system works in practice. To
illustrate its mechanisms it is necessary to draw on the
concepts elaborated in previous sections. Knowledge
production in contemporary world is structured into an order
of power with its main centers having much more influence
on social discourse than its peripheries. To maintain the
196
position at the top of this hierarchic ladder the main centers of
knowledge production have to produce knowledge of
particular type. These forms of knowledge produce more
points in the measurement system dominated by rankings. As
soon as some centers deviate from the production of
acceptable knowledge their ranking positions are seriously
undermined. A good example for this is the low rankings of
economics departments producing heterodox economics
research. More generally, institutions with reputation for
critical non-standard research, such as The New School or
Goldsmiths, University of London tend to rank lower than
their peers with similar reputation for excellence.
University rankings keep the system in check. They determine
the order of weight in social discourse. Only those centers of
research that produce acceptable forms of knowledge could
aspire to ascend the order of prestige. The system is self-
sustainable. The more prestigious the higher education
institution is, the more brilliant professors and students it
receives. These students and professors, in turn, are backed
by the prestige of their universities. Professors set the social
discourse in the academia. Students go on to occupy leading
positions of power in the international system. Anyone who
wants to rise up the social ladder would have to go through
dominant centers of higher education and research
production, where dominant social paradigms will be
instilled in them with various degrees of success. In the end,
the critical mass to push the dominant system forward is
created, and alternatives are marginalized or eliminated.
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Conclusion
The dissertation studied impacts of academic rankings on
higher education and knowledge production. Multiple
mechanisms through which the rankings influence the
direction of higher education and research have been
identified. It is hard to discern the trends in higher education
that academic rankings have created, and those that they
reinforced. However, it is clear that the rankings affect the
current system of higher education and research in a
substantial way.
The principal reason that enables academic rankings to
influence the higher education system is that the rankings are
used for concrete policy decisions. The rankings have rooted
themselves in the public sphere, and they are consulted with
when funding and other distributive decisions are being
made. The dissertation has identified various impacts that
rankings have on higher education and research production.
The rankings permeate the system of higher education and
research production on all levels: policy level, institutional
level, individual level. They promote elitism in national
education systems, they prioritize some discipline over
others, and they favor particular types of research.
Most importantly, academic rankings influence higher
education system in a subtler way. The bulk of the third
chapter of the dissertation studied the marginalizing
influence of academic rankings. This marginalization trend
works to reinforce dominant research paradigms and
undermine rival research. The principal mechanism at work
here is the higher impact of mainstream research in the
academic discourse. As the competitiveness of the academic
system increases, and its institutional structure becomes more
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rigid, pursuing research in dominant paradigms becomes the
key to the survival of young researchers.
The marginalizing influence of academic rankings was
demonstrated on a case study of heterodox economics. A
game-theoretical model was used to demonstrate that, ceteris
paribus, with the incentives that rankings create the
recruitment process in academia works against heterodox
economics candidates. Extrapolating this case on a wider
situation of international academia, it can be said that any
researcher participating in less mainstream research projects
has a distinct disadvantage in the higher education system. To
prove that the model corresponds to the real situation,
surveys of graduate students and recruitment committee
members were conducted.
Curiously, the marginalizing influence works to sustain those
research paradigms that maintain rather than challenge the
dominant social trends. In the case of economics, the rankings
work well to reinforce the position of neo-classical synthesis,
the market-oriented approach to the social system. Heterodox
economics strands that research alternatives to the dominance
of the market are being strongly disadvantaged under the
incentives that academic rankings create. An interesting
intuition worth following in the further research is whether
the logic of the rankings equally disadvantages other research
pursuits that challenge dominant social paradigms.
Academic rankings also influence other aspects of higher
education and knowledge production. The rankings reinforce
preexisting trends of the higher education system. One of the
most important trends that the rankings reinforce is the
prioritization of STEM disciplines over humanities and social
sciences. The systems of measurements devised by the
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principal ranking systems are better suited to measure
research production in the STEM disciplines. Considering that
research production is one of the major elements of the final
ranking scores, STEM-oriented HEIs have a great advantage
over the HEIs specializing in social sciences and humanities.
Another disturbing trend that the rankings reinforce is
prioritization of teaching over research. The unity of teaching
and research was one of the pillars of the Humboldtian
university model. Currently, research activities have greater
importance in the higher education system. The contribution
of the rankings to this process is that while the research
activity of a university contributes the bulk of the university’s
final score, the teaching activity contributes almost nothing.
Few proxies that aim to measure the teaching activity have
almost no real value due to their imprecision. An indirect
proof of the faltering importance of teaching in the academia
is that teaching experience was identified as the least
important criterion in the hiring of economics faculty by the
respondents of our survey.
In many ways, the logic of the rankings corresponds to the
logic of the market. They promote more marketable forms
academic activities. This brings the discussion back to the
beginning of the first chapter. If there are mechanisms that
keep the higher education and knowledge production system
in check with dominant social paradigms, they should be
sought in the workings of the market system. The rankings
constitute one element of this system.
Despite the solid façade of multitude, academic rankings are
subjected to a single logic. The research of the second chapter
demonstrated connections between various ranking systems.
Moreover, the principal ranking systems (ARWU, QS, THE)
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and auxiliary rankings (e.g. Impact factor, H-Index) are also
connected. This connection is due to the use of the same
databases (ISI, Scopus, Google Scholar) and similar methods
of score calculations (quantity vs. quality). In sum, all the
rankings work to push the knowledge production system in
the same way.
The future of academic rankings is unclear. There are constant
efforts to develop more sensitive measures of higher
education system (U-Multirank). It remains to be seen how
successful these attempts will be. The rankings perform an
important function providing an easily accessible simple
metrics to interested parties. Their applicability, however,
masks the fact that they provide a very perfunctory picture of
the academic system, higher education institutions, and
individual researchers.
The wisdom of higher education scholars is that the rankings
are here to stay. Although there is a great demand for the
information function that the rankings perform, it does not
mean that the rankings will not lose their significance. One of
the most important trends here is a growing number and
diversification of rankings. Obviously, the three principal
ranking systems draw the most scholarly attention, but that
need not be so in the future.
The axes of significance/insignificance and
generality/sensitivity provide an interesting insight into the
potential developments of the ranking systems. Three major
scenarios of further development could be identified here.
The two polar scenarios are significant-general rankings
versus significant-sensitive rankings. In the first case, the
trends for marginalization, prioritization of STEM disciplines,
and separation of teaching and research will continue to
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intensify in the international academia. In the second case,
more sensitive measures would allow measuring universities
based on their mission, which would rectify the current skew.
The two scenarios in which the academic rankings lose their
significance lead to the same outcome: regression of the
academic system to the pre-ranking state, where reputation
played larger role than performance of higher education
institutions.
Whichever direction the further development of the ranking
systems will take, the trends that the rankings reinforced will
influence the system of higher education and knowledge
production well into the future. Larger investments into
STEM disciplines, prioritization of particular research culture,
promotion of research over teaching, preferences towards
mainstream research topics ought to leave a mark on the
academia. One mechanism through which the trends will
persist is the creation of critical mass of professors working in
disciplines and fields promoted by the logic of the rankings.
These professors will train the next generation of scholars,
who would be exposed to particular perspectives and
incentivized to follow particular types of research.
What should be expected under this system in short term is
growing consolidation of higher education and research
production centers, as well as entrenchment of the current
order of power in the academia. The rhetoric of rankings will
continue to reinforce the dominant position of the HEIs that
are already positioned in the rankings. The better their
position, the easier it is to continue occupy prominent
position in the rankings. A notable mechanism here is that the
more spotlight a HEI, department, or individual researcher
receives, the more references they receive thus feeding back
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into the system. The institutions that would like to break into
the global elite in this system would have to struggle against
considerable odds.
In the long term, multiple developments are possible. The
trend towards sidelining humanities and humanistic social
sciences may squeeze the fields altogether out of the academic
system. Although, this situation is hardly imaginable today,
humanities do not fit well with the market-oriented trend of
the international academia. They might either have to
redefine themselves in more applied terms or undergo further
marginalization. The insight into the situation could be
developed by adding to this trend the marginalization of
fringe research fields and qualitative research areas. The
higher education and knowledge production system is being
gradually reoriented towards creating research applicable to
the market.  In the worst case scenario academia might
become a research arm of the corporate system.
To sum up, academia currently undergoes systemic change
pervading every level. Academic rankings contribute to these
changes in important ways. The rankings create behavioral
incentives on policy, institutional, and individual levels that
push higher education system in particular directions. This
dissertation has shown how the incentives, which rankings
create on various levels, work together to push the system
into the same direction. The trends are easily discernible, but
their actual impact is far from being clear. The dissertation
opened many roads to follow. Perhaps, the future might even
see an emergence of a separate field of ranking studies.
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Appendix 1. The Surveys.
Graduate Students Survey.
1. In what area of economics do you do your research?
(Multiple areas can be specified)
Microeconomics
Macroeconomics
Econometrics
International Economics
Political Economy
Economic History
Heterodox (Institutional, evolutionary, Austrian, post-
Keynesian etc.)
Other (please specify)
2. When you chose your research topic, which of the
following factors mattered most?
Least Important—Most Important (1-10, Multiple Answers
Possible).
Personal Interest
Career and Employment Prospects
Suggestion of Tutor/Supervisor
Relevance/Popularity of the Topic
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Availability of Resources (Supervisor, Labs, Library etc.)
By Chance
Other (please specify)
3. Which factors do you think matter most to potential
recruitment committees of junior staff?
Least Important—Most Important (1-10, Multiple answers
possible).
Research productivity
Research topic quality
Research topic fit to the recruiting institution
Teaching Experience
Previous Education
Institutional Reputation (of your institution)
Prominent supervisor/s
Other (please specify)
4. Would you be willing to change/modify your research
topic if the alternative provided better opportunities to
secure employment?
Yes
More Yes than No
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Not Likely
No
5. If you were interested in a topic, but it would compromise
your employment prospects would you still be willing to
pursue the research?
No
Not Likely
More Yes than No
Yes
6. Do/did you have any interest in heterodox strands of
economics (Institutional, evolutionary, post-Keynesian,
Austrian, Sraffian, socialist, neuroeconomics, ecological
economics etc.)?
Yes
Somewhat
No
7. Would you be interested to pursue a research project in
heterodox economics?
Yes
Maybe
No
8. If you answered "No" to the previous question, why?
206
Not relevant to your research topic
Not familiar methodology
Lower chances of publishing/citations
Worse career prospects
Reputation of Heterodox economics
Lack of interest
Other (please specify)
Faculty Survey.
1. In what area of economics do you do your research?
Microeconomics
Macroeconomics
Econometrics
International Economics
Political Economy
Economic History
Heterodox (Institutional, evolutionary, Austrian, post-
Keynesian etc.)
Other (please specify)
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2. Which factors matter most in your choice of a candidate
for a junior faculty position?
Least Important—Most Important (1-10, Multiple Answers
Possible).
Research productivity
Research topic quality
Research topic fit to the recruiting institution
Teaching Experience
Previous Education
Institutional Reputation (of the candidate’s institution)
Prominent supervisor/s
Other (please specify)
3. Could you reasonably predict research productivity of a
candidate for a faculty position?
Yes
Rather Yes than No
Rather No than Yes
No
4. Would you be willing to hire a candidate working in non-
standard (i.e. heterodox) economics strands?
Yes
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Rather Yes than No
Not Likely
No
5. If you have answered "No" to the previous question, why?
Lower predicted research productivity
Unpredictable academic performance
Reputation of heterodox economics
Not fitting methodological paradigm
Other (please specify)
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Appendix 2. The Empirical Data.
Graduate Students Survey.
1. In what area of economics do you do your research? (%)
Sur. 1      Sur. 2    Sur. 3     Sur. 4     Sur. 5     Sur. 6      Sur. 7      Total
47/52         48/52   30/36 41/53 34/37 15/21 43/48 258
Micro 61.70 41.67 56.67 56.10 47.06 33.33 60.47 52.7
Macro 27.66 35.42 33.33 24.39 41.18 20 18.60 29.07
Econ. 23.40 10.42 16.67 17.07 11.76 20 18.60 16.66
Intern. 6.38 12.50 6.67 17.07 20.59 13.33 16.28 13.14
Pol.Ec. 10.64 8.33 3.33 7.32 20.59 26.67 11.63 11.21
Ec.Hist 0 4.17 3.33 4.88 11.76 13.33 0 3.67
Hdox 4.26 4.17 3.33 0 23.53 13.33 0 5.22
Other 23.40 27.08 26.66 39.02 17.64 53.33 30.23 29.00
47 48 30 41 34 15 43 258
Micro 61.70 41.67 56.67 56.10 47.06 33.33 60.47 52.71496
Macro 27.66 35.42 33.33 24.39 41.18 20 18.60 29.06973
Econ. 23.40 10.42 16.67 17.07 11.76 20 18.60 16.665
Intern. 6.38 12.50 6.67 17.07 20.59 13.33 16.28 13.17783
Pol.Ec. 10.64 8.33 3.33 7.32 20.59 26.67 11.63 11.24085
Ec.Hist 0 4.17 3.33 4.88 11.76 13.33 0 4.263295
Hdox 4.26 4.17 3.33 0 23.53 13.33 0 5.814922
Other 23.40 27.08 26.66 39.02 17.64 53.33 30.23 29.06535
2. When you chose your research topic, which of the following factors
mattered most? (10 point scale)
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51/52     54/54 35/36     53/53      37/37      20/21    46/48       296
51 54 35 53 37 20 46 296
Per.Inter 9.1 9.19 9.31 8.98 9.24 8.65 9.35 9.14
Prospects 6.24 6.26 6.29 6.33 6.41 6.05 6.57 6.32
Tutor 5.85 5.72 4.66 5.06 5.86 5.25 5.42 5.43
Relevance 7.10 6.06 5.67 5.98 5.73 5.79 7.04 6.27
Resource 6.06 5.79 5.50 5.45 5.49 5.53 5.69 5.67
Chance 3.89 3.22 3.19 4.38 3.11 4.05 3.50 3.62
Other 0
3. Which factors do you think matter most to potential recruitment
committees of junior staff? (10)
50/52     54/54 36/36      53/53 37/37     19/21    46/48          295
50 54 36 53 37 19 46 295
R.Prod 9.15 8.43 9.22 8.92 8.97 7.89 9.07 8.86922
RT
Qual.
8.61 8.87 8.53 8.25 8.38 8.44 9.07
8.615085
RT Fit 8.17 7.87 7.78 7.49 7.84 7.79 8.15 7.876339
Teach.
Ex
4.66 4.67 4.23 4.60 4.69 5 4.13
4.541593
Prev. Ed 5.55 5.50 5.40 4.73 5.08 5.72 4.82 5.21339
Inst.Rep 7.96 7.94 7.53 7.13 7.46 8.21 7.74 7.673831
Prom.
Sv.
7.56 8.09 7.42 6.85 7.30 7.95 7.20
7.448746
4. Would you be willing to change/modify your research topic if the
alternative provided better opportunities to secure employment? (%)
51/52     54/54 36/36      53/53 37/37 20/21 46/48         297
51 54 36 53 37 20 46 297
Yes 13.73 22.22 13.89 15.09 8.11 25 15.22 15.82529
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More
Yes
50.98 25.93 50 39.62 45.95 30 43.48
41.07842
Rather
No
25.49 44.44 36.11 39.62 35.14 45 34.78
36.69909
No 9.80 7.41 0 5.66 10.81 0 6.52 6.396667
5. If you were interested in a topic, but it would compromise your
employment prospects would you still be willing to pursue the research? (%)
51/52      54/54 36/36 53/53       37/37    20/21    46/48           297
51 54 36 53 37 20 46 297
No 5.88 5.56 8.33 3.77 8.11 10 2.17 5.722896
Rather
No
43.14 50 38.89 41.51 35.14 20 45.65
41.41512
Rather
Yes
39.22 37.04 44.44 47.17 37.84 65 39.13
42.42522
Yes 11.76 7.41 8.33 7.55 18.92 5 13.04 10.43707
6. Do/did you have any interest in heterodox strands of economics
(Institutional, evolutionary, post-Keynesian, Austrian, Sraffian, socialist,
neuroeconomics, ecological economics etc.)?
49/52    54/54    36/36     51/53     37/37 20/21    45/48 292
49 54 36 51 37 20 45 292
Yes 26.53 29.63 27.78 25.49 48.65 55 11.11 29.45226
Somewhat 22.45 29.63 30.56 31.37 16.22 15 40 27.74055
No 51.02 40.74 41.67 43.14 35.14 30 48.89 42.80969
7. Would you be interested to pursue a research project in heterodox
economics? (%)
50/52 54/54    36/36 51/53 37/37       20/21 45/48        293
50 54 36 51 37 20 45 293
Yes 22 20.37 13.89 25.49 40.54 40 15.56 23.89143
Maybe 28 29.63 33.33 31.37 24.32 35 35.56 30.71608
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No 50 50 52.78 43.14 35.14 25 48.89 45.39403
8. If you answered "No" to the previous question, why?
28/52   24/54     21/36 24/53      14/37     5/21 22/48       138
28 24 21 24 14 5 22 138
N.Rel.RT 50 54.17 76.19 45.83 85.71 60 59.09 59.41964
N.fam.M 35.71 29.17 42.86 45.83 14.29 60 40.91 36.95667
L. Pub 28.57 16.67 9.52 16.67 28.57 40 27.27 21.73884
W. Car. 25 20.83 14.29 16.67 35.71 0 27.27 21.73891
Rep HE 28.57 20.83 9.52 20.83 21.43 0 31.82 21.73754
Lack Int 57.14 66.67 52.38 70.83 78.57 80 59.09 63.7671
Faculty Survey (75 respondents)
Survey 1 Survey 2 Total
1. In what area of economics do you do your research? (%)
51/60 12/15 63
51 12 63
Micro 54.90 41.67 52.38
Macro 35.29 33.33 34.9166667
Econ. 19.61 25 20.6366667
Intern. 15.69 16.67 15.8766667
Pol.Ec. 9.80 16.67 11.1085714
Ec.Hist 3.92 8.33 4.76
Hdox 7.84 0 6.34666667
Other 21.56 25 22.2152381
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2. Which factors matter most in your choice of a candidate for a junior faculty
position?
59/60 15/15 74
59 15 74
R.Prod 8.89 9.20 8.952838
RT Qual. 8.93 9.27 8.998919
RT Fit 6.07 6.60 6.177432
Teach. Ex 3.21 3 3.167432
Prev. Ed 5.25 5.80 5.361486
Inst.Rep 5.35 7.07 5.698649
Prom. Sv. 4.40 6.33 4.791216
3. Could you reasonably predict research productivity of a candidate for a
faculty position?
59/60 15/15 74
59 15 74
Yes 10.17 13.33 10.81054
Rather Y 77.97 66.67 75.67946
Rather N 11.86 20 13.51
No 0 0 0
4. Would you be willing to hire a candidate working in non-standard (i.e.
heterodox) economics strands?
58/60 15/15 73
58 15 73
Yes 17.24 6.67 15.06808
Rather Y 13.79 33.33 17.80507
Rather N 62.07 53.33 60.27411
No 6.90 6.67 6.85274
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5. If you have answered "No" to the previous question, why?
33/60 8/15 41
33 8 41
Lower RP 39.39 87.50 48.77732
Unpred AP 45.45 50 46.3378
Rep.HE 24.24 37.50 26.82732
Meth.NF 21.21 37.50 24.38854
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Appendix 3. The List of Surveyed HEIs.
Washington University in St. Louis
University of Washington
London School of Economics and Political Science
Queen Mary, University of London
University of Minnesota
Michigan University
University of Wisconsin-Madison
University of California, Santa Barbara
University of California, Riverside
New York University
The New School
University of Colorado-Boulder
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
University of California, Los Angeles,
Michigan State University
Princeton University
University of California, San Diego
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University of Toronto
Central European University
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca
Hebrew University
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
National University Singapore
Hong Kong University
Australian National University,
University of Sussex,
University of Pennsylvania,
European University Institute,
Pompeu Fabra University
University of Toulouse
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